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Thesis 
 
Abstract 
 
 This thesis is an empirical investigation of three related capital structure dynamics of 
US-based multinationals and their domestic counterparts. Specifically, the thesis 
examined whether there are differences in capital structure adjustment speed between 
US-based Multinationals (hereafter, MNCs) and Domestic Corporations (hereafter, 
DCs), and if so, what theoretical factors contribute to the differences. At an industry 
level, the thesis examine whether or not industries of US-based Multinationals (MNCs) 
and their domestic counterparts (DCs) have different speed of capital structure 
adjustment toward the target level, particularly the manufacturing industry. And at the 
macro level, the thesis estimates the effect of macroeconomic factors (commercial paper 
spread, growth in aggregate capital expenditure of nonfinancial firms, and consumer 
price index (CPI)), and macroeconomic conditions defined by GDP, default spread, 
unemployment and price-output ratio on capital structure dynamics of US-based MNCs 
relative to DCs. Various econometric techniques were employed in the thesis to test the 
hypothesis that capital structure dynamics of US-based MNCs differ from DCs.  
 Using fixed effect instrumental variables (FEIV), the empirical results shows that on 
average, DCs adjust to target leverage faster than MNCs. Similarly, the results support 
existences of capital structure differences among industries for MNCs and DCs.  
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1. BACKGROUND REVIEW OF CAPITAL STRUCTURE RESEARCH 
 
In the past five decades, the capital structure literature has covered a wide range of 
firm efficiency behaviour including value creation and determinants of observed 
capital structure. Managers, invariably make financing decisions in order to expand 
operations, capitalize on investment opportunities, or to maintain a certain level of 
cash reserves. The choice of financing (i.e. Debt or Equity), the determinants of 
financing choices and their economic implications for market participants are the 
central focus of the capital structure literature. The debate on the relevance of capital 
structure started with the landmark paper by Modigliani and Miller (1958) in which 
the authors analyse the relevance of the proportion of debt and equity in regards to 
value maximization. Under sets of rather rigid assumptions such as “no arbitrage” and 
“perfect capital markets”, Modigliani and Miller (1958) made two propositions. First, 
they argued that, how firms’ finance their investments is irrelevant to firm value 
because investors can directly in the capital markets, replicate or counter any 
financing choices made by financial managers, as long as the capital markets are 
perfect with unlimited borrowing and lending at an equal interest rate. Second, the 
overall costs of capital (i.e. combined cost of debt and equity) will remain unaffected 
regardless of the proportion of debt to equity, because a reduction in the cost of one 
component of capital will be offset by an increase in the costs of the other. Following 
Modigliani and Miller (1958), researchers have explored and relaxed the assumptions 
in Modigliani and Miller (1958), and have developed capital structure theories and 
empirical methods to underscore the economic and financial implications of capital 
structure. However, despite the significant contributions to the literature over the 
years, there is no consensus on many critical issues, such as the determinants of 
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financing choices. In addition, the predictions of the underlying theories of financing 
choices and their representative variables sometimes give conflicting empirical 
results, especially when a single theory is exclusively applied in a study. The causes 
of dissension among researchers may be viewed from at least two perspectives; first, 
many researchers have investigated capital structure dynamics from a single theory 
perspective, favouring one theory over the other. But, to date, capital structure 
theories, individually, have not provide a compelling results in explaining the 
observed cross-sectional differences in financing choices among firms’, Second, the 
determinants of financing choices underlying a particular theory are dynamic 
variables and cannot be confined to a single theory. However, recently, the literature 
is increasingly moving towards an integrated specification, incorporating major 
theories and their respective determinants of financing choice in a single analytical 
model. Effectively, the integrated approach represents the inherent interdependence of 
capital structure theories and their respective determinants of financing choices. 
Specifically, prior literature hypothesized on issues including, the effect of financing 
choices on firm value (Modigliani and Miller, 1958; Miller, 1963), how firms finance 
their investments (Myers, 1984; Graham and Harvey, 2001), are financing decisions a 
product of intricate agency issues and cost-benefit tradeoffs (Stiglitz, 1972; Kraus & 
Lichtenberger,1973; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Myers, 1984;; Frank and 
Goyal,2005), the effect of managerial overconfidence on capital structure (Ben-David 
et al.,2007; Malmendier et al.,2007), the leverage differential between US based  
multinational firms and their domestic counterparts (Lee and  Kwok, 1988; Burgman, 
1996; Doukas and Pantzalis, 2003), the effect of industry on leverage (Boquist and 
Moore, 1984; Almazan et al., 2002; Miao, 2005), the effect of macroeconomic 
conditions on capital structure (Levy and Hennessy 2007; Cook and Tang, 2010), and 
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a wide range of capital structure adjustment literature (Flannery and Rangan, 2006; 
Drobetz, and Wanzenried, 2006; Lemmon,  Roberts, and Zender, 2008; Baker and 
Wurgler. 2002). These and many other important questions are the subject of a 
continuous discourse in the capital structure literature. 
 
Although not exhaustive, Figure 1 Summarizes key moments and the trajectory of 
capital structure research. 
Figure 1. Summarized timeline of landmark moments in capital structure research 
 
1958 Modigliani & Miller (1958) – Irrelevance theory. -This theory is 
predicated on very strict assumption of no arbitrage environment 
(perfect capital markets) without frictions. 
1963 Modigliani & Miller (1963) – Corporate tax introduced- debt tax shield 
- Preferring debt to equity. Why aren’t firms fully capitalizing on debt 
tax shield?. 
1972   Stiglitz (1972) – Introduces bankruptcy costs 
1973 Kraus & Lichtenberger (1973) – reinforces bankruptcy costs. -
Bankruptcy costs provide a counter argument against all-debt-
financing as implied by Modigliani & Miller (1963). Cost of financial 
distress should be weigh against the benefit of debt tax shield. As 
firms’ debt level rises, marginal cost of debt rises as well. And failure 
to meet interest payment obligations may lead to involuntary 
bankruptcy. 
1976 Jensen & Meckling (1976) – Introduces a type of agency cost (Asset 
Substitution). 
1977   Myers (1977) – Introduces a type of agency cost (Under-Investment) 
Miller (1977) – Introduces personal taxes – depending on the tax 
bracket of investors, corporate debt tax shield may be offset by higher 
taxes paid in dividends by investors. Benefit of corporate debt tax 
shield may not be relevant if the firm dividend pay-out ratio is high to 
investors in a high tax bracket. 
1980 DeAngelo & Masulis (1980) – Introduces non-debt-tax-shield (NDTS) 
- Debt tax shield is less relevant for firms with high non-debt tax 
benefits such as depreciation, amortization and goodwill impairments. 
1984   Titman (1984) – Reintroduces bankruptcy costs 
   Myers (1984) – Information Asymmetry – leads to Pecking Order 
2002                           Baker & Wurgler (2002) - Market timing hypotheses 
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Subsequent to Modigliani and Miller (1958), two prominent capital structure theories 
emerged. First, the static-tradeoff theory, implied in Modigliani-Miller (1963) and 
Kraus-Lichtenberger (1973) respectively, highlighted the trade-off between debt-tax 
shield and cost of financial distress.
1
 But this theory also cannot explain the financing 
pattern observed across firms, mainly due to its lack of flexibility in regards to firm-
specific characteristics and the prevailing capital market conditions. The underlying 
notion of static-tradeoff theory is incompatible with both the internal and external 
economic environment. It suggests constant optimal leverage. Under this theory, any 
exogenous shock to the capital structure equilibrium is immediately corrected. 
Introducing agency problems, adjustment costs and allowing for interaction between 
firm specific characteristics and financing decisions leads to the dynamic version of 
tradeoff theory.   
                                                             
1
 Modigliani and Miller (1963) serve both as a response and 
reassessment of their earlier (Modigliani and Miller1958) 
irrelevance theorem under the assumption of perfect capital markets, 
which suggest that capital structure of firms  should not exhibit 
any systematic patterns of within-group homogeneity and between-
group heterogeneity. In their 1963 paper, they showed that, by 
relaxing tax-free assumption, debt was the preferred source of 
financing for firms. They argued that unlike dividends, firms can 
deduct interest expenditure and lower tax liability (this is the 
debt-tax shield variable underlying the trade-off theory). 
Apparently, the 1963 paper was a step forward, but it suffers from 
serious empirical contradictions. If firms are positioned to benefit 
from interest deductibility, why are firms not issuing 100% debt? Or 
yet, why do we observe low level of debt? Modigliani and Miller 
(1963) were silent on those questions. Nevertheless, Kraus and 
Lichtenberger (1973) addressed the above questions with the 
bankruptcy argument, stating that the likelihood of financial 
distress increases as firm debt level increases, and this, 
accordingly prevents firms from maintaining 100% debt level. Hence, 
the emergence of trade-off between cost and benefits associated with 
debt. That is, in reality, debt capacity is finite, a condition that 
reflects the view that distress costs and/or informational gap problems 
prevent debt holders from gauging precisely the firm’s ability to service 
their debt.  
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This improved version of tradeoff theory allows for temporary deviations from the 
target (optimal) leverage, and thus implies a gradual readjustment process, which is 
also a dynamic function of various factors. In a dynamic tradeoff framework, firms at 
any given time are not necessarily at the optimal leverage level, but rather in a state of 
dynamic readjustment. Hence, competing theories argued against target leverage, any 
empirical evidence of capital structure readjustment is a differentiator among capital 
structure theories.
2
 A related issue has been the proper identification of specific firm 
characteristics and other factors that are economically relevant for empirical 
modelling of leverage and readjustment. 
On the other side of the theoretical divide, are the proponents of pecking order theory. 
As the name implied, this theory suggest that capital structure determination follows 
specific sequence of managerial activism in financing decision making. The theory 
postulates that managers will finance investment projects, starting with the least 
(lowest cost of capital) to the most expensive (highest cost of capital) financing 
channels. That is, managers will first utilized internal capital (i.e. cash and cash 
equivalents), and then, any shortfall in financing investments (financial deficit), will 
be funded by debt and equity in that order. Some researchers suggest similar pecking 
order mechanism within debt financing; by using the cheapest form of debt first, to 
the most expensive. However, the implied rigidity in this sequential financing could 
                                                             
2
 Dynamic trade-off is a major leap in the capital structure literature. It 
has many desirable features; however, it has not been able to explain many 
other capital structure related questions. Nevertheless, optimum capital 
structure appears to be of great interest to academics, practioners, and 
investors alike. It is reasonable not to expect a single theory to explain 
all circumstances related to a panel of firms’ capital structure, hence no 
two firms are exactly identical. Equally, individual firm’s capital 
structure are impacted not only by the financial market conditions, but 
also through various  firm-specific characteristics including 
profitability, non-debt tax shields, and growth options (Myers-1977). 
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not be congruent with the dynamic interaction between investment opportunities, 
strength of firms balance sheets (i.e. availability of cash), and capital market 
conditions. To theoretically and empirically address this issue, some researchers 
suggest a dynamic version of pecking order.  The dynamic version of pecking order 
theory allows for delicate interaction among specific-firm characteristics and financial 
market conditions. Thus, we may temporarily observe a disorderly sequence in 
financing choices. Discussed in later sections, this version of pecking order has 
important implications for the dynamic trade off theory and readjustment process. 
Though, the aforementioned theories dominated capital structure literature, they are 
for the most part unable to explain the motives of financing choices (debt vs. Equity), 
and most often provides conflicting theoretical and empirical interpretations. On the 
other hand, empirically, these theories have provided valuable insights concerning the 
determinants and dynamics of capital structure of firms
3
, especially in the area of 
identification of firm-specific factors affecting leverage
4
. Even though, currently 
available theoretical and empirical evidences are mixed and deficient in explaining 
managerial motives of financing choices, prior findings, nevertheless, has revealed 
and attracted considerable attention to certain important elements of capital structure 
determination and readjustment process. 
                                                             
3 Generally, organizations are viewed as a complex nexus of contracts with 
inherent conflict of interest, thus any theory; plausible it maybe, suffers 
from limitations, which de-monopolize any theoretical-hypothetical 
construct. Thus, in practicum, there is no reason to expect a single theory 
to encompass capital structure variations among firms over time and space. 
4
 Harris and Raviv (1991), Rajan and Zingales (1995), and Frank & Goyal 
(2007) have empirically extended the capital structure literature with 
firm-specific variables, although the interpretation of the evidence are 
sometimes mixed, making it difficult to differentiate competing capital 
structure theories. 
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Besides the mainstream theories (trade-off and pecking order), market-timing 
hypothesis (Baker and Wurgler 2002), has gained considerable momentum in capital 
structure literature. This theory suggests that capital structure at any point in time 
(snapshot view) is largely determined by cumulative outcome of past net external 
financing activity, as a result of market-timing. Suggesting that, managers issue equity 
securities when the market is favourable (i.e. higher stock valuation) and repurchase 
when the stock prices are unfavourable (i.e. lower stock valuation). The intuition 
behind this theory is very compelling; however, it implicitly assumed, absence of 
optimization strategy, and thus concurrently assumed inactive readjustment 
mechanisms following a shock to the stock price. Another major assumption with the 
market-timing hypotheses is that, it implied, inefficiency in the capital market, 
pointing to information asymmetry problem. Within market-timing framework, Welch 
(2004), investigated the effect of stock returns on market leverage of a sample of 
publicly traded U.S firms, and found that stock returns are relatively the single most 
important determinant of capital structure, and has implicitly rejected both traditional 
capital structure theories (trade-off and pecking order). Apparently, a pattern that 
appeared to have emerged from capital structure literature besides the main theories 
and few outliers, is more like a group of consensus builders. In a large middle, 
researchers, who are intensely focused on factor-based models of leverage, tend to 
either prove or disprove a particular theory.
5
 In this effort, specific variables are 
conditioned on sample of firms and periods in order to determine leverage. 
Consequently, the literature seems to be divided into theoretical camps. This 
                                                             
5
 Welch (2007) has described the state of capital structure research in an 
economically worded manner. He separates the current affairs of capital 
structure literature into two camps; in one camp, researchers investigate 
how firms arrived at the observed debt ratio and in the other camp, 
researchers seek to answer why firms arrived at such an observed debt 
level. 
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inevitably leads to an incessant search for factor-relevancy, which is not limited to 
firm-specific factors. External factors are also increasingly employed in leverage 
models, to capture the important interactions among firm-specifics and external forces 
(i.e. macroeconomic and international market conditions). Recognition of these 
interactions, an element of which is beyond management’s control is crucial, 
especially, in appraising fiduciary responsibility of management, as it relates to 
maximization of shareholder wealth through capital structure. For instance, managers’ 
choice of financing at a particular juncture may be largely influenced by the overall 
macroeconomic conditions. Ultimately, the level and success of financing choice of 
managers is a culmination of external factors and firms’ idiosyncratic characteristics.  
In conclusion to the background introduction, it is necessary to re-emphasize the 
point, that over the past fifty years, we have learned quite a lot about how capital 
structure dynamics varies across firms and industries, but there are still many 
unanswered questions, which are specifically related to managers’ motivation for a 
particular choice of financing (debt vs. equity).
 
 
 
1.1   Capital structure  
While financial structure encompasses the entire right hand side of the balance sheet, 
capital structure is generally concerned with the sources of long-term financing (i.e. 
debt and equity) of the firms’ long-term capital investments. With no coincidence, the 
widely used weighted average cost of capital (WACC) reflects exclusively the capital 
structure dynamics in various valuation processes of the firm
6
. From an economic 
perspective, capital structure effectively represents the economic interests of market 
                                                             
6 Especially in the capital budgeting process and overall firm valuation.  
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participants in the firm
7
. How this economic interest is preserved and maximized is a 
central focus of capital structure management. From the financial perspective, capital 
structure represents an implied payoff scheme for the debt holders in the form of 
uninterrupted debt servicing, and to the equity holders in the form of value 
maximization through the equity market and dividend payments from cash flows 
generated through profitable investments. Jointly, the two perspectives lead to an 
inherent conflict of interest in capital structure management in regards to debt holders, 
equity holders and management. Very few firms are immune from this type of 
conflict. The other possible perspective to capital structure is related to the equation of 
capital structure, whether certain balance sheet items are substantially considered debt 
or equity, but this has not change the underlying economic and financial implications 
of capital structure. Thus, capital structure is effectively a proportion of debt and 
equity employed by the firm to finance its investments. However, this proportionality 
of debt and equity is readily observable from firms’ financial statements. Thus, the 
determinants of the observed capital structure are the real concern to researchers. In 
other words, why do firms arrive at the observed mix of debt and equity, why there 
exists heterogeneous capital structures among firms, and importantly, what are the 
underlying dynamics of the fluctuations observed in firms’ capital structure?  
 
1.2 Why is capital structure important? 
The economic and financial implications of capital structure directly affect individual 
investors, organizations and governments. The dynamics of risk-return allocation in a 
                                                             
7 Market participants restrictively include debt and equity holders, but 
generally, it involves the government (i.e. from the tax perspective), 
employees, management and the delicate interaction among the participants. 
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market-based economic system creates an indispensable need for economic agents to 
be sophisticated and be acutely aware of ways in which they may minimize their risk 
exposure and maximize their expected returns. Hence capital structure represents 
financial claims of various stakeholders on the firms’ capital assets, the structure of 
such financial claims and the value of the underlying capital assets have profound 
economic implications for both management and the stakeholders, because the 
ultimate expected payoff scheme for the stakeholders depends on the performance of 
capital assets and on how conflict between various claimants are managed through the 
structure of financial claims and other externalities such as the imperfect capital 
market forces. As Michael Milken stated, “It doesn’t matter whether a company is big 
or small, capital structure matters. It always has and always will” (Michael Milken, 
WSJ April, 21, 2009). The relevance of capital structure for individual constituents of 
a firm may be well understood in the context of a risk-return trade-off. For example, 
to debt investors, the contractual agreement regarding the timing of expected cash 
flows (i.e. interest and principal payments) is considered in conjunction with the 
overall financial viability of the firm. The risk exposure for debt investors includes 
both operational and financial risk of the firm in fulfilling the stipulations of the 
contract
8
. It is not uncommon for debt investors to include specific restrictions in the 
debt covenant to protect their investment
9
.  
                                                             
8 Debt investors may be affected by capital structure in several ways. For 
example, the value of existing debt is affected by marginal debt, due to 
the dilution of the underlying collateral for each additional dollar of 
debt. Similarly, management on behalf of equity holders may under-utilize 
funds generated in the debt market or engage in asset substitution. These 
possibilities could have direct impact on the expected cash flows due to 
debt holders.  
9 Certain contractual restrictions may present difficulties for management.  
12 
 
However, such restrictions tend to infringe on the interest of other investor 
constituents of the firm, thus introducing a potential for a certain type of conflict of 
interest. For, equity investors, the risk may be relatively skewed to the right, but the 
expected returns can be infinite (i.e. theoretically) in the equity market. Hence capital 
structure may present risk of bankruptcy as well as a promise of debt tax shield, the 
return to equity investors may increase with marginal debt tax shield in the form of 
higher earnings per share, which is generally priced into the market value of equity. 
However, in the case of bankruptcy, equity investors may forfeit all their investment. 
Thus, a well-balanced capital structure which promises maximum debt tax shield and 
minimum chances of bankruptcy is particularly essential for equity investors
10
. At the 
macro-level, governments may be affected by capital structure as well, through taxes 
paid by firms and through social welfare payments in the case of  
bankruptcy
11
.  
                                                             
10 Weighing benefits and costs of debt financing is central to the expected 
payoff to equity holders (true owners of the firm). Although, debt may 
lower tax liabilities, it may also threaten the survival of the firm. Over-
leverage increases risk, and may affect equity value. Similarly, under-
leverage, implies under-exploitation of debt tax shield, and therefore 
reduces equity value. 
11 One of the key macro-economic indicators for most economies is 
employment. In developed countries, over half of all employment is 
generated by the private sector.  Undisciplined capital structure 
management may lead to bankruptcy through overleverage (risk) or loss in 
value, causing massive job loss or total collapse of the entire firm. In 
the case of complete liquidation, former employees may need unemployment 
insurance payment. When such events are replicated throughout the economy, 
it affects not just employment, but the economy as a whole. Importantly, 
most government retirement programs such as 401K program in the United 
States are invested in the private sector (i.e. mainly with investment-
grade companies), however, the quantity and quality of debt owed by firms 
are an important input in the investment-grading mechanism.  
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When domestic US firms expand their operations to foreign countries, the 
implications of capital structure may become far reaching
12
.  
1.3 Implication of capital structure adjustment for capital structure theories 
 
The distinctive feature of trade-off theory of capital structure is the underlying notion 
of target capital structure, and the subsequent adjustment process in the event of a 
shock to capital structure.  This concept differentiates the simple trade-off theory from 
other capital structure theories such as pecking order and market-timing. Preceding 
the emergence of dynamic capital structure theories, capital structure adjustment 
process is exclusive to the simple trade-off theory, suggesting that financial managers, 
set a target capital structure in the process of weighing the trade-off between the 
benefits and costs of debt (Modigliani & Miller, 1963; Stiglitz, 1972; Kraus & 
Lichtenberger, 1973). The simple pecking order theory, predicated on relative costs of 
capital, suggests a systematic relative cost of financing scheme, starting with internal 
capital (i.e. retained earnings or cash flows) to debt and then equity in that order 
(Myers, 1984). In such financing scheme, managers do not set target leverage. That is, 
leverage is set and determined by financial deficit. Equivalently, debt is issued only 
when internal capital is not sufficient, and equity is issued when the sum of internal 
capital and debt is insufficient to finance capital investment. Similarly, under market-
                                                             
12 For example, foreign direct investment in a form of subsidiaries provides 
employment for local workforce, thus capital structure related bankruptcy 
or value destruction may cause job losses, which may pose a potential 
problem for the foreign government. Also, foreign direct investment may 
undermine the monetary and fiscal policy stability of a foreign government 
such as massive withdrawal of capital, and loss of tax revenue related to 
capital structure. For investors, internationalization of capital structure 
may translate into higher agency cost and other monitoring activities.  
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timing theory, capital structure is determined by accumulated effect of past equity 
price, suggesting capital structure inertia with no specific long term capital structure 
target (Baker & Wurgler, 2002). Hence, the simple trade-off theory implies an 
instantenous adjustment to target, the predictions of the theory has subsequently 
diverged with the observe capital structure. This dilemma has subsequently inspired a 
more dynamic capital structure theory (dynamic trade-off theory) that allows for 
temporary deviation from target leverage. Most importantly, the dynamic trade-off 
theory is not mutually exclusive from other capital structure theories (i.e. pecking 
order and market timing theories) in the dynamic capital structure adjustment process. 
In other words, a dynamic capital structure adjustment is a process which integrates 
firm-specific characteristics and capital market conditions
13
.  
2. Leverage and Adjustment Speed  
This section discusses the debate on variations of leverage definitions and the 
divergence on the estimation of capital structure adjustment speed. The model used to 
define leverage may have an impact on both leverage determination and capital 
structure adjustment speed.      
2.1   Discussion of  leverage definition 
Leverage as an explained variable, in capital structure literature purposefully varies 
among researchers. And some of the conflicting results are due to this variation and 
the inherent measurement error in the nature of this variable. Prior researches have 
used the following variations of leverage measure.  
                                                             
13 In an imperfect capital markets, firms may not be able to instantaneously 
adjust to target leverage, or to strictly follow the pecking order of 
financing. The firm-specific characteristics are those variables suggested 
by capital structure theories. 
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1. TD/TA = Total Debt to Total Assets 
2. LTD/ (LTD+BVE) = Long-Term Debt to sum of Long-Term Debt and BV of 
Equity 
3. LTD/TA = Long-Term Debt to Total asset 
4. LTD/ (LTD+MVE) = Long-Term Debt to the sum of Long-term Debt and MV of 
Equity. 
The first three leverage measures, although widely used in the literature are 
technically flawed. The first measure failed to properly segregate the relevant long 
term debt from short term debt, and the use of total assets is exposed to accounting 
manipulation. The second measure adequately uses the long term debt, but the book 
value measure is exposed to an accounting adjustment of equity section (i.e. the 
equilibrium of the balance sheet is maintained by plugging the equity section on right 
hand side of the balance sheet). The third measure of leverage suffers similar fate as 
the first equation in the denominator, but is widely referred to as book leverage and is 
often used in prior literature to compare with market leverage. The only measure of 
leverage consistent with the derivation of weighted average cost of capital (WACC) is 
the ratio of long-term debt to the sum of long-term debt and market value of equity. 
This measure unlike others has also satisfied the converse test of leverage. Use of 
long term debt is consistent with firms’ long term investment objective, and the 
market value of equity is consistent with the underlying assumptions of capital 
structure theories. 
 
2.2. Debate on capital structure adjustment 
Why do firms attempt to rebalance their capital structure? This is perhaps one of the 
most important issue in capital structure research today. If firms adjust quickly toward 
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their target leverage, which changes across time as firm characteristics and market 
conditions change, then historical shocks of firm-specifics and market conditions 
(exogenous factors) will have only short-lived effects on firms’ current capital 
structures, imposing major implications on traditional capital structure theories such 
as the trade-off theory. In fact, the key factor to differentiate between competing 
capital structure theories is whether firms gravitate toward a specific leverage target, 
following shocks to their capital structure. The trade-off theory suggest that firms 
continuously attempted to maintain an “optimal” debt ratio, whilst market-timing and 
pecking order  theories suggest that there is no target level of leverage. Underlying the 
notion, of adjustment to the long-run target leverage is the optimal balancing of debt 
tax shield, transaction costs, financial distress costs, and opportunity costs of current 
leverage relative to future borrowing. That is, firms’ may choose to take a long 
excursion away from the target leverage, only to subsequently adjust back to target 
leverage through timing of earnings and growth opportunities. In a perfect world of 
Modigliani and Miller (1958), where there exists no transaction and adjustment cost, 
all firms will be at the optimum leverage. Under such ideal conditions, the observed 
leverage of firm i at time t, should not be different from the optimal leverage, there 
will be a complete and continuous convergence of observed leverage and optimal 
leverage. In a perfect setting, this implies that the change in actual leverage from the 
previous to current period should be exactly equal to the change required for the firm 
to be at optimum leverage at time t. However, if adjustments and transactions are 
costly, then firms may not find it optimal to adjust fully, or they would only adjust 
partially. Since we will never be at a perfect world devoid of transaction and 
adjustment costs, firms will rarely be at the optimal target leverage. The speed at 
which firms’ adjust depends on many factors inclusive of transaction and other 
17 
 
adjustment costs. The existing literature has provided mixed results on the speed of 
adjustment toward target financial leverage. Leary and Roberts (2005) show that the 
presence of adjustment costs produces a clustering of leverage rebalancing and Fama 
and French (2002) suggest that firms move quite slowly towards their target leverage. 
The other side of readjustment argument is the speed at which firms readjust. Fama 
and French (2002) estimate a speed of adjustment of 7-18% per year. Lemmon, 
Roberts, and Zender (2008) find that capital structure is so persistent that the cross-
sectional distribution of leverage in the year prior to the IPO, predicts leverage twenty 
years later, yet they estimate a relatively rapid speed of adjustment of 25% per year 
for book leverage. Flannery and Rangan (2006) estimate an even faster speed of 
adjustment: 35.5% per year using market leverage and 34.2% per year using book 
leverage, suggesting that it takes about 1.6 years for a firm to remove half of the effect 
of a shock on its leverage. Both Leary and Roberts (2005) and Alti (2006) find that 
the effect of equity issuance on leverage completely vanishes within two to four years, 
suggesting fast adjustment toward target leverage. As Frank and Goyal (2008) state in 
their survey article: “Corporate leverage is mean reverting. The speed at which it 
happens is not a settled issue.”The differences in the speed of adjustment may lie in 
the use of different econometric techniques, and different data over different sample 
periods. Thus aim of this research is not about reconciling the different prior findings, 
but rather to identify the influence of specific variables on the speed of capital 
structure adjustment.  
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  3. Discussion of capital structure theories 
3.1. Trade-off theory and agency view of capital structure 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) - The pioneers of capital structure research.           
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After MM (1958), capital structure has evolved quite extensively, and  below are some   
selected theories/new claims that have  emerged over the years: 
  
  
 
1. trade-off theory /agency theories- primarily dealing with 
taxes 
   
 
optimal capital structure/target  structure 
2. Pecking order theory - primarily dealing with information asymmetry No well defined target structure   
3. Free cash flow theory - Dealing with agency cost of debt & information Gap optimal capital structure/target  structure 
4. market timing - fairly new - non-optimal stance  
   
 
indifference/inertia/historical importance 
5. stock returns effect - fairly new - non-optimal stance 
  
indifference/inertia/historical importance 
  
         
  
In responding to some of the criticisms of Modigliani and Miller (1958) seminal paper, Merton Miller (1989) stated that,” Showing what 
doesn't matter can also show, by implication, what does."   
        
  
                        
 
For simple exposition, the table above highlights the emergence of capital structure 
literature and its subsequent mutation into other popular theories. It illustrates the two 
propositions of Modigliani and Miller (1958). Proposition I stated that the market 
value of any firm is independent of its capital structure. Equivalently, it stated that 
firms in a similar risk class will have similar average cost of capital (WACC) 
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regardless of the proportion of debt to equity (i.e. rate corresponding to label B in the 
above table). And when proposition I is held, the cost of equity capital (i.e. rate 
corresponding to label A in the above table) becomes a linear increasing function of 
the debt to equity ratio (Proposition II). That means, when managers raise cheaper 
debt capital, the gain in terms of lower cost of debt will be offset by the 
correspondingly higher cost of riskier equity capital
14
. In the table, changing the 
proportionality of debt to equity yields the same average cost of capital (WACC), but 
the cost of equity will change as you increase debt to equity ratio. It must be noted 
that, the underlying assumption in Miller and Modigliani (1958) framework is based 
on a frictionless environment with no taxes and no informational gap. However, 
patterns, such as industry-specific leverage ratios are reasonably observable in the 
market, which implies that capital market imperfections do exist, and thus validated 
the relevancy of capital structure. 
Over the years, since Miller and Modigliani (1958, 1963), almost all assumptions of 
frictionless environment were relaxed, subsequently given rise to theories such as 
trade-off and pecking order. In the table, relaxing the tax assumption yield lower 
average cost of capital (i.e. rate corresponding to label C). In effect, managers are 
actively trading off the costs of potential financial distress with tax benefits. However, 
it must be noted that, tax-centred explanations for capital structure patterns are not 
sufficient, for two primarily reasons. First, taxes are set exogenously by governments. 
Second, companies within the same industry or national boundaries tend to fall under 
the same tax bracket; thus tax rates will not fully explain the observed heterogeneity 
in capital structure (Graham 2003). Without complicating the matter, the above 
                                                             
14
 As cheap debt financing rises, new equity becomes expensive. This 
offsetting effect is the underlying logic of MM propositions. 
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exposition is the main underlying intuition of the trade-off theory, and for decades, 
researchers have endeavoured to identify potential cost-benefit trade off in explaining 
capital structure dynamics. 
In a purely static trade-off theory, which rarely exist, implied that a firm always 
maintain an optimal debt ratio (Myers-1984). The implication of this strict form of 
trade-off theory is that it holds all other firm characteristics constant except the costs 
and benefits of leverage (i.e. the trade-off).  
Thus, a more practically realistic form is the dynamic trade-off theory which although 
maintains a target leverage, allows for a period of deviation from the target and allows 
other firm specific factors to determine the adjustment process. Due to the cost 
involved in adjustment process, the dynamic trade-off theory implied, that the observe 
leverage is not optimal; however firms do gradually adjust to the target (optimal) 
level. This dynamic form of trade-off theory has in itself, sparked contentious stream 
of research in an attempt to determine cross-sectional variations in the speed of 
readjustment to target level.  
An important element to note within the trade-off framework, is how researchers with 
agency perspective, tries to explain debt financing. This goes beyond the simplistic 
underlying theoretical construct of trade-off theory. For example, Jensen and 
Meckling ( 1976); Jensen (1986); Hart and Moore (1994) argued that debt can be 
utilized as disciplinary tool to reduce the free cash flow problem, on the other hand 
Myers (1977) posited that debt may mitigate shareholder-manager conflict but may 
wind-up exacerbating shareholder-debt holder conflicts.  
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Another important area where caution is required is the theoretical predictions of 
trade-off theory or any theory. In another words, predictions of most theories 
including the trade-off theory largely depend on specific variables, holding all others 
constant. For instance, higher tax rates, increases the benefit of interest tax shield, 
therefore predicting higher debt level. DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) suggest that firm 
specific factors such as net operating loss carry forwards, depreciation expenses and 
investment tax credits are appropriate as a proxy for interest tax shield. The cue here 
is that, interest tax shield is not sufficient to explain cross-sectional variations of 
leverage. The tax benefits of debt financing may not be significant in the presence of 
high intangibles or other non-cash deductibles. Relating the argument to US 
multinational (MNCs), prior research found that MNCs tend to benefit largely from 
their massive intangibles, and other non-debt tax shields, mostly through M&A 
activities (DeAngelo & Masulis, 1980). The higher the non-debt tax shields, the lower 
the benefit of interest tax shields. Furthermore, in a semi-efficient market, debt 
investors may come to understand that the objectives of debt financing is not about 
optimizing capital structure, instead, is about transferring wealth from debt holders to 
equity holders
15
. Of course, before making any serious conjecture about the motives 
of management, debt holders must first examine the cash position of the firm and 
investment opportunities available to the firm. The latter is not easily identifiable due 
                                                             
15 This argument is effectively linked to both information asymmetry and 
agency view. That is, manager’s motivation for debt issuance may not be for 
increasing firm value, because there is enough savings from non-debt tax 
shields the firm can pass onto equity investors. Thus, any attempt to issue 
debt may be seen by debt investors as wealth transfer scheme. However, this 
view doesn’t take cash availability and growth opportunities into account – 
that is, the majority of non-debt tax shield comes from depreciation of 
tangible assets, and cash is needed to acquire those assets. If cash is not 
available, financing will become necessary. The pecking order section below 
has attempted to address this issue. 
22 
 
to informational gap.  Hence debt tax shield is positively related to leverage, non-debt 
tax shield (NDTS) is expected to be negatively related to leverage. The latter are non-
cash transactions which nevertheless, shield income from taxation. Thus, the higher 
non-debt tax shields (NTDS), the lesser the firm is motivated by tax advantages of 
debt. This makes sense at least on two fronts. First, firms with other tax shields, such 
as depreciation, amortization or impairment deductions, will have less need to exploit 
the debt tax shield. Ross (1985) argues that if a firm in this position issues excessive 
debt, it may become "tax-exhausted" in the sense that it is unable to use all its 
potential tax shields. In other words, the incentive to use debt financing diminishes as 
non-debt tax shields increases. Accordingly, in the framework of the trade-off theory, 
a negative relationship between leverage and non-debt tax shields is expected. 
Second, since there are no explicit cash outflows or probability for bankruptcy 
attached to non-debt tax shields, managers are expected to exploit non-debt tax 
shields and thus maximize shareholder value.  The above argument is relevant for 
MNCs due to the relative size of both their tangible and intangible assets. Therefore, 
the significance of this variable (NDTS) is expected to be more pronounced for 
MNCs. However, as with most variables used in capital structure literature, the 
empirical evidences of non-debt tax shield on leverage are mixed and the directional 
impact is not always consistent.  
 
Agency view: 
The research in this area was initiated by Jensen and Meckling (1976), but it was built 
on an earlier study by Fama and Miller (1972). Conflict between shareholders and 
managers and between debt holders and equity holders are the two types of conflicts 
identified by Jensen and Meckling (1976). The conflict between managers and 
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shareholders can best be understood in terms of ownership structure. That is managers 
rarely own hundred percent of firms resources, however, they bear the cost of 
managing the resources on a continuum. Such ownership reality presents a wide 
window of opportunity for conflict between managers and the shareholders. Under 
such contracts, agents are naturally perceived to have likely engaged in activities that 
may be inconsistent with the interest of the stakeholders
16
. That is, agents may pursue 
or undertake activities that maximize benefit in some form to themselves through 
various mechanisms ranging from excessive perquisites to building empires (i.e 
managerial entrenchment).  
From the capital structure perspective, the implicit assumption as to the relevancy of 
any debt-to-capital proportionality is the maximization of value
17
. Issuance and 
repurchase of debt or equity both affect the mathematics of capital structure , 
however, at the source of concern intuitively stems from, how the changes in the debt 
ratio differently impact the interest of different stakeholders (the narrow view of 
stakeholders taken here, refers to managers, the debt and equity holders). As in most 
                                                             
16 In a perfect agent-principal contract, the agent will invariably act in 
the interest of the principal whether it be through a consultation with the 
principal or unilaterally. However, perfect view of agent-principal view is 
naive in practical terms. One of the main practical challenges is the 
diversity and conflicting circumstances of the stakeholders in the firm. 
For instance, the financial interest of debt holders and equity holders may 
be different, so as that of the managers. The impracticality of aligning 
the interest of all stakeholders results in agency problem, which in effect 
has practical implications for the capital structure of firms.  
17 Value creation in the capital structure context can be viewed as the 
positive outcome, possible through a delicate relationship between 
investment and financing - When actual economic cost of financing is lower 
than the actual return on capital expansion. However, this is can only be 
discerned ex-post. The outcome is not known at the time of financing and 
actual investment. So the value attached to capital structure should be 
viewed as an expected value. One place to look for the realization of this 
expected value would be the capital markets, or to monitor internally, 
specific performance and financial metrics.  
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business environment, conflicting parties are expected to strategically defend their 
interest. Agency cost is therefore a natural consequence of the defensive stance by 
differing stakeholders. The type of agency issue between management and 
shareholders can be a serious one. Therefore, from the shareholder perspective, debt 
in the capital structure context, may serve an important function of minimizing 
potential agency problems such as managerial over-indulgence or entrenchment. For 
instance, debt requires periodic payment of financial obligations (i.e. interest, 
graduated principal payments), thus, the free cash flow that may otherwise be 
available for potentially pursuing sub-optimal investment activities, may now be 
diverted to satisfy the periodic financial obligations. Debt in this view, can be a 
disciplinary tool, and can seemingly satisfy two critical objectives of shareholders.  
First, by motivating managers to perform, and thus meet the periodic financial 
obligations as a result of investing in positive net present value projects. Second, by 
achieving the first objective (i.e. consistent investments in positive NPV projects), 
with proper awareness by the capital market participants, shareholder value is 
effectively maximized. Another supporting view for the merits of debt infusion is the 
bankruptcy cost
18
 argument. Failure on the part of management to satisfy the periodic 
                                                             
18
 Lewellen (1971) used the variance of cash flows as a proxy for bankruptcy 
cost – measured by the standard deviation of the first difference in annual 
operating earnings (earnings before the deductions of interest, 
depreciation and taxes). Kraus and Lichtenberger (1973) also addressed 
potential bankruptcy cost in response to Modigliani and Miller (1963).  
Lewellen’s (1971) proxy for bankruptcy was also used by many researchers 
including Bradley, Jarrel & Kim (1984). I proposed in this research to 
proxy bankruptcy cost instead with the variance of cash flows from 
operations – measured by the standard deviation of the first difference in 
cash flows from operations. This measure is less susceptible to possible 
accounting shenanigans, and is measures directly the variance of actual 
cash necessary for payment of financial obligations.  
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interest payments may result in voluntary or involuntary bankruptcy. In addition, 
management in the event of default could lose control of the firm, suffer reputational 
blemish and the firm may become vulnerable to hostile takeover. The corollary to 
these possibilities is that management in an effort to avoid these adverse 
consequences will consume fewer perquisites and assume activities that will 
maximize shareholder wealth and simultaneously minimize the probability of 
bankruptcy. However, in a broader capital structure view, taken a preceding 
shareholder perspective of minimizing agency problem through debt may be lopsided.  
Because theoretically, a positive NPV project is an expectation, and there is a limit to 
how much any firm can borrow in an imperfect capital markets. This leads to a 
particular type of conflict between debt holders and shareholders.   Management often 
finds itself captive by many utility maximizing stakeholders
19
 and conflicting 
objectives of the individual investors. As a result, managers find it challenging to 
derive an equilibrium that will produce the optimum value of the firm (i.e. present 
value of the firm). Furthermore, under incomplete contractual agreements
20
, managers 
strive to satisfy both classes of investors, but such effort is not always apparent to 
investors. Thus, as previously alluded to, investors in an attempt to safeguard their 
interest in the firm are pro-active in minimizing their perceived risk exposure, 
consequently strengthening their respective positions. The economic cost attached to 
                                                             
19
 Although there are numerous stakeholders in the firm, the main focus in 
this research is on conflict among managers, debtholders and equity 
holders. Conversely, in this research, it will not be feasible to account 
for the various utility functions of the stakeholders.   
20
 The key notion here is that, in practice no contractual agreement is 
complete. This is so, due to numerous potential unforeseen events and the 
practical impossibility of enforcing all the implied aspects of debt 
convenants, as well as the difficulties in monitoring the fiduciary 
integrity of management. 
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this investor effort is the underlying theme of agency cost, and it can be profoundly 
significant in capital structure context, hence capital structure directly deals with debt 
and equity holders. The expectation of debt and equity holders with respect to their 
respective interest in the firm is far from ambiguous. Equity holders expect 
management to maximize their wealth through streams of profitable investments, 
which upon realization should be reflected in the stock price (i.e appreciation) and 
cash dividends (i.e constant or growing dividend). Debt holders on the other hand, 
expect a timely periodic interest and principal payments. Hence, excessive debt which 
equity holders may be inclined to utilized for capital expansion, may infact diminish 
the value of outstanding debt
21
.Marginal debt theoretically increases the likelihood of 
bankruptcy, and thus, has dilution effect on all existing debt. In some cases, marginal 
debt may only be obtained with specified restrictions imposed on management. Such 
restrictions may result in increased cost of capital but most importantly, it may stifle 
growth. In order to grasp the notion of debt holder and equity holder conflict, we need 
to explore further and deepen our understanding of the expected payoff scheme of the 
two investor class.
22
 
Although the expected payoff for both investor classes inherently comes with risk, the 
degree and nature of risk is different for debt holders relative to equity holders. Equity 
                                                             
21 Irrespective of priority in the debt structure, marginal debt has 
dilution or bankruptcy effect on existing debts.    
22
 Since equity holders are the owners of the firm, the conflict is actually 
between debt holders and the representatives of equity holders (i.e. 
management). The risk-return paradigm of equity holders tend to be largely 
market-based. That is, the derivations of the expectations (risk-return) 
rely heavily on market models. For debt holders, the risk-return scheme 
tends to be more internally focused on firm characteristics. Interest and 
principal payments hinges on cash availability more so than what the market 
expects.  
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holders as residual claimants, bear the risk of losing up to their total capital 
investment, meaning they are not legally liable to debt holders in the event of a 
bankruptcy. The implication of this legal protection to equity holders is that, they can 
benefit infinitely from the upside (when the firm is doing well); however, their 
downside loss is limited to their invested capital. On the contrary, debt holders may 
equally lose all their stakes but their upside gain is finite. For instance, suppose 
management in the interest of equity holders, issue a financial obligation in order to 
fund a positive net present value project. Generally, debt holders will be entitled to 
only the contractual stipulations of interest and principal, and the rest of the gain from 
the investment accrues to equity holders. In the event that, the investment failed (i.e. 
bankruptcy), debt holders are left to bear the burden. Incidentally, debt holders are 
more vulnerable to risky projects which may decrease the value of the debt. It is 
complicated to accurately quantify the risk exposure of debt holders, but it includes 
risks of default on interest payment, principal payment, and myriads of managerial 
activities that serves the interest of equity holders at the expense of debt holders.  
Given the relevance of the aforementioned conflict within the capital structure 
framework, my research gives special attention to Myers (1977) agency cost (under-
investment/sub-optimal investment). Investigating the effect of free cash flow 
hypotheses (Jensen (1986), Stulz (1990)) is also necessary but not the central focus of 
this research. Because, theoretically, the free cash flow hypothesis is constrain by the 
availability of excess cash flows.  
In the capital structure literature, the theoretical predictions of agency costs are not 
always clear, however, the general prediction in the literature is that, agency costs 
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associated with debt in the absence of other counter-factors
23
 will most likely 
discourage the use of corporate debt. 
In addition to various proxies used in the literature to gauge the influence of this 
agency cost is the asset substitution hypothesis of Jensen and Meckling (1976), by 
using interest coverage ratio as a proxy. The implication of this proposed measure is 
that, higher interest coverage ratio and or higher return on assets, means the firm is 
investing in profitable and less risky projects. But is this always true? Let’s consider, 
for example, that a firm undertakes a risky project and is face with three potential 
outcomes (good, normal and bad). The firms’ interest coverage or return on asset in a 
good state will be high and low in a bad state. This scenario reveals a potential 
disconnect between interest coverage and the underlying risky assets. In other words 
the relationship between interest coverage ratio and riskiness of assets is not 
directionally unique. Thus, we may have a high measure of interest coverage and or 
return on assets whilst the underlying assets are still highly risky. It might be 
something else driving up the interest coverage ratio. Similar argument can be made 
about the return on assets. In a bundle of assets, a higher return on assets might be 
driven by few existing capital investments other than the current risky project(s) – 
there is an identification challenge associated with this measure, thus, my research 
instead used the agency measure (Market-to-book) used in Myers (1977). 
                                                             
23 There are certain factors that may counter the effect of agency 
costs, and these includes factors such as competition for good 
managers, government regulations such as Sarbanes Oxley act of 2002, 
shareholder activist groups, rating agencies, run on firms stocks, market 
analysts, and takeovers. 
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On a comparison basis, the evidence in the literature attached higher agency problem 
to MNCs relative to DCs. Thus, the degree of internalization (i.e. increasing levels of 
MNCs –defined by foreign tax ratio) is used in this research to assess the effect of 
project riskiness on leverage. There is ample evidence in the literature that, a highly 
diversified firm is better positioned in reducing cash flow volatility (this is consistent 
with the modern portfolio theory), however, it similarly, points to certain risk factors 
like managerial entrenchment motives, lack of competitiveness, and coordination 
challenges (i.e. lack of managerial expertise to operate large firms).  The key 
prediction of Myers (1977) study is that, firms with high under-investment problem 
tend to have higher debt level. Given the nature of conflict between debt and equity 
investors, we may intuitively expect shareholders to issue as much debt as possible 
and not invest in profitable projects, especially if bankruptcy is impending. The 
inherent moral hazard problem that exists between lenders and owners of the firm 
may result in a prohibitively costly financing and or limited access to financial 
markets. Thus, lower debt level is the likely outcome of under-investment problem. 
The literature on the capital structure of MNCs for the most part, has provided 
evidence of higher agency cost for MNCs relative to DCs.  
There are other agency costs of debt financing that are often cited in the capital 
structure literature, and it appears that such identifications at least in theory are critical 
in explaining cross-sectional variations of debt levels. For example, According to 
Jensen (1989) industries with high free cash flows from operations tend to have a 
higher agency costs, and he further claimed that industries such as steel, chemicals, 
brewing, tobacco, television and radio broadcasting, and wood and paper products 
tend to exhibit signs of agency problem. The free cash flow theory predicts that these 
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industries should be characterized by high leverage. In sum, the most important 
implication of the agency approach or model is that leverage is positively associated 
with firm value.
24
 
With respect to theory, agency cost concept is supportive of the optimal capital 
structure (trade-off theory). However, as discussed below in the asymmetric 
information section, the two theories (pecking-order and trade-off) are not necessarily 
mutually exclusive. Both at the theoretical and empirical level, the two mainstream 
theories tend to complement each other in a dynamic capital structure environment  
 
3.2. Pecking-order theory 
Continuing with the intuition developed for asymmetric information, pecking order 
(also called adverse selection or financing pyramid) in its simplest form, is a 
preference theory, which progressively exploit financing choices from the least costly 
to the most expensive. The pecking order theory has been mainly associated with 
Stewart Myers (Myers (1984), Myers and Majluf (1984). According to Myers 
description of pecking order theory, firms will borrow, rather than issuing equity, 
when internal cash flow is not sufficient to fund capital expenditures. Thus the 
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 Stulz (1990)), predicts that leverage is positively associated with firm 
value; DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) shows a relation between non-debt tax 
shield (NDTS) and leverage; (Jensen and Meckling (1976), Stulz (1990)) 
shows relations between degree of regulation and leverage ; Sullivan (1974) 
and Lyn & Papaioannou (1985) suggested market power; collateral value is 
suggested by Scott (1977); Scott and Martin (1975) also shows the effect of 
firm size; Titman (1984) posits relation between liquidation value and 
leverage; free cash flows (Jensen (1986), Stulz (1990)). On the other hand, 
leverage is expected to be negatively associated with the degree of growth 
opportunities (Jensen and Meckling (1976), Stulz (1990)). Here, leverage 
and firm value are associated, under the assumption that, leverage in 
reality, affect firm value. 
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amount of debt on firms’ balance sheet at any given time will reflect the firm's 
cumulative need for external funds. This is somewhat in contrast with the trade-off 
theory, that firms seek debt levels that balance the tax advantages of marginal debt 
against the marginal costs of possible financial distress. In general, the pecking order 
theory has enjoyed a period of wide acceptance in the 1990s, but has recently been 
challenged. With the publication of Baker and Wurgler’s (2002) article relating 
capital structure to past market-to-book ratios, the market timing theory has 
increasingly challenged both the static tradeoff and pecking order theories. 
 
In principle, pecking order prefers internal funds to external financing, and in the 
event of external financing, it prefers debt to equity. Consistent with the logic of 
Myers and Majluf (1984), and Myers (1984), it is reasonable to view the right hand 
side of the firms’ balance sheet as a sum of “fixed assets in place (measured by a ratio 
of fixed assets to total assets) and growth opportunities (measured by a ratio of market 
value to book value of equity).   
  
                                    Illustrative Balance Sheet 
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Before summarizing the implications of the above illustrative framework in 
connection to pecking order, we must start with a realistic mindset that, there is and 
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will always be an information asymmetry problem in the financial markets. That is, 
investors may not know all the information available to management with respect to 
possible investment opportunities and the true value of the fixed assets in place.  
A surgical scrutiny of the above illustrative balance sheet reveals at least two 
possibilities from the investors’ perspective. First, investors may positively react to 
the firms’ issuance of securities, assuming that the proceeds from external financing 
will be deployed in positive net present value growth opportunities. This is good for 
both debt and equity investors, and managers may get a fair price from security 
issuance. Second possibility is that, investors may view the security issuance as a 
signal of over-valued assets in place and management is therefore attempting to 
exploit that window of opportunity by offering securities at inflated price
25
. These 
dual possibilities are the classic outcome in an environment of informational gap. If 
management, issued securities at too low a price, they will be essentially transferring 
wealth from existing to new equity investors, and if they are able, on the other hand, 
to issue at too high a price, the opposite effect will occur. In Myers and Majluf 
(1984), it was assumed that managers do act in the interest of existing shareholders, 
and will therefore not issue undervalued shares of stock. They further argued that 
managers will only do so (issue undervalued shares) when the net present value of 
growth opportunities, more than offset the loss to existing shareholders, should 
undervalued shares be issued. To put the concept in perspective without needlessly 
going into complications of how to quantify the loss to existing equity holders and the 
net present value of growth opportunities, it is assumed that managers can compute 
                                                             
25 This is what essentially connects market-timing and pecking order. 
However, market timing is not suggestive about the order of financing 
events as explicitly described in pecking order. 
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these offsetting effects.  Several implications may emerge from pecking order 
hypotheses depending on the value that investors placed on existing assets and their 
perception regarding growth opportunities. Managers, facing this investor dilemma, 
may decide not to sell undervalued securities and may forgo positive net present value 
investment opportunities. Certain responsive actions by managers to this and similar 
problems are highlighted in our earlier discussion of under-investment hypotheses. 
Myers (1984) argued that firms with comparatively low tangible assets relative to firm 
value are more likely to suffer from information asymmetries. Therefore such firms 
can be expected to have higher debt levels over time, ceteris paribus. On the other 
hand, Lucas and McDonald (1990) found that Myers and Majluf (1984) expositions of 
information asymmetry are mainly driven by temporary forces; therefore firms can 
counteract these temporary forces by delaying the adoption of projects. The 
deficiency, however, with Lucas and McDonald’s (1990) argument, is that economic 
value option of waiting, may prove to be very costly. In a competitive market, 
delaying an important project may result in severe value destruction. Managers, 
however, in the context of pecking order, can minimize the effect of information 
asymmetry by respectively employing internal funds, debt and finally equity, in 
financing future growth. It must be noted here that, debt is prefered over equity not 
just for the benefit of the tax shield, but because there is inherently less information 
asymmetry associated with debt relative to equity. Essentially, in Myers and Majluf 
(1984), debt issuance is a device to avoid signalling to the equity investors who may 
misinterpret the actions of managers. What is really implicit in the pecking order 
hypothesis is that, firms’ debt ratios do reflect their historic and cumulative needs for 
external financing. We may use a simple equation to clarify this point. 
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 Let’s assume that external financing follows the following dynamic process: A = B - 
C - D. Where A, is Shortfall/Financial Deficit, B is cash flows, C is cash expenditure 
on capital investment, and D is dividend payments (dividend payment is assumed to 
be sticky and a reduction in available cash). Consistent with the legal definition of 
corporations, managers take an infinite-horizon view when deciding on investment 
and financing policies. The implication for such view is that today’s decisions have 
consequences on the feasible set of future decisions. As the equation above implied, 
this decisions includes (a) investment in tangible assets, (b) fluctuations in cash 
balances, (c) security issuances – debt vs. equity, and (d) distributions to debt and 
equity investors. According to pecking order, each year, this simple equation will 
determine if external financing is needed, and if needed, we should observe the 
workings of pecking order – that is debt before equity issuance depending on the 
severity of informational gap. It has been mentioned in the earlier sections that 
pecking order and the trade off hypothesis need not be mutually exclusive. This can 
be clearly captured by our simple financial deficit equation above. Assuming that the 
level of growth opportunities is not constant from year to year, cash flows will also 
not be constant from year to year. That is, in certain periods, investments will be 
higher relative to other periods. Thus, the dispersion in investment pattern and 
fluctuations in cash flows, suggests that firms’ will have higher need for external 
financing at some period than others. During periods of high investment, we may 
observe higher external financing, similarly in periods of high cash flows and low 
investment, we my witness retirement of financial obligations or stock repurchases. 
Although quite popular, a pure pecking order hypothesis is not always supported 
within the broader research community. However, the dynamic version of pecking 
order, which extends the underlying rationale of simple pecking order, is not 
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inconsistent with the readjustment implications of trade-off framework. With dynamic 
pecking order, managers with knowledge of impending growth projects may 
strategically reduce leverage with excess cash or equity issue, so that, they can later 
push leverage higher to debt capacity when really needed. The dynamic form in a way 
is a strategic process, in which management is not strictly following the pecking 
order, but dynamically shifting their financing choices with respect to investment 
growth opportunities. Keeping the link between pecking order and trade-off theory is 
crucial for our research, because pecking order is not necessarily mutually exclusive, 
especially in studies where readjustment to target is important. However, this doesn’t 
mean that pecking order is exactly the same as trade-off theory; instead it reveals how 
we may apply elements of pecking order to examine readjustment of capital structure. 
In addition to the dynamism involved in pecking order, this research makes two more 
assumptions with respect to the illustrative market balance sheet: First, we assume 
that growth in assets returns and/or investment opportunities increases equity market 
value. In another words, growth in equity market value is a direct result of growth in 
asset returns and investment opportunities. Realization of assumption one leads us to 
the second assumption that a decrease in equity market value is a result of 
deterioration in asset returns and/or investment opportunities. From an operational 
perspective, equity holders are far more likely to benefit from the underlying 
assumptions.  Actualizing assumption one in an efficient market will maximize equity 
market value, but not necessarily the cash flows to pay interest and debt maturity 
value. Similarly, assumption two theoretically affects debt holders disproportionately 
higher than equity holders. A decrease in asset returns and/or investment opportunities 
maybe sufficiently offset by the sum of debt tax shield and non-debt tax shield 
resulting in minimal impact on equity value through a stable earnings per share. In 
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contrast, the effect of under-investment and asset substitution that underlies 
assumption two cannot be easily offset by debt holders. Therefore, a higher required 
return and possibly a restrictive debt contract will be demanded by debt holders, 
resulting in a higher cost of capital. Higher cost of capital negatively impacts debt 
ratio as firms attempt to avoid expensive financing.  
Asymmetric information view: 
Under the agency view section, I briefly touched on an important issue related to the 
overlapping nature of the two main theories (i.e. trade-off theory and pecking order 
are not completely mutually exclusive). This relationship will be further explained in 
this section. 
To set the stage for discussion of asymmetric information (i.e. informational gap), we 
need to recall that asymmetric information has many important applications in 
economics and finance. And, over the years, the ability of economists to explicitly 
model private information has important implications for capital structure research.  
What do we normally mean by asymmetric information? A broader definition of 
asymmetric information is, when there is a mismatch or gap of information between 
managers and the market
26
 – In this mismatch/gap, managers are perceived to have 
private information regarding certain characteristics of the firm that is outside the 
purview of the market. Ross (1977) and Leland and Pyle (1977) are the pioneers in 
this area of research, in which they claimed that, the firms’ capital structure plays an 
                                                             
26 The informational gap is usually due to strategic reasons and may also be 
attributed to the inefficiency in the market – That is, it may not be 
competitively prudent for management to immediately disclose all 
proprietary and sensitive information to the market. Informational mismatch 
may be viewed as informational distortion or noise between managers and 
market participants – It is usually difficult and costly to address 
informational mismatch. 
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informational role and is thus a signal to the market about the private information of 
managers. Some years later, Myers and Majluf (1984) and Myers (1984) took a 
different position, in which they viewed capital structure as a tool to reduce the 
problem of information asymmetry. Thus, we have two interesting perspectives or 
approaches in defining capital structure in the context of information asymmetry. One 
view defines capital structure as a signalling tool, whilst the other sees it as a control 
mechanism. There are serious and important implications for this. First, it implies at 
best, that the markets are at semi-strong efficiency. Second, contrary to the Myers 
(1977) conflict of interest between debt and equity investors, in Myers and Majluf 
(1984) and Myers (1984), the aim is to address the conflict between new and existing 
equityholders. They (Myers and Majluf (1984) and Myers (1984)) claimed that equity 
may be mispriced in the capital market because investors do not know all the private 
information held by managers. So given specific investment opportunities, firms will 
not finance this new investment opportunities with equity because it may be severely 
underpriced due to asymmetric information. And if they were to finance the new 
project with equity at such an underpriced value, the returns will benefit the new 
equityholders more than the existing equityholders, thus, existing equity holders will 
reject positive NPV projects – This is similar to the under-investment problem 
addressed under agency view section – one difference is the direction of the conflict, 
the logic is the same. This rejection of positive NPV essentially connects 
informational gap to the under-investment hypotheses.  
How do firms resolve this conflict? As Myers (1984) argued, it leads to the widely 
referenced “pecking order theory”. Firms will start with internally generated funds 
(cash flows), then riskless debt, risky debt and finally equity as a last resort.   
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Higher debt level is one view of identifying under-investment under agency view, and 
we can see from the pecking order hypotheses how that may come about. First, we 
know that all firms do sometimes have cash flow problem, so is very unlikely that 
internal funds will suffice in financing all possible positive NPV project. Second, we 
know that firms may have first grade credit ratings, but the debt obligations they issue 
are far from been riskless. In fact, highly risk adverse investors who are interested in 
riskless securities will be better-off investing in US Government securities. So in 
reality, we have two types of securities; risky debt and equity. Now, due to 
information asymmetry, equity maybe underpriced; firms will have to issue more debt 
before equity. Under the pecking order hypotheses, firms’ will likely shift to equity 
issuance only when debt level is too high and the risk of financial distress becomes a 
concern (i.e. a trade off between benefiting from interest tax shield and bankruptcy 
cost). It is also possible that, firms before reaching their debt capacity decide to 
strategically shift to equity in order to create a financial slack for future debt financing 
(i.e. a strategic trade off). Thus, asymmetric information incidentally connects 
pecking order hypothesis with the trade-off hypothesis. This relationship between 
pecking order and trade-off is even more apparent in the readjustment context which 
is appropriately discussed in later sections. 
Given the depth and breadth of market participation of MNCs, information 
asymmetry in the capital structure context is likely less severe for DCs relative to 
MNCs.  MNCs, operating in various countries and markets have to deal with the 
challenges of more broadly diverse investor base. Furthermore, consolidated financial 
information of MNCs are initially (i.e. prior to conversion into US GAAP framework 
at parent company in U.S.) gathered around the world using different accounting 
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standards and rules. In addition, different countries have differing positions regarding, 
among others, corporate taxation, outflow of capital, labour rules and disclosure. 
These and many other internationally related challenges
27
 may exacerbate the 
information asymmetry problem for MNCs relative to DCs.  
 
3.3. Market-timing theory 
a market-timing hypothesis (Baker and Wurgler 2002), has recently gained 
considerable momentum in capital structure literature. This theory suggests that 
capital structure at any point in time (snapshot view) is largely determined by 
cumulative outcome of past net external financing activity, as a result of timing of 
managerial activism in issuing equity securities when the market is favourable (i.e 
higher stock valuation) and repurchase when the stock prices are unfavourable (i.e. 
lower stock valuation). The intuition behind this theory is very compelling; however, 
it implicitly assumed absence of optimization strategy, and thus concurrently assumed 
inactive readjustment mechanisms following a shock to the stock price. Another 
major concern with the market-timing hypotheses is the implied inefficiency in the 
market, pointing to information asymmetry problem which is extensively discussed 
below. Despite the hypothetical divergence and lack of explicit and theory-specificity 
of market timing, Welch (2004), seen as a logical extension of Baker and Wurgler 
                                                             
27 Some of the other international challenges relevant for this research are 
outlined in the MNC section below. Generally, it includes those issues 
mainly confined to operations outside the boundaries of the country the 
parent company is located – in this case, the U.S. The evidences from prior 
research and due to advances made in the field of finance, not all 
internationally related challenges are important, because managers can 
readily hedge and minimize the effect of some of the challenges.  
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(2002), investigated the effect of stock returns on market leverage of a sample of 
publicly traded U.S firms. Welch (2004) shows that stock returns are relatively the 
single most important determinant of capital structure, and has implicitly rejected both 
traditional capital structure theories (trade-off and pecking order).  
 
      4. Capital Structure Literature 
 4.1. Domestic Context 
For the most part, the motivation behind capital structure research, starting from the 
irrelevance theorem to the recently developed inertia hypothesises (market-timing and 
stock return effect) of capital structure, is to primarily identify determining factors of 
financing choices and readjustment to target. Capital structure is perhaps the most 
extensively researched area in corporate finance and yet the most contentious in terms 
of research findings. Specific challenges of capital structure research are highlighted 
in a section below, but generally, there are three main reasons for this; first, the 
underlying financial theories of capital structure are difficult to model due to factor 
dependency on unpredictable managerial actions. Since we cannot precisely model 
such actions (i.e. managerial behaviour), many research results diverge from the 
actual observed capital structure. Second, certain proxies have no economic 
relationship with capital structure. Third, are the challenges of constantly changing 
economic and firm-specific factors. Nevertheless, the literature over time has unveiled 
many important stylized facts about capital structure dynamics. The best exposition of 
the dynamism in capital structure research can be found in the survey results of 
Graham and Harvey (2001). They surveyed 392 CFOs, and found that debt financing 
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by managers are influenced by, real concerns for financial flexibility, and credit 
ratings. On the contrary, they found that, equity financing are influenced by concerns 
for earnings per share dilution and recent stock price movement. They also found 
support for the two major capital structure theories (Pecking-order and trade-off 
theory). Surprisingly, they found that managers are not too concerned about 
asymmetric information, asset substitution, transaction costs and free cash flows. 
However, the survey findings later significantly diverged from the observed capital 
structure of the firms in the survey sample. What we learned from Graham and 
Harvey (2001) is that, the methodology of the research (Survey) is not suitable for 
capital structure research, mainly due to incompleteness in CFO response, and other 
market factors that may temporarily force managers to shift from desired choice of 
financing. Similarly, there are noticeable contradictions in CFO responses. For 
example, if most managers support either pecking order or trade-off theory as the 
survey results indicated, then managers must also be concerned with information 
asymmetry and other agency costs, however, the survey results found no connection 
between agency costs and the underlying theories. Lending support to Graham and 
Harvey (2001), Opler and Titman (1998) found that firms generally issue equity when 
stock prices are favourable. This may be considered to be an early stage of market-
timing hypothesis, which was later advanced and explicitly modelled by Baker and 
Wurgler (2002). However, the underlying argument in Opler and Titman (1998) is 
that, by using market leverage measure, timing of equity issuance moves the firm 
further from its target leverage and we may therefore observe variations in leverage 
across firms and over time. Looking back, Fisher et al. (1989), shows that leverage 
varies across time and space, and away from target due to transaction cost of issuing 
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and retirement of financial securities. This is in contrast to the survey findings of 
Graham and Harvey (2001) in which CFOs indicated less concern for transaction cost.  
In regards to the credit ratings from the CFO survey, Kisgen (2006) tested the direct 
effect of credit ratings on financing decisions, and found that firms expecting a credit 
rating upgrade or downgrade, issue less debt relative to equity than firms not 
expecting any changes to their credit ratings. Although Kisgen (2006) lend support to 
the CFO survey (Graham and Harvey – 2001), it differs in regards to transaction 
costs. The central argument in Kisgen (2006) is that, credit ratings are essential for 
capital structure because of the discreet costs or benefits associated with different 
rating levels. If a firm is expecting an upgrade, it will prove beneficial not to issue 
until after the upgrade at which point they may issue with lower cost of debt, 
conversely, if a downgrade is in the offing, issuance before the expected downgrade 
may cause a significant jump to the riskiness of the firm and therefore lead to many 
adverse actions by debt holders. Another way of looking at it is that, any increase in 
debt level just before changes to credit rating will infact adversely affect the 
impending ratings, because credit ratings are correlated with the level of debt, and the 
converse is true for not issuing before the changes in credit ratings.  
Credit ratings and issuance dynamics has important implications for both trade-off 
and pecking order theory and the readjustment to target process. The empirical design 
in Kisgen (2006) is difficult to defend. His measure of closeness to changes in ratings 
assumed no major jump in firms’ credit ratings (i.e. from a rating of B- to A). There is 
also an implicit assumption that the market is not efficient enough to expect such 
changes. If the market participants correctly expect the direction of changes, then 
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issuing before or after the changes to credit ratings will not make much difference – 
the market would have already attached an appropriate cost to the issuance.  
The effect of credit ratings on leverage should be viewed with caution and some 
degree of professional scepticism. The nature of credit rating process and recent 
anecdotal evidences of highly rated firms that filed bankruptcy suggest that firms 
maybe involved in shopping for better credit ratings. As market participants become 
more aware of the inconsistencies between credit ratings and the fundamentals of the 
firm, the effect of credit ratings on capital structure may become significantly 
diminished. 
In the capital structure literature, there appears to be benchmark factors that are 
frequently used as capital structure determinants. For example, according to Harris 
and Raviv (1991), the general consensus is that” leverage is positively related to fixed 
assets, non-debt tax shields, investment opportunities, and firm size and negatively 
related to volatility, advertising expenditure, likelihood of financial distress, 
profitability and uniqueness of the product (i.e. R&D and marketing expenditure)”. 
Similarly, in their study of the capital structure of G-7 countries, Rajan and Zingales 
(1995) used four of the above mentioned factors: fixed assets, investment 
opportunities, firm size, and profitability, and found that the relationship between 
these factors and leverage are similar across the G-7 countries. However, they qualify 
these similarities with the underlying differences in country-specific factors that may 
explain variations in capital structure across countries. They used ordinary least 
squares and censored Tobit models – Tobit regressions were computed in other to 
eliminate negative outliers, however both OLS and Tobit Model yield similar results. 
Their findings are consistent with Harris and Raviv (1991) as all factors showed the 
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expected signs. However, the sample period (five years) in Rajan and Zingales (1995) 
is very short, and country specific factors were not controlled for in their model 
specification. For this reason comparison of the effect of capital structure 
determinants across countries may be biased and most likely suffer from model mis-
specification, thus subject to statistical problems that undermines the credibility of 
inferences.  
A literature review also reveals that besides the familiar factors, industry and country 
of origin may be important for capital structure determination Scott and Martin 
(1974); Harris and Raviv (1991); Bradley, Jarrell, and Kim (1984); and DeAngelo-
Masulis (1980). These studies all showed that certain industries have a common 
leverage ratio which, over time, is relatively stable. Partly due to this finding, many 
researchers are comfortable using average industry leverage as a target ratio for firms 
within the industry.  
In the recent past, two new capital structure inertia hypotheses (stock returns and 
market-timing) have been developed. These two hypotheses have significantly 
advanced the literature by identifying stock returns and past issuing activity as the 
major capital structure determinants. Their findings also contradict both pecking order 
and trade-off theory, and therefore found no evidence, that firms do readjust to target 
debt ratio.  Ivo Welch (2004) using cross-sectional and Fama and MacBeth  type 
regression on market leverage of sampled US firms, shows that debt-equity ratios 
change closely with changes in their own stock prices. He argued that the stock price 
effects are often large and last a long time, at least several years. He finally concluded 
that stock return–caused equity growth can explain about 40 percent of capital 
structure dynamics.  
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These findings have profound implications. The latent implications of Welch (2004) 
include persistence of stock-return induced changes on capital structure. It also 
implied that prior capital structure determinants are less relevant given the fact that 
stock return-induced changes account for about 40% of capital structure dynamics. 
The paper is very insightful, but is limited in scope by assuming away many 
important factors such as agency costs of debt financing and costs of adjustment that 
may explain the long excursion of leverage away from the target. Similarly the paper 
tested two extreme hypothesis of perfect readjustment or perfect non-readjustment. In 
practice, most firms may readjust to target slowly due to cost and other 
considerations
28
.  
Some of the other issues with Welch (2004) are that if equity investors are rational 
and the market is efficient, then there will be a relationship between equity value 
today and changes in capital structure determinants. Conversely, capital structure 
determinants may affect equity value. The point here is that, there is an inherent 
endogenous problem in testing adjustment behaviour. Thus, a panel model is well 
suited for such tests, especially when endogeneity is a concern. In addition, Welch’s 
(2004) sample includes firms with regulated capital structure, like banks. Financial 
institutions and other regulated firms such as utility companies tend to have different 
determinants of capital structure, and are generally excluded from the sample. The 
inclusion of regulated firms may introduce unnecessary noise in the data. 
Furthermore, the estimation techniques used in Welch (2004) are based on standard 
panel estimators, which are biased in the dynamic adjustment context. Dynamic panel 
                                                             
28 In practice, if we assume target leverage, firms will neither be at the 
two extremes suggested by Welch (2004). The readjustment is a function of 
various factors, some of which may have offsetting forces, thus rendering a 
slow and incomplete reversion to target. 
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estimators are appropriate when the right hand side of the model equation includes a 
lagged dependent variable. Even though, the lagged dependent variable posed its own 
challenge, various dynamic estimation techniques are available to find strong 
instrument for the lagged dependent variable.  
Drobetz and Pensa (2007) adopted Welch’s (2004) methodology and conducted 
similar research on European firms. Their findings are similar to Welch in terms of 
the explanatory power of stock returns but they differ on the issue of readjustment. 
Drobetz and Pensa (2007) argued that European firms seem to readjust to target in the 
long run. Relative to Welch (2004), Drobetz and Pensa (2007) use a smaller sample 
size of 425 firms. The differing views on readjustment between the two findings may 
be due to country specific factors.  
Moreover, Baker and Wurgler (2002) examined the relation between capital structure 
and the historical path of the market leverage. They argued that managers time capital 
markets when issuing equity. In corporate finance, equity “market timing” refers to 
the practice of issuing shares at high prices and repurchasing at low prices. The 
intention is to exploit temporary fluctuations in the cost of equity. This is consistent 
with Graham and Harvey’s (2001) survey in which an overwhelming majority of 
CFOs express concern about the stock price movements, and if stock prices 
appreciate, they can sell high and therefore reduce cost of equity financing. 
Nevertheless, Baker and Wurgler (2002) find that low leverage firms tend to time the 
market and raised funds when market valuations are high and high leverage firms 
raised funds when market valuations are low. And more importantly, past market 
timing activity is shown to have persistent effect on capital structure. Essentially, the 
findings dismissed readjustment and therefore the trade-off theory.  
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An interesting observation in the market timing model is the market valuation proxy 
(M/B – market to book equity), which signifies an opportunity for net equity issues, is 
also used in the trade-off model but with different meaning. In the trade-off model, 
M/B may represent investment opportunity, and also Myers (1977) agency cost. 
Barker and Wurgler’s (2002) market-timing hypothesis although seems to have 
substantial explanatory power, it suffers from similar problem as Welch (2004) by 
failing to explicitly address readjustment process by examining firm specific factors, 
especially agency costs.  In the presence of readjustment cost (issuing/retiring cost) 
and agency costs, firms may not readjust in the short run, but that doesn’t qualify for 
non-adjustment.  
Yet, at a macro-level, Korajczyk and Levy (2003) have modelled firms’ capital 
structure as a function of macroeconomic conditions and firm-specific factors. Using 
ordinary least squares regressions; and a financially constrained measure, they divided 
their sample into firms that are financially constraint and unconstrained. They found 
that target leverage is counter-cyclical for the relatively unconstrained sample, but 
pro-cyclical for the relatively constrained sample. Moreover, they show that 
macroeconomic conditions are significant for issue choice for unconstrained firms 
relative to constrained firms. Applying market-timing hypothesis to the two samples, 
they found evidence that unlike constrained firms, unconstrained firms tend to issue 
when market conditions are favourable.  
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There is a consensus that macroeconomic cycle phase affects default risk, which in 
turn affects cost of financing.
29
  In Hackbarth et al. (2006), the theoretical model 
suggests that the incidents of debt restructuring are much lower in good economic 
conditions than in an economic downturn. Although, both Hackbarth et al. (2006) and 
Korajczyk and Levy (2003) studied the macroeconomic conditions on capital 
structure, they are primarily applied in a domestic context and did not address the 
effect of macro-conditions on readjustment process. However, part of the 
readjustment gap in the domestic context was later addressed by Cook and Tang 
(2009). They used dual dynamic partial adjustment capital structure models to 
measure the effect of selected macroeconomic variables to determine the speed of 
adjustment to target debt ratio. Cook and Tang (2009) found that selected macro-
variables (term spread, default spread , GDP growth rate, and dividend yields) have 
significant effect on capital structure, and that firms readjust faster toward target 
leverage in good economic environment than in the economic trough, where good and 
bad economic environment are defined by selected macro-variables. 
 
4.2 Multinational Corporation Defined 
Various definitions of multinational corporations are given in the literature. Many of 
these classifications invoke the “are based on either foreign assets ratios, foreign sales 
                                                             
29 In this research, the focus is on the readjustment patterns preceded by 
macro-economic exogenous shock to capital structure. Firms’ internal 
expertise and characteristics operates in a broader macro-economic 
environment. More so, there is a variation in how different industries fare 
under different macro-economic conditions. For instance, food and medical 
industries tend to be immune to economic downturns, whilst travel and 
entertainment industries tend to fare relatively well in an economic boom. 
Thus, the speed of readjustment to target depends not only on the state of 
the economy, but also on the type of industry.     
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ratios or foreign income ratios.  Therefore firms that do not meet these criterions are 
normally classified as domestic. My research will used foreign tax ratio
30
 as the 
classification criteria – this measure is essentially using foreign income criteria in 
terms of foreign taxes relative to overall tax of the firm.  It must be noted that none of 
these measures are perfect and here we can highlight some of this imperfections; for 
example, the foreign assets ratio (foreign assets/total assets) may constitute largely of 
intangibles and not really representing the real assets of the firm. Among other 
problems with foreign asset ratios is that of inflationary effect. In a high inflationary 
country, assets purchased and recorded at cost may artificially inflate the true asset 
base, assuming that purchasing power parity doesn’t hold and that there is a 
significant cost of transporting fixed assets from one country to another. With regards 
to foreign sales ratio (foreign sales/total sales)
31
, the problem lies in differentiating 
true international direct investment (i.e sales generated by subsidiaries in foreign 
countries, physical foreign locations) and international trade (exports of the parent 
company).  A firm may have conduits in foreign countries that coordinate sales for the 
parent company whilst the parent company has no direct physical presence in that 
country, thus mixing international trade with international direct investment (FDI). 
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 Lee (1986); Lee and Kwok (1988) used the foreign tax ratio to classify 
firms as MNCs or DCs.  
31
  Geyikdagi (1981); Errunza and Senbet (1984); Fatemi (1984, 1988), 
Michel and Shaked (1986); Shaked (1986) all classified a sample of 
corporations as being either multinational or domestic using the foreign 
sales ratio. Michel and Shaked’s (1986) study is limited to fortune 500 
companies engaged in manufacturing, and are classify as MNCs or DCs on the 
basis of foreign sales ratio and number of countries in which firms have 
subsidiaries (this classification method is often referred to as 
structural). Nevertheless, all above referenced researchers found lower 
debt levels for MNCs relative to DCs. However, Fatemi (1988), and Michel 
and Shaked (1986) both found that MNCs utilize more short term debt 
financing than DCs.  
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Foreign tax ratios measure is also prone to problems. Besides the fact that countries 
have varying tax systems and payment methods, some countries that are really in need 
of foreign direct investments, are offering attractive tax incentives in an attempt to 
lure foreign firms. Nevertheless, foreign tax ratios appeared to be a far superior 
measure than other measures. With these proposed classification methodology, 
additional robustness testing by further analyzing firms’ capital structure according to 
various groups of foreign tax ratios will be conducted. Ultimately the measure used to 
define multinationality largely hinges on the availability of data. 
 
 
4.3 MNC Literature  
In almost every extant literature, there exist a landmark paper(s) which generally set 
the ground for further investigation. Thus, we begin our review with such papers and 
then progress into more recent papers. This allows for a better understanding and 
appreciation of the progress made thus far in the area of MNC capital structure 
research. Similar to the previous general capital structure review, my aim here is to 
focus on literatures that are relevant to my own investigation. The Puzzle in this 
literature is about prior empirical findings, that US DCs have higher leverage than 
MNCs. Why is this puzzle? Well, from traditional paradigm of trade-off (between tax 
benefits and financial distress) and pecking order hypothesis, MNCs should be able to 
sustain higher debt than DCs, because MNCs have subsidiaries in several countries 
with less than perfectly correlated economies. Such diversification is expected to 
reduce cash flow volatility and hence bankruptcy cost. Similarly, operating in several 
environments of differential tax structures, US MNCs can strategically structure their 
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financing decisions in order to maximize their debt tax shield. Therefore, MNCs may 
simultaneously reduce bankruptcy cost whilst maximizing tax benefits. From the 
pecking order perspective, similar argument can be made that diversification may 
stabilize cash flows and in the event of a financial slack (when investment 
opportunities exceeds available internal cash), MNCs with better access to financial 
markets (domestic and international) may obtain faster and cheaper financing relative 
to DCs. Therefore MNCs could accumulate higher debt level relative to DCs.  These 
are essentially the arguments that lead to the conclusion that US MNCs should be 
more highly leveraged than DCs. However, when observed debt levels between 
MNCs and DCs were observed, DCs tend to have higher leverage than MNCs.  
In an attempt to explain this puzzle, researchers introduced several agency costs of 
debt into their models in determining capital structure of MNCs. Subsequently, many 
previous researches in the capital structure of MNCs revolve substantially around the 
outlined attributes of MNCs in conjunction with various agency costs. In passing, it is 
crucial to note also that, although, ordinary least squares (OLS) is the dominant 
method in the literature, a variant of research techniques were across the overall 
landscape of MNC’s capital structure research. For example, Lee and Kwok (1988) 
examined the capital structure of sampled U.S.-based multinationals by employing a 
non-linear approach; Whilst Burgman (1996) employed a linear approach by directly 
testing the effect of specific International factors on the capital structure of MNCs. In 
Lee and Kwok’s (1988) framework, the effect of international environment factors on 
firm-specific factors (such as agency and bankruptcy costs) were measured, which in 
turn affect the capital structure of MNCs. After controlling for size and industry 
effects , They (Lee and Kwok -1988) found that MNCs have higher agency costs and 
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non-debt tax shields than DCs, and similarly suggests that MNCs do not exhibit lower 
bankruptcy cost relative to DCs when the size effect was controlled  – A finding 
contrary to the prediction of international diversification hypothesis. Interestingly, 
they found that agency cost and non-debt tax shield are positively related to extent of 
international diversification. This is not surprising given the tendency for MNCs to 
accumulate intangibles and the increased in conflict of interest as a result of 
international involvement. The puzzle regarding lower debt level for MNCs relative to 
DCs were also confirmed by Lee and Kwok (1988). The paper provides valuable 
insight into capital structure of MNCs, especially the non-linear approach, and 
industry analysis; however, the paper is restricted to Myers (1977) agency cost, non 
debt tax shields and bankruptcy cost. The paper did not consider many other 
important capital structure determinants which may also play a significant role in 
causing the difference between the capital structures of MNCs and DCs. Burgman 
(1996) found political risk and exchange rate risk to be positively related to leverage, 
although he reached similar conclusions about the lower debt level of MNCs and that 
there is actually no trade-off between tax advantages and bankruptcy costs, because 
diversification does not appeared to have reduce bankruptcy cost. The major 
drawback in Burgmans (1996) methodology is that, he only used firms listed on New 
York Stock Exchange (NYSE), and many traditional capital structure determinants 
(i.e size, profitability, tangibility, etc) were not use even as robustness test. Chen et al 
(1997) extend the study by Lee and Kwok (1988) with a panel data, employing a 
multivariate analysis by controlling for traditional capital structure determinants, and 
degree of. Their research is similarly to Lee and Kwok (1988) focused on trade-off 
theory and agency cost. Consistent with prior research, Chen et al (1997) found that 
even after controlling for major capital structure determinants, MNCs have less debt 
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than DCs, and that within MNCs, firms with more foreign income before tax tend to 
be more levered. They argued that almost half of the mean difference of debt ratios 
between MNCs and DCs is explained by Lee and Kwok’s (1988) bankruptcy and 
agency costs, but the other half is explained by the direct effect of the degree of 
internationalization. Thus, Lee and Kwok (1988) only explain part of the difference in 
capital structure between MNCs and DCs.  Perhaps, a problem with Chen et al (1997) 
panel data model is their definition of MNC, which they defined as a ratio of foreign 
pre-tax income to total pre-tax income. This measure did not account for foreign tax 
benefit which may be significant and relevant for the trade-off theory, thus, its 
exclusion undermines potential benefits that may be gained from different tax 
structures within the MNC. It is reasonable to expect MNCs to shift their financing to 
areas where they may gain maximum benefit for tax purposes, ignoring this potential 
completely undermines the underlying trade-off theory. Reeb et al (2001) using 617 
firms, studied the direct relationship between cost of debt financing and the degree of 
internationalization using firm-level data on traded non-provisional debt. Using credit 
ratings, Reeb et al (2001) found that highly internationalized firms have better credit 
ratings, and the cost of debt financing is inversely related to degree of 
internationalization. The assumption in this paper is that MNCs have lower agency 
cost of debt relative to the combined benefits of global diversification. Theoretically, 
if MNCs enjoy better credit ratings, it also means that the positive characteristics 
attached to MNCs outweigh the negatives. Thus, for MNCs, better credit ratings 
should translate into higher debt level. But this is contrary to what the majority of 
researchers have concluded based on observe data. Reeb et al (2001) utilized the now-
defunct Lehman Brothers Bond database for market value of bonds, yields and 
duration; S&P and Moody for credit ratings, and Disclosure WorldScope database for 
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financial profiles. This research provides valuable insight into the relationship 
between credit ratings and degree of internationalization; however the utilization of 
market value of debt is of serious concern. Many researchers tend to steer clear of 
using market value of debt because it is almost impossible to get a reliable data on this 
variable. The fact that Lehman Brothers recently collapsed may testify to difficulties 
involved in marking book value of debt to market value. Credit ratings may help 
explain capital structure dynamics; however we must weigh its merits against other 
considerations especially in the trade-off framework. To illustrate, lets assume that 
there are two otherwise identical firms with equal credit ratings; managers of one firm 
intends to maximize tax benefits (interest deductibility) probably because they have 
relatively little non-debt tax shield, and managers of the other firm intends to just 
simply adjust their capital structure. The latter just want to exploit the benefits of 
better credit ratings (meaning lower cost of financing) to bring its capital structure 
close to target, while the former  regardless of  lower cost of debt financing may not 
issue debt because it doesn’t yield enough tax advantage (lower interest expense). 
Reeb et al. (2001) did not address variations in issuance, which can only be achieved 
by incorporating agency costs and other firm-specific attributes. Chkir and Cossett 
(2001) went further by defining internationalization in terms of not only the number 
of countries MNCs have subsidiaries, but also by diversification of their operations 
(different business segments). Essentially, they (Chkir and Cossett -2001) have 
examined the relation between MNCs’ capital structure and managers’ diversification 
strategy. By employing a switching regime regression methodology, they (Chkir and 
Cossett - 2001) identified four types of diversification regimes based on product 
dimensions (different business segment) of diversification. They found that MNCs 
with high level of combined product and subsidiary diversification have higher 
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agency costs (Myers 1977 – underinvestment hypothesis) but lower operating risk 
(defined by the coefficient of variation of earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT)). 
Among the control variables used by (Chkir and Cossett 2001) are political risk, non-
debt tax shield, profitability, size and exchange rate risk. Essentially, they have an 
integrated theoretical representation of both trade-off theory and pecking order 
hypothesis. They exposed very well two important features of MNCs; first, they 
highlight the complex structure of business segments within MNCs and varying 
underinvestment problem that may be attached to different business segments.  
Second, they controlled for non-debt tax shield (NDTS) which in the literature is 
generally agreed to be higher MNCs than DCs, and thus may explained the lower debt 
level for MNCs, because with higher intangibles, the marginal benefits of interest 
deductibility may be more than offset by the probability of bankruptcy. The main gap 
in this literature is that issuance and adjustment dynamics were not directly addressed, 
and many political risk measures did not differentiate the political riskiness among 
countries. It is plausible to argue that some countries are more risky politically than 
others. This phenomenon (differential political risk) is described by Mittoo and Zhang 
(2008) as an upstream-downstream hypothesis. One other potential area of criticism 
for Chkir and Cossett (2001) methodology is that, firms normally don’t have a 
specifically identified capital structure based on product lines; in many cases, 
especially recently, the parent company often obtain external financing and distribute 
the proceeds to various business segments (transfer pricing), usually based on 
financing need by segments and their respective asset base. It is also possible that, 
under one foreign subsidiary there exist more than one business segment. In this 
scenario, you have more diversified product line but less diversified in terms of 
internationalization (the number of countries MNCs have subsidiaries).  Combining 
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the two different levels of diversification to explain leverage may overstate/understate 
the influence of one over the other – differentiation problem. In fact Singh et al. 
(2003) have attempted to explain this problem. Their (Singh -2003) research shows 
that firm leverage is positively related to diversification cross business segment 
(product lines), inversely related to geographic diversification (number of countries 
with subsidiaries). However, after controlling for geographic diversification, asset 
turnover and firm size, they found diversification across business segments to be 
unrelated to leverage, further highlighting the difficulty in separating the effect of 
these two types of diversification when different control variables are included in the 
regression model. In somewhat similar vein, Ali Fatemi (1988) investigated the effect 
of international operations corporate financing policies of U.S.- based firms. Fatemi 
(1988) found that, firms with notable foreign involvement have lower target leverage 
ratios than their domestic counterparts, and that MNCs make greater use of short-term 
financing than longer-term. However, he (Fatemi 1988) did not reconcile the gap 
between MNCs easy access to short-term debt and lower long-term debt. If MNCs can 
relatively easily obtain short-term debts, assuming that short-term rates and long-
terms rates follow the underlying assumptions of the term structure of interest rates, 
thus MNCs should be expected to have higher long term debt. Larger firms such as 
MNCs extensively make use of commercial papers due to their higher credit ratings, 
then why are they not capitalizing on their higher credit rating status to obtain longer-
term debts? I suspect two culprits, often mentioned in the literature; first, agency cost 
outweigh the benefits of tax advantages which in turn lowers the price investors are 
willing to pay for debt offerings by MNCs. Second, MNCs due to higher agency cost 
proactively seek to maintain lower target leverage. However, this may also represent a 
strategy policy mechanism where MNCs signal financial soundness to the investment 
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community – this is a behavioural issue and may be very daunting to measure. If prior 
research is accurate, that MNCs have higher agency costs than DCs, then it can 
hypothesized that due to higher agency costs, MNCs should have lower debt level and 
slower adjustment speed. However, the relative speed of adjustment will ultimately 
depend on whether agency costs more than offset the benefits other perceived positive 
factors such as diversification, and wider access to international capital markets. 
Moreover, completely different evidence found by Mitto and Zhang (2008), shows 
that Canadian multinational corporation exhibit higher leverage than domestic firms 
(DCs). Applying the upstream-downstream hypothesis, they suggests that the higher 
leverage of Canadian MNCs is due to the lower agency costs of debt associated with 
Canadian MNCs' U.S. operations. Mittoo and Zhang (2008) also found that access to 
international capital markets is positively related to higher leverage. The upstream-
downstream hypothesis states that the directional effect of diversification and other 
attributes specific to MNCs is largely contingent on the location of subsidiaries. That 
is if MNCs expand into a more advanced country (upstream), then diversification and 
access to international capital markets will have positive effect on leverage, and if 
they expand into a less develop country (downstream), the effect will be opposite. The 
underlying assumption here is by no means a new concept, but certainly a novel way 
of analysing and or decomposing the effect of diversification. The agency costs such 
as monitoring and informational gap that most researchers found to have an offsetting 
effect on MNC specific attributes are expected to be higher for less developed 
countries than advanced countries. In another related research, Doukas and Pantzalis 
(2003) empirically investigate whether agency costs of debt may explain the relatively 
lower leverage of U.S. MNCs in a sample of manufacturing, agricultural and mining 
firms in the 1988–1994 periods. They employed three different proxies of agency 
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costs of debt: non-collateralized asset ratio (proxy for intangible assets), asset 
liquidity ratio (proxy for free cash flows), and market-to-book equity ratio (proxy for 
future growth opportunities). There findings are consistent with the conclusions of 
some prior researchers that the agency costs of debt have a strong inverse effect on 
long-term debt ratio, and that this negative effect is a function of increasing foreign 
involvement. Their conclusion is consistent with the prior findings that the geographic 
diversification of the U.S. MNCs increases informational gap and also makes active 
monitoring more difficult and expensive for bondholders, thus results in lower 
leverage for MNCs relative to DCs. Although Doukas and Pantzalis (2003) strengthen 
the support for the role of agency cost in capital structure determination, their 
coverage of industries and sample size are limited. Similarly, they failed to directly 
address the role of agency costs in capital structure adjustment process. The 
complications involved in cross-country analysis can be found in Rajan and Zingales 
(1995) study, when they compared the capital structure of G-7 countries using similar 
firm-specific proxies for all seven countries. They found the firm-specific factors to 
be correlated with leverage in a similar fashion across the G-7 countries, nevertheless, 
they pointed out that the economic underpinnings of the firm-specific factors are 
different. Although, there is no clear-cut consensus in the MNC capital structure 
literature, two forces are at the forefront; international factors and agency costs. 
Unfortunately, much attention is not drawn on to the role of international factors and 
agency costs in the adjustment process of MNCs capital structure. Firm-specific 
factors are often employed, but not enough attention is given to the financial market 
forces and the macroeconomic conditions in both the determination and adjustment 
process of MNCs capital structure. Thus this research is attempting to fill these gaps 
(determination and adjustment process) by examining the dynamics of US-based 
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MNCs capital structure relative to DCs, through the financial markets and 
macroeconomic conditions, while taken specific recognition of Myers (1977) and 
Jensen’s (1976) agency costs, firm-specific variables, and international factors.  
 
    5. Industry and capital structure dynamics 
The introduction of bankruptcy costs (Baxter, 1967; Kim, 1978, Kraus and 
Lichtenberger, 1973, and Stiglitz, 1972), information asymmetry (Myers, 1977), debt 
tax shield (DeAngelo and Masulis, 1980), and agency costs (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976,), suggested that firms do not belong to a similar risk class. Similarly, different 
industries have different sets of challenges which may be unique to the firms within 
the particular industry. The connection between industry membership and leverage is 
been widely examined in the literature. Using industry belonging as a proxy for risk 
class, prior studies found a relationship between financial leverage and the cost of 
equity (Hamada 1972). In subsequent periods, other researchers concluded that 
industry specific optimal leverage does in fact exist (DeAngelo-Masulis 1980, 
Masulis 1983, Schwartz and Aronson 1967). Several other researchers have found a 
relationship between leverage and industry membership (Scott 1972, Bowen et al 
1982, Cordes and Sheffrin 1983, and Bon-Horim et al 1987, Boquist and Moore's 
1984, Mandelker and Rhee 1984, Harris and Raviv 1991
32
, Bradley et al 1984, Long 
and Malitz 1985, and Jianjun Miao 2005). However, there is no general consensus 
regarding the major drivers of the dispersion of capital structure among industries. For 
                                                             
32
 However, G.Shanmugasundaram (2008) among others found evidence of intra-
industry variation of leverage in pharmaceutical industry in India. Alman 
A. & Molina C. (2002) noted leverage dispersion of leverage among firms in 
U.S. industries. Thus besides Inter-industry variation in leverage, there 
is ample evidence in the literature for intra-industry leverage dispersion. 
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example, some researchers point to tax shield and tax rates (DeAngelo-Masulis 1980) 
and (Masulis 1983), while others noted the relevance of earnings volatility (Bradley et 
al 1984). In sum, prior research has used various firm characteristics to explore the 
dynamics of firms’ capital structure belonging to similar industry. One of the gaps in 
previous literature is the lack of formal investigation of capital structure adjustment 
speed across industries of MNCs and DCs. 
Although financial theory appears to be linked to behavioural phenomenon through a 
cross fertilization of economics and psychology, very limited research is been 
conducted in the area of behavioural aspect of firms’ financing decisions. One such 
study is the herd migration hypothesis (Patel, Zeckhauser and Hendricks, 1991, 
Filbeck et al 1996) and the leader-follower hypothesis (Filbeck et al. 1996). Herd 
migration hypothesis regarding capital structure is to investigate whether firms within 
an industry tend to maintain an industry median leverage. There are serious 
implications for these behavioural phenomena, because the existence of herd 
migration relating to capital structure points to mental accounting and irrationality, 
instead of managers making rational financing decisions. Both (Patel et al. 1991) and 
(Filbeck et al 1996) in a cross-sectional model found herding behaviour among U.S. 
firms in the manufacturing industry. According to (Patel et al 1991), a statistically 
significant co-efficient on the lagged industry leverage indicates a tendency for herd 
migration.  
6. Macro-economy and capital structure dynamics 
Relatively little research has been done on the effect of macroeconomic conditions on 
capital structure dynamics, and very little is known about the impact of 
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macroeconomic states on capital structure adjustment speed
33
 toward targets for 
MNCs relative to DCs.  Hackbarth et al. (2006), as one of the most influential papers 
on the role of macroeconomic conditions on capital structure, shows that 
macroeconomic conditions do affect the choice of target capital structure. Thus, the 
capital structure adjustment speed is subject to both macroeconomic factors and the 
overall condition of the economy. An earlier study on this subject (Choe et al., 1993; 
Korajczyk and Levy, 2003) found that macroeconomic states are non-trivial factors 
for firms’ financing decisions. Since macroeconomic conditions vary over time (i.e. 
the economy undergoes through the natural business cycle of expansion and 
contraction), capital structure decisions including the adjustment process varies over 
time and across firms’ as macroeconomic conditions change. This dynamic 
relationship between capital structure and the macroeconomy highlights managers’ 
active effort to manage firm value and other competing factors of their business 
environment
34
. In a domestic context, Hackbarth et al. (2006) studied the role of 
                                                             
33 One of the implicit underlying economic and financial implications for 
faster adjustment in a good macroeconomic state relative to bad 
macroeconomic state is that equity investors (i.e the true owners of the 
firm) are holding 2 in 1 real options; they can either exercise their 
holdings in good macroeconomic state or hold for even better future returns 
as long as the firm moves closer to its target leverage which optimizes 
cost of capital. However, caution is needed here, because firms in a good 
macroeconomic state will likely move further away from the target due to a 
rise in market equity price, in which case, firms’ may need to rebalance 
their capital structure accordingly. Nevertheless, as long as firms adjust 
faster in good macroeconomic states relative to bad macroeconomic states, 
the 2 in 1 real option assumption is theoretically satisfied. 
 
34 Both firm value and the elements of the business environment may change 
in response to macroeconomic conditions. Naturally, such changes will 
affect different constituents of the firm differently. Therefore, to 
restore the perceived equilibrium between various constituents, managers’ 
must make adjustments. For leverage, changes in target capital structure 
and the adjustment speed can be characterized as managers’ responsiveness 
to shifts in macroeconomic conditions, and thus play a facilitative role in 
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dynamic capital structure decisions by employing a contingent model, which allows 
for dynamic capital structure adjustment, and their model suggests faster adjustment 
in economic expansions than in contractions. Similarly, Drobetz et al. (2006) shows a 
positive relationship between capital structure adjustment speed and business cycle 
for a sample of Swiss companies. Recently, Cook and Tang (2010), documented a 
positive correlation between macroeconomic conditions and capital structure 
adjustment speed for sample of US firms over a 30 year sample period from 1976 – 
2005. The empirical findings of Cook and Tang (2010) support the findings of 
Hackbarth et al. (2006) that firms’ adjust to their target leverage faster in good 
macroeconomic conditions relative to bad macroeconomic conditions. In their 
investigation of financing choice of unconstrained US firms, Korajczyk and Levy 
(2003) determined target capital structure as a function of the macroeconomic states 
and firm-specific characteristics, and shows a significant relationship between 
macroeconomic states and financing decisions for unconstrained firms. The state of 
the macroeconomy may also affect the dynamics of agency problems which in turn 
may affect capital structure dynamics. Thus, in their attempt to address the fluidity of 
agency problems in relation to changing macroeconomic conditions, Levy and 
Hennessy (2007) find evidence of a tactical managerial activism, where firms 
substitute equity for debt during economic expansions and substitute debt for equity 
during economic contractions. Such tactical rebalancing of debt and equity in 
different macroeconomic states serve a signalling function, in which managers during 
economic contraction deliberately increase their share of total equity holdings, 
sending a confidence signal to the market participants.  Another related study was by 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
maintaining a balance that maximized(minimized)value(loss)for debt and 
equity investors.  
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Gertler and Gilchrist (1994), who document the importance of macroeconomic 
conditions on firms’ capital structure.  Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) studied five 
periods of contractionary monetary policy (i.e. 1968, 1974, 1978, 1979, and 1988)
35
 
and then, group the sample firms’ by asset size to determine the effect of 
contractionary monetary policy on firms financing decisions. Their empirical results 
indicated that during periods of monetary policy tightening, short-term borrowing 
deteriorates for smaller firms and commercial paper
36
 financing rises for large firms
37
. 
Hence a period of contractionary monetary policy suggests existing good 
macroeconomic state, an increase in discount rate or a decrease in money supply 
directly affect long-term debt financing (Kashyap et al., 1993), which directly impact 
                                                             
35 Gertler and Gilchrist’s (1994) study shared a similar contextual spirit 
with the study conducted by Kashyap et al., (1993) in which the latter 
authors discussed the potential impact of monetary policy actions on the 
supply of loans by financial institutions through the balance sheet of the 
borrowers. Since the collateral value of fixed assets tend to be 
economically pro-cyclical, the leverage level through collaterability can 
be affected by the economic cycle. In other words, the return on fixed 
assets and the expected cash flows from those fixed assets in the case of 
bankruptcy determines the value of the collateral. Also to be noted is that 
the return on fixed assets and probability of bankruptcy may depend on the 
state of the economy.  
 
36 In the U.S, commercial paper is currently the only source of publicly 
traded short-term debt. Because commercial paper market requires high 
credit rating, it provides large firms or MNCs with the financial 
flexibility to keep their overall debt level low. That is, it allows firms 
to finance investments only when financing needs are known, and therefore 
minimize the borrowing costs associated with long-term financing before 
undertaking the project or financing need are determined. From a strategic 
viewpoint, the provision of low debt feature of commercial paper allows 
future access to debt market.   
 
37 This is consistent with the survey by Graham and Harvey (2001), that 
chief financial officers (CFOs) of US corporations cited financial 
flexibility as an important consideration for debt issues, and it also 
supports Opler et al. (1999) that firms may create financial flexibility by 
maintaining high cash holdings. It must be noted that high cash holdings 
involves substantial costs to the firm, nevertheless the benefits of high 
liquidity may offset the costs in a tight monetary policy environment. 
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debt level and the adjustment process. Their study (Gertler and Gilchrist, 1994), 
assuming irreversible investment, has at least two implications for capital structure; 
first, the deterioration in short-term borrowing for smaller firms suggest a shift to 
longer term borrowing and further deviation from target leverage; second, increase in 
commercial paper financing by large firms suggests a shift from long-term borrowing 
to short-term borrowing and less deviation from target leverage (Seidenberg and 
Strahan, 1999). In the context of MNCs and DCs, the former (MNCs) are generally 
and relatively large conglomerates and are considered less risky due to their 
diversified expected cash flow portfolio.   At least, from the perspective of domestic 
finance, the debate of capital structure adjustment speed in different macroeconomic 
states is not as contentious as prior studies that have ignored the effect of 
macroeconomic conditions on capital structure adjustment speed. A consensus 
appears to be gaining a momentum from the literature that firms adjust faster in good 
macroeconomic states than in bad macroeconomic states, yet to this point, such a 
consensus is only emanating from studies which used aggregated data, and has largely 
ignored the effect of macroeconomic conditions on capital structure adjustment speed 
of MNCs relative to DCs. There is evidence that macroeconomic factors may affect 
capital structure dynamics (Kashyap et al., 1993; Choe et al., 1993; Gertler and 
Gilchrist, 1994; Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997; Friedman and Kenneth, 1998; Korajczyk 
and Levy, 2003; Hackbarth et al, 2004; Cook and Tang, 2010). 
Prior literature has used a set of macroeconomic factors including default spread, 
GDP, and price-output ratio to define macroeconomic conditions (Fama and French, 
1989; Estrella & Hardouvelis 1991; Korajczyk, Levy 2003; Hackbarth et al. 2006; 
Rangvid, 2006; Frank and Goyal, 2004; Cook and Tang, 2010).  In a good 
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macroeconomic condition, the spread should be smaller and higher in bad 
macroeconomic condition (Fama and French, 1989).  
 
7. Dynamic Panel Estimators  
 
Standard panel estimators like the fixed effects regressions are often used in capital 
structure study; however, these techniques may be biased in a dynamic setting, where 
lagged dependent variables are included in the model (Dynamic models). Traditional 
estimators for a dynamic panel model with firm fixed effects includes mean 
differencing the model. As Flannery and Rangan (2006) observed, the bias in the 
mean differencing estimate of the speed of adjustment can be substantial for a 
dynamic panel dataset in which many firms have only a few years of data (a short 
time dimension bias). To reduce the bias, Flannery and Rangan rely on an 
instrumental variable in their mean differencing estimation. The weakness of mean 
differencing model has also been highlighted by Arellano and Bond (1991), that a 
lagged dependent variable in a fixed effect model is correlated with the error term, 
and therefore sufficiently endogenous. And, taking first-differences will eliminate the 
fixed effects but the first difference of lagged dependent variable is still correlated 
with the first difference of the error term, thus the fixed model will not resolve the 
endogeneity problem
38
.  
Recently, a vast majority of capital structure literature utilizes the dynamic panel 
estimators, by utilizing methods such as fixed effect instrumental variables (FEIV), 
                                                             
38
 Fixed effect regression takes out the common time-invariant and firm 
specific effects out of the error term and through first differencing 
eliminate completely the fixed effect component of the model. However, in a 
dynamic panel estimation, where a lagged dependent is necessary, the first 
differencing is not sufficient to solve the endogeneity problem 
(Roberts/Leary 2005, Arellano/Bond 1991, Greene 2003, chap.13). 
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Biased Corrected Least Squares Dummy variables (LSDVC)
 39
, and Generalized 
Method of Moments estimators. For example, Arellano/Bond (1991) estimator takes 
first differences of the panel data to eliminate individual effects, and dealt with the 
challenges of endogeneity by using lagged levels and differences of the dependent 
variables as instruments in a GMM framework. System GMM estimators such as 
Arellano/Bover (1995) or Blundell/Bond (1998) used similar methods such as 
Arellano/Bond (1991). Many researchers such as Antoniou, Guney, and Paudyal 
(2008) and Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender (2008) have used a system GMM 
(generalized method of moments) estimator. In the system GMM estimation, the 
model itself and the first difference of the model are estimated as a “system.” The 
system GMM estimator, however, may be biased when the dependent variable is 
highly persistent, as is the case with debt ratios.. All the various techniques used in the 
literature have their relative strengths and weaknesses. Thus, this chapter starts with 
all four major dynamic models used in the literature to independently examine 
adjustment speed for the three groups (i.e. DC, MNC, and MNC10). I used the 
traditional fixed effect instrumental variables estimator (FEIV), which specifically 
instrumentalized the lagged dependent variable with its two own lagged, then the 
Arellano and Bond (1991), first stage and second stage differenced GMM estimators, 
and finally, the LSDVC dynamic estimator is used to estimate the adjustment speed 
for MNCs and DCs. According to Bruno (2005), bias corrected least squares dummy 
(LSDVC) performs better than other dynamic models, when estimating unbalanced 
dynamic panel data, however LSDVC do not generate system standard errors, and are 
therefore estimated through a bootstrapping technique. The fixed effect instrumental 
                                                             
39 See Bruno (2005, 2005a, 2005b). 
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variables (FEIV) tend to perform well with unbalanced panel data without generating 
too many unnecessary instruments as in the case of GMM estimators and it directly 
generates standards errors.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
68 
 
References 
 
[1] Almazan, A., Molina, Carlos. 2002. Intra-Industry capital structure dispersion. 
McCombs Research Paper Series No. FIN-11-02. 
 
[2] Alti, A., (2006): How persistent is the impact of market timing on capital 
structure? Journal of Finance, 61(4), 1681-1710. 
 
[3] Antonios Antoniou, Yilmaz Guney and Krishna Paudyal. 2008. The Determinants 
of Capital Structure: Capital Market-Oriented versus Bank-Oriented Institutions. 
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, volume 43, pp 59-92. 
 
[4] Arellano, M., and S. Bond. “Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data: Monte-
Carlo Evidence and an Application to Employment Equations.” Review of Economic 
Studies, 38 (1991), 277-297. 
 
[5] Arellano, M., and O. Bover. “Another Look at Instrumental-Variable Estimation 
of Error- Components Models.” Journal of Econometrics, 68 (1995), 29-52. 
 
[6] Baker, Malcolm, and Jeffrey Wurgler. 2002. “Market Timing and Capital 
Structure”.    Journal of Finance 57 (February): 1-32. 
 
[7] Baxter, N., "Leverage, Risk of Ruin and the Cost of Capital," Journal of Finance 
22, September 1967, pp. 3956-403 
[8] Ben-David, I., Graham, J.R., Harvey, C.R. (2007): Managerial overconfidence and 
corporate policies. Working paper, Duke University 
 
[9] Blundell, R., and S. Bond. “Initial Conditions and Moment Restrictions in 
Dynamic Panel Data Models.” Journal of Econometrics, 87 (1998), 115-143. 
 
[10] Bon-Horim, M., S. Hochman and O. Palmon, "The Impact of the 1986 Tax 
Reform Act on Financial Policy," Financial Management 16, Autumn 1987, pp. 29-
35. 
 
[11] Bowen, R.M., L.A. Daley and C.C. Huber, "Evidence on the Existence and 
Determinants of Inter-Industry Differences in Leverage," Financial Management, 
Winter 1982, pp. 10-20. 
 
[12] Boquist, J.A., and W.T. Moore, "Inter-Industry Leverage Differences and the 
DeAngelo-Masulis Tax Shield Hypothesis," Financial Management, Spring 1984, pp. 
5-9. 
 
[13] Bradley, Michael, Gregg A. Jarrel & E. Han Kim. 1984. On the existence of an 
optimal capital structure: Theory and evidence. Journal of Finance, 39: 857-80. 
 
[14] Bruno, Giovanni S.F., 2005, Approximating the Bias of the LSDV Estimator for 
Dynamic Unbalanced Panel Data Model, Economic Letters 87, 361-366. 
69 
 
[15] Bruno, G.S.F. (2005a). Approximating the Bias of the LSDV Estimator for 
Dynamic Unbalanced Panel Data Models. Economics Letters 87 (1): 361-366. 
 
[16] Bruno, G.S.F. (2005b). Estimation and Inference in Dynamic Unbalanced Panel 
Data Models with a Small Number of Individuals. Stata Journal 5 (4): 473-500. 
 
[17] Burgman, A. Todd. 1996. An empirical examination of multinational corporate 
capital structure. Journal of International Business Studies, 27(3): 553-70. 
 
[18] Chen, C; C. Cheng; J. He; and J. Kim. "An Investigation of the Relationship 
between International Activities and Capital Structure."Journal of International 
Business Studies, 28 (1997), 563-577. 
 
[19] Choe, H., Masulis, R., Nanda, V., 1993. Common stock offerings across the 
business cycle: theory and evidence. Journal of Empirical Finance 1, 3-31. 
 
[20] Cook D, Tang T, 2010. Macroeconomic conditions and capital structure 
adjustment speed. Journal of Corporate Finance 16 (1) 73-87. 
 
[21] Cordes, J.J., and S.M. Sheffrin, "Estimating the Tax Advantage of Corporate 
Debt," Journal of Finance 38, March 1988, pp. 95-105. 
 
[22] Chkir I, Cosset J "Diversification Strategy and Capital Structure of Multinational 
Corporations. ", Journal of Multinational Financial Management 11, 2001, 17-37. 
 
[23] Darren J. Kisgen Source: The Journal of Finance, Vol. 61, No. 3 (Jun., 2006), pp. 
1035-1072 
 
[24] DeAngelo, H. & R. Masulis1 1980. Optimal capital structure under corporate and 
personal taxation. Journal of Financial Economics, March: 3 -29.  
 
[25] Doukas, J. and C. Pantzalis, 2003, "Geographic Diversification and Agency 
Costs of Debt of Multinational Firms," Journal of Corporate Finance 9, 59-92. 
 
[26] Drobetz, W., and G. Wanzenried, 2006, What determines the speed of adjustment 
to the target capital structure? Applied Financial Economics 16, 941–958. 
  
[27] Drobetz Wolfgang, Pascal Pensa. (2007). Capital Structure and Stock Returns: 
The European Evidence. http://ssrn.com/abstract=957302 
 
[28] Errunza V and L. Senbet “International Corporate Diversification, Market 
Valuation and Size-Adjusted Evidence”. Journal of Finance, 34 (1984), 727-745. 
 
[29] Estrella A., Hardouvelis, G., 1991. The term structure as a predictor for real 
economic activity. Journal of Finance 46, 555-576. 
 
[30] Fama, Eugene F., and Kenneth R. French, 2002, Testing trade off and pecking 
order predictions about dividends and debt, Review of Financial Studies 15, 1-33. 
 
70 
 
[31] Fatemi, Ali M. 1984. Shareholder benefits from corporate international 
diversification. Journal of Finance, 39: 1325-44. 
 
[32] Fatemi, Ali M. 1988. The effect of international diversification on corporate 
financing policy. Journal of Business Research, 16: 17-30. 
 
[33] Filbeck, Greg., Gorman. F. R., & Preece, C. Dianna. 1996. Behavioural aspects 
of the Intra-Industry capital structure decision. Journal of Financial and Strategic 
Decisions, 1-13. 
 
[34] Fisher, E., R. Heinkel, and J. Zechner, 1989, Dynamic capital structure choice: 
theory and tests, Journal of Finance 44, 19–40. 
 
[35] Flannery, Mark and Kasturi Ranjan, 2006, Partial adjustment toward target 
capital structure, Journal of Financial Economics 79, 469-506 
 
[36] Frank, Murray Z. and Vidhan K. Goyal, 2005, Tradeoff and pecking order 
theories of debt, Working Paper, University of British Columbia 
 
[37] Frank, M.Z., and V.K. Goyal, 2007, Trade-off and pecking order theories of debt, 
in B.E. Eckbo, (ed.) Handbook of Corporate Finance: Empirical Corporate Finance, 
Vol. 2. In: Handbook of Finance Series, Chapter 12, – (Elsevier/North-Holland, 
Amsterdam).  
 
[38] Gertler, Mark, and Gilchrist, Simon. "Monetary Policy, Business Cycles, and the 
Behavior of Small Manufacturing Firms." Q.J.E. 109 (May 1994): 309-40. 
 
[39] Geyikdagi, Yasar M. 1981. The cost of equity capital and risk of 28 U.S. 
multinational corporations vs. 28 U.S. domestic corporations: 1965-1978. 
Management International Review, 21: 89-94. 
 
[40] Graham, J.R., and Harvey, C.R. (2001): The theory and practice of corporate 
finance: Evidence from the field. Journal of Financial Economics, 60(2-3), 187-243. 
 
[41] Greene, W. H. Econometric Analysis. 5th edition, Upper Saddle River, New 
Jersey: Prentice-Hall, (2003). 
 
[42] Hackbarth et al., 2006 D. Hackbarth, J. Miao and E. Morellec, Capital structure,  
credit risk, and macroeconomic conditions, Journal of Financial Economics 82  
(2006), pp. 519–550 
 
[43] Hamada, R.S., "The Effect of the Firm's Capital Structure on the Systematic Risk 
of Common Stocks," Journal of Finance, 1972, pp. 435-452. 
 
[44] Harris, Milton & Artur Raviv. 1991. The theory of capital structure. Journal of 
Finance, 46: 297-355 
 
71 
 
[45] Jensen, Michael C., WH. Meckling. 1976. Theory of the firm: Managerial 
behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3: 
305-60. 
 
[46] Jensen, Michael C., 1986, Agency costs of free-cash-flow, corporate finance, and 
takeovers, American Economic Review 76, 323-329.  
 
[47] Jo-Ann, S., Davidson, W., Singh, M., Corporate diversification strategies and 
capital structure. The quarterly review of economics and finance, volume 43, Issue 1, 
2003, Pages 147-167. 
 
[48] Kashyap, A., Stein, J., Wilcox, D., 1993. Monetary policy and credit conditions: 
evidence from the composition of external finance. American Economic Review 83 
(1), 78–97. 
 
[49] Kim, E.H., "A Mean-Variance Theory of Optimal Capital Structure and 
Corporate Debt Capacity," Journal of Finance 33, March 1978, pp. 45-63. 
 
[50] Kiyotaki, N., Moore, J., 1997. Credit cycles. The Journal of Political Economy 
105, 211-248. 
 
[51] Korajczyk, R. A., and A. Levy, 2003, Capital structure choice: Macroeconomic 
conditions and financial constraints, Journal of Financial Economics 68, 75–109. 
 
 
[52] Kraus, A. & R. Litzenberger.19 73. A state preference model of optimal financial 
leverage. Journal of Finance, 28:911-21 
 
[53] Leary, Mark T. and Michael R. Roberts, 2005, Do firms rebalance their capital 
structure? Journal of Finance 60, 2575-2619 
 
[54] Lee, Kwang Chul. 1986. The capital structure of the multinational corporation: 
International factors and multinationality. Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University 
of South Carolina. 
 
[55] Lee, Kwang Chul & Chuck C.Y Kwok. 1988. Multinational corporations vs. 
domestic corporations: International environmental factors and determinants of capital 
structure. Journal of International Business Studies, 19 (2): 195-217. 
 
[56] Leland, Hayne and Pyle, David. Informational Asymmetries, Financial Structure 
and financial Intermediation. Journal of Finance, XXXII:371–387, 1977. 
 
[57] Lemmon, M., M. Roberts, and J. Zender, 2008, Back to the beginning: 
Persistence in the cross section of corporate capital structure, Journal of Finance, 63, 
1575-1608. 
 
[58] Levy, A., and Hennessy, C, "Why does capital structure choice vary with 
macroeconomic conditions?" Journal of Monetary Economics, vo1.54, no. 6, pp. 
1545-1564,2007 
72 
 
 
[59] Lewellen, W . 1971. A pure financial rationale for the conglomerate merger. 
Journal of Finance ay: 521-37 
 
[60] Long, M.S., and E.B. Malitz, "Investment Patterns and Financial Leverage," In: 
B. Friedman (ed.), Corporate Capital Structures in the United States, Chicago: 
Inventory of Chicago Press, 1985. 
 
[61] Lucas, Deborah, and Robert MacDonald, 1990, Equity issues and stock price 
dynamics, Journal of Finance 45, 1019-1043. 
 
[62] Malmendier, U., Tate, G., Yan, J. (2007): Corporate financial policies with 
overconfident managers. Working paper, UC Berkeley, NBER, UCLA, and Stanford 
University. 
 
[63] Mandelker, G.N., and S.G. Rhee, "The Impact of the Degrees of Operating and 
Financial Leverage on Systematic Risk of Common Stock." Journal of Financial and 
Quantitative Analysis 19, March 1984, pp. 45-57. 
 
[64] Masulis, R.W., "The Impact of Capital Structure Change on Firm Value: Some 
Estimates," Journal of Finance 38, March 1983, pp. 107-126. 
 
[65] Miao, Jianjun, 2005, Optimal capital structure and industry dynamics, The 
Journal of Finance. 
 
[66] Michel, Allen & Israel Shaked. 1986. Multinational corporations vs. domestic 
corporations: Financial performance and characteristics. Journal of International 
Business Studies, 17 (3): 89-100. 
 
[67] Milken, Michael. 2009. Why capital structure matters: Companies that 
repurchased stock years ago re in a world of hurt. The Wall Street Journal, [online] 21 
April. Available at: <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124027187331937083.html> 
[Accessed 1 March 2011].  
 
[68] Modigliani, F. & M. Miller. 1958. The cost of capital, corporation finance and 
the theory of investments. American Economic Review, 48: 261-97. 
 
[69] Modigliani, F. & Miller, M. H. 1963 “Corporate income taxes and the cost of 
capital”,American Economic Review, pp. 433-443. 
 
[70] Myers, Stewart C. 1977. Determinants of corporate borrowing. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 5: 147-75. 
 
[71] Myers and N. Majluf, 1984, Corporate financing and investment decisions when 
firms have information that investors do not have, Journal of Financial Economics 
13, 187–224. 
 
[72] Myers, Stewart C., 1984, The capital structure puzzle, Journal of Finance 39, 
575-592.  
73 
 
 
[73] Patel, J., R. Zeckhauser, and D. Hendricks, “The Rationality Struggle: 
Illustrations from Financial Markets,” American Economic Review Papers and 
Proceedings, 1991, pp. 232-236. 
 
[74] Rajan, R., and L. Zingales, 1995, What do we know about the capital structure? 
Some evidence from international data, Journal of Finance 50, 1421–1460. 
 
[75] Rangvid, J., 2006. Output and expected returns. Journal of Financial Economics 
81, 595-624. 
 
[76] Ross, Stephen A. 1977. The determination of financial structure: The incentive-
signaling approach. Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science, 8: 75-80. 
 
[77] Schwartz, E. and J.R. Aronson, "Some Surrogate Evidence in Support of the 
Concept of Optimal Financial Structure," Journal of Finance 22, March 1967, pp. 10-
18. 
 
[78] Scott, D .F. 1977. Bankruptcy, secured debt and optimal capital structure. Journal 
of Finance arch: 1 – 19 
 
[79] Scott, D.F, J.D. Martin.1 975. Industry influence on financial structure. Financial 
Management, Spring:6 7- 73. 
 
[80] Scott, J.H., "A Theory of Optimal Capital Structure," The Bell Journal of 
Economics, 1972, pp. 33-54. 
 
[81] Shanmugasundaram, G. 2008. Intra-Industry variations of capital structure in 
Pharmaceutical industry in India. International Research Journal of Finance and 
Economics, 16:1-13. 
 
[82] Stiglitz, J.E., "A Re-Examination of the Modigliani-Miller Theorem," American 
Economic Review 59, December 1972, pp. 784-793. 
 
[83] Stulz, R., 1990. Managerial discretion and optimal financing policies. Journal of 
Financial Economics 26, 3-28. 
 
[84]Titman, Sheridan. 1984. Determinants of capital structure. An empirical analysis. 
Working paper, UCLA, January 
 
[85] Welch, Ivo, 2004, Capital structure and stock returns, Journal of Political 
Economy 112, 106-131. 
 
1 
 
Chapter 2 
 
Dynamic capital structure adjustment:  US MNCs & DCs 
Abstract 
This empirical chapter uses dynamic panel estimators to examine whether there are 
differences in capital structure adjustment speed between US-based Multinationals (hereafter, 
MNCs) and Domestic Corporations (hereafter, DCs), and if so, what theoretical factors 
contribute to the differences. Hence prior literature attributes the differences in leverage level 
between US-based MNCs and DCs to agency costs of debt financing, and the theorized 
variance stabilization of overall cash flows due to diversification, this chapter specifically 
tests the effect of these variables on the adjustment speed of MNCs relative to DCs. 
Relatedly, specific speed factors of adjustment and the rebalancing of capital structure 
following equity price shock were investigated. The final analysis of integrated comparative 
dynamic partial adjustment model using fixed effect instrumental variables (FEIV)  shows 
that on average, DCs adjust to target leverage faster than MNCs, supporting the market-
timing, pecking order, and the dynamic trade-off theories of capital  structure as it relates to 
equity market returns, debt-capacity and relative target leverage. The chapter identified and 
attributed the overall relatively faster capital structure adjustment speed of DCs to; the 
relatively higher equity returns for MNCs, relatively lower incidence of under-leverage (i.e. 
debt capacity < 1) for DCs, and the relatively higher incidence of above-target leverage for 
DCs. The specific comparative test of agency costs and cash flows on adjustment speed, 
shows that agency costs (M/B), financial flexibility (i.e. Cash Flows) and capital investments 
have different effect on adjustment process for MNCs relative to DCs. The result partially 
supports prior evidence of inertia following equity price shock to capital structure rebalancing 
(Welch, 2004).  
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Keywords: Dynamic capital structure adjustment; adjustment speed factors; capital structure 
rebalancing; MNCs vs. DCs; panel Analysis 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The estimation of the dynamic partial adjustment model shows that on average US 
Multinationals
1
 adjust to target capital structure relatively slower than their domestic 
counterparts. Although, agency costs, financial flexibility and diversification of cash 
flows implied relatively faster adjustment for MNCs, the relative structural 
complexity of MNCs capital structure, investor complexity of MNCs (i.e. range, 
dispersion in taste and classes of investors due to active cross border operations), and 
an almost exclusive financial market complexities faced by MNCs, all implied 
relatively slower adjustment speed. 
In general, capital structure matters to all stakeholders. It draws attention to some of 
the most important questions in modern finance - how managers finance (i.e. Equity 
vs. Debt) their investments? The choice of financing investment projects influences 
both the payoff and conflicts between various stakeholders. “It doesn‟t matter whether 
a company is big or small, capital structure matters. It always has and always will” 
                                                             
 
1 MNC is defined in this study as a firm that engages in foreign direct 
investment, either through acquisition and mergers, or through primary 
entrance into foreign market with established physical presence as a taxed 
entity. To differentiate foreign direct investment from pure international 
trade (i.e. import and export), a tax approach is used to defined MNCs. A 
subsidiary of an MNC pays taxes in the country it is located, thus firms 
with reported foreign tax are classified as MNCs. A second definition (i.e. 
more restricted) of MNC in this study is all MNCs with at least a foreign 
tax ratio of 10% (i.e. combined foreign tax to consolidated total tax). 
MNCs are very important in a globalized economy. In fact, globalization is 
predominantly led by MNCs. Some MNCs have an economy surpassing the GDP of 
most countries. Their lobbying power can affect foreign residents where the 
subsidiaries are located, and a sudden withdrawal of MNCs from a foreign 
market may cause a major macro-economic dilemma, including monetary policy 
determination. DCs in this study are the strictly US-based domestic firms – 
that is firms with zero reported foreign tax.   
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Michael Milken (WSJ April, 21, 2009). A disciplined capital structure is essential not 
only for shareholder value maximization, but also its impact on a firm‟s ability to 
effectively compete. Thus it affects both value and risk.  
The relationship between capital structure and firm value may be broadly understood 
through the weighted average cost of capital (WACC)
2
. The mixed of capital (i.e. 
equity and debt) is an important input in the computation of the weighted average cost 
of capital (WACC) of a firm, which in turn affects both investment decisions and 
return on investment (ROI). Thus, the overall cost of capital varies with capital 
structure. In addition, varying capital structure triggers a market driven mutation in 
conflicts of interest among the stakeholders, notably between debt and equity 
investors. In such a dynamic setting, management has to determine the impact of 
changes in capital structure on the overall cost of capital, firm value, investment 
decisions, and on conflicting interest groups. Target capital structure suggested by 
trade-off theory incorporates this capital structure dynamics and therefore implied an 
adjustment back to the target leverage following a deviation from the optimal level
3
. 
As to risk, overleverage
4
 and operational risk (i.e. unsatisfactory interest coverage 
ratio from core operations) can force the firm into involuntary bankruptcy or 
undermine its ability to effectively compete. Both overleverage and underleveraged 
may be seen as a bane for the firm. For example, generally, an over-levered firm is 
                                                             
2
 This is by far the most widely used metric in the capital budgeting 
process. Capital budgeting process may be viewed as an investment selection 
process conditional on cost of capital and other considerations. However, 
just like any other metric, WACC has its own limitations. 
3 The economic intuition for optimal capital structure is to find a balance 
within the internal and external environment in which the business 
operates. In other words all stakeholders are to be considered. This is a 
complex task, and is one of the reasons we cannot directly observe the 
optimal capital structure, and thus has to be estimated.   
4 In the literature over-leverage is usually measured by debt capacity (i.e. 
debt/ppe > 1, see appendix for variables), but it can also be viewed from 
an operational perspective, where enough income is not generated to meet 
fixed financial obligation. 
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perceived by the capital markets to be relatively riskier, which indirectly affects 
firm‟s value through costs of capital. And under leverage may be viewed as a sign of 
managerial inefficiency or even as value destruction.
5
 However, sometimes, both 
overleverage and underleveraged may constitute a strategic capital structure 
management. For instance, firms may intentionally lower their leverage level to 
influence credit ratings. Similarly, firms in anticipation of major future investment 
may opt for lower leverage at present, in order to create space for future debt 
financing. But, such strategies may be challenged on the grounds of wealth transfer 
from one period to another and possibly between existing investors and new investors. 
Yet still, firms may intentionally overshoot their leverage to deter possible hostile 
takeovers, transfer of wealth from debt holders to equity holders, especially when 
bankruptcy is eminent (i.e. within management circle). The abovementioned 
possibilities, if applied in a broader context points to the fact that capital structure 
affects all stakeholders and therefore matters to all constituents of a firm.   
The discussion of capital structure in the international finance literature suggests that 
capital structures of MNCs are different from DCs. If this is so, then logically, the 
adjustment process should be different as well.  Some of the major sources of capital 
structure differences between MNCs and DCs include capital structure ambiguity and 
the intricate network of stakeholders of MNCs relative to DCs.  
First, from a financial perspective, the ambiguity of MNCs capital structure is 
embedded in the consolidated financial statements prepared by the US parent 
company. This aggregated capital structure is a result of a pooling of several 
                                                             
5
 Debt has less information asymmetry problem and thus relatively cheaper 
than equity. Due to interest tax shield, it lowers WACC. From this view, 
under-levered firms may not be optimizing cost of capital. A counter view 
is that under-levered firms have relatively higher flexibility to adjust 
their debt level due to unused debt capacity. 
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independent capital structures influenced by different national accounting standards 
(Lee 1986)
6
. The consolidation mechanism differentiates MNC capital structure in at 
least two major ways. First, investors not familiar with foreign accounting standards 
may interpret the combined capital structure differently (Choi 1993). The partial 
solution to this problem is, to de-consolidate the financial statements for analysis, but 
this process will enormously increase agency costs, not only between equity investors 
and management, but also between equity investors and debt investors. Second, it 
complicates the assessing of risk at both subsidiary and parent level. Capital structure 
theorists argued that capital structure can serve a signalling function to mitigate 
uncertainty of risk (Ross 1977), but in the case of MNCs, capital structure may 
increase uncertainty. For example, at the subsidiary level, an investor may not rely 
just on the subsidiaries capital structure without a guarantee from the parent. And at 
the parent level, an investor may need to evaluate individual entities that make up the 
consolidated capital structure in order to reasonably assess overall risk. In effect, the 
signalling function may not pertain to MNCs as it may have for domestic firms. 
Second, from a stakeholder perspective, MNCs compared to their domestic 
counterparts (DCs), have a larger and more complex network of interest groups, and 
this complexity increases as MNCs continue to grow through mergers and 
acquisitions. Prior research shows that capital structure matters to a whole spectrum 
of interest groups (Cornell & Shapiro 1987). In the case of MNCs, underlying 
independent capital structures increases heterogeneity in all stakeholder-categories. 
Moreover, members of similar interest groups within the MNC may have conflicting 
                                                             
6 US GAAP requires that foreign financial statements be translated before 
consolidation at the parent level; however, the detail transactions 
culminating into full independent capital structure of the subsidiary are 
generally prepared in accordance with the national accounting standards 
where the subsidiary is located. 
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goals depending on the subsidiary/entity (Slovin & Sushka 1997).
7
 For example, it is 
not rare for a parent firm to guarantee a loan to the subsidiary, or infuse cash or equity 
into a subsidiary, however, such actions may incidentally improve the position of 
investors in the subsidiary, but it may increase risk for the investors in the parent 
company (i.e. type of wealth transfer). As a result, the capital structure of MNCs is 
much more complex than in the national case. 
On the other hand, and from the firm behaviour efficiency perspective, the operational 
and structural complexities of MNCs may be justified. As nations compete for foreign 
direct investment, MNCs may become the beneficiaries of incentivized taxation 
scheme. MNCs can bypass certain externalities such transportation costs, both tariff 
and non-barriers, by directly going to the foreign market through acquisitions and 
mergers. Through their subsidiaries, MNCs may gain favourable access to the inputs 
of production and therefore build economies of scale, and more efficient distribution 
channels. In addition, MNCs through their subsidiaries can directly control 
proprietary technology (i.e. contrary to licensing agreement), and better implement in 
the final product market, price discriminations that may not be possible for their 
domestic counterpart. Given the overwhelming evidence in prior literature regarding 
lower leverage and higher agency costs for MNCs, this chapter argued that within the 
dynamic trade-off framework , specific firm characteristics like agency costs, 
financial flexibility and investments have relatively higher adjustment effect on 
MNCs than DCs.  
                                                             
7 This type of conflict may arise from differences in investor 
characteristics, jurisdictional heterogeneity, and most importantly, 
transfer of wealth from the investors of one entity group to another or 
from one interest group to another. 
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The chapter is divided into ten sections. The first section briefly reviews relevant prior 
studies of capital structure dynamics. The second section developed and formulates 
related research questions and hypothesises. The third section discusses the data 
generating process (DGP) and leverage measure. The fourth section discusses the 
descriptive statistics. This section discusses some of the key characteristics of MNCs 
and DCs. In the fifth section, the partial adjustment and capital structure are explained 
with the integrated modified dynamic partial adjustment process. This section 
discusses partial adjustment of capital structure and develops the equations for 
empirical testing. The sixth section suggests Adjustment speed factors. The aim of 
this section is to investigate the individual effect of specific factors on capital 
structure adjustment speed of MNCs and DCs. The seventh section discusses the 
relevance of financial flexibility, external financing costs and the mitigating factors, 
to capital structure adjustment speed. The eight section discusses the rebalancing of 
capital structure following an equity price shock. This section is to investigate 
whether there are differences in the rebalancing behaviour between MNCs and DCs, 
following equity prices changes. The ninth section discusses econometric techniques 
used in this study. Empirical findings are discussed in section ten followed by a 
summary and conclusion section. 
 
2. Review of capital structure adjustment literature8  
Over the years, a number of theories evolved attempting to explain variations in 
corporate financing decisions across firms‟. In their seminal paper, Modigliani and 
                                                             
8
 There is a separate chapter specifically dedicated to literature review of 
the broader capital structure research, including research on 
Multinationals. Thus, the review in this chapter mainly pertains to the 
specific research question of the chapter. Furthermore, this approach 
minimizes the recycling of the literature. 
 
8 
 
Miller (1958) shows that a firm's choice of capital structure is irrelevant to its intrinsic 
value when capital markets are perfect (i.e. zero taxes, no transaction costs, and no 
informational advantage). However, in their subsequent paper, in which the zero tax 
assumption was relaxed, Modigliani and Miller (1963) made a value proposition, that 
firms should use 100% debt financing in a pseudo-perfect market – this was meant to 
fully utilize the debt tax shield. In practice, however, many firms show a moderate 
amount of leverage, which suggests an existence of certain costs attached to debt 
financing, as a result of capital market imperfections. In an imperfect capital market, 
managers under optimal contract are expected to deal with the dynamic market forces 
to increase value for their shareholders and concurrently meet their financial 
obligations to the creditors. Accordingly, the observed capital structure may be 
explained by proactive managerial activism in balancing the costs and benefits of debt 
in order to fulfil their mandate (i.e optimal contract). Since the “irrelevance” 
proposition by Miller and Modigliani (1958)
9
, the academic community has been 
vigorously debating the determinants and adjustment dynamics of capital structure. 
Although, there is no general consensus on the dynamics of capital structure, prior 
evidences have advanced our understanding of the role of firm characteristics in 
determining the mix of capital.  
Notably, the capital structure literature is dominated by two main competing 
theories, the classic trade-off theory and the pecking order theory
10
. However, market 
timing hypothesis and inertia propositions have recently entered the literature and 
                                                             
9
 The “irrelevance” proposition assumes perfect capital markets and zero 
corporate tax. The tax assumption was relaxed in the subsequent paper 
(Modigliani & Miller, 1963). Ever since, all other assumptions have been 
relaxed, resulting in the discovery and development of several empirically 
testable capital structure determinants, theories and hypothesises.   
10
 The pecking order theory, motivated by information asymmetry was 
initially proposed by Donaldson (1961) and later extended by Myers and 
Majluf (1984).This is the hierarchical financing model, from cheap to 
expensive financing. 
9 
 
have gained considerable attention of both the academics and the practitioners. The 
dynamic version of both trade-off and pecking order theories are mainly the dominant 
alternative in empirical capital structure research
11
. The problem with the static trade-
off theory is that, it assumes instantaneous readjustment, which implies either zero 
transaction costs or managers‟ indifference to transaction costs. On the other hand, the 
pure pecking order assumes strict adherence to the order of financing, dictated by 
issuing costs; from internal capital to debt and finally to equity. These classic versions 
of trade-off and pecking order theories are incongruent with the dynamics of both 
firm characteristics and the capital markets. The dynamic trade-off model relaxes the 
stickiness of static trade-off theory and has combined the key ingredients of both 
pecking order
12
 and trade-off theory, as it allows temporary deviation from the 
optimal leverage, the readjustment process is thus determined by both the attributes of 
pecking order and trade-off theories.  
The dynamic trade-off notion is that, firms do attempt to maintain an optimal (target) 
capital structure that balances the costs and benefits associated with different degrees 
of leverage, and has an implicit positive effect on expected return on investment. This 
view posits that firms counteract disruptions in their optimal capital structure by 
rebalancing their leverage ratio back to the optimal level. However, such rebalancing 
is done gradually (partially) due to transaction costs imposed by imperfect capital 
markets. The dynamic trade-off theory therefore leads us to two central questions; 
first what are the costs and benefits of debt financing? Second, what are the costs and 
benefits of readjusting to target? If we assume that firms have varying costs and 
                                                             
11 Among the list are Fama and French (2002), Frank and Goyal (2005), 
Flannery and Ranjan (2006), Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman (2001), Mehotra, 
Mikkelsen, Partch (2003), and Strebulaev (2004). 
12 Pecking order and market timing suggests that there is no target 
leverage, which essentially differentiates the trade-off theory from other 
theories. 
10 
 
benefits of both debt financing and adjustment to target, then firms should have 
varying debt level and varying speed of adjustment to target. To answer these 
questions in a dynamic trade-off framework, prior research weighs the costs and 
benefits of debt financing using specific firm-level characteristics. Similarly, the costs 
of deviating from target is weighed against the cost of moving towards the target, as 
well as the mitigating factors that minimizes external financing costs and therefore 
either speed up the adjustment process or tempered the costs of deviation from target.  
However, there is a lack of broader consensus as to the theoretical predictions of the 
determinants of leverage and factors of adjustment speed. For instance, the prediction 
of the trade-off theory is that firms with lower bankruptcy costs or higher tax 
advantages should use more debt. Yet, a closer scrutiny of observed leverage reveals 
that firms subjected to similar tax policy (i.e. statutory tax rate) may have different 
debt level, thus the tax rate alone couldn‟t explain the variation across firms. 
Similarly, the proxies used in empirical testing are far from perfect - take bankruptcy 
proxy for instance - a probability measure using firm-level characteristics, but recent 
events of unexpected bankruptcy of high profile Wall Street firms highlights the 
weaknesses of such predictions (i.e. bankruptcy proxy).  
Nevertheless, the issue of adjustment to target leverage is central to the understanding 
of trade-off theory (Flannery and Hankins, 2007, Frank and Goyal, 2008). But how 
fast do firms adjust and why do some firms adjust faster than the others are still under 
intense academic debate.  The trend in the literature suggests that researchers are 
focused on firm-level characteristics as distinguishing determinants of both leverage 
and the adjustment process. Yet, empirical evidences for adjustment speed estimates 
ranged from 7% to 100%. Perhaps a major area of dissension among the researchers is 
the source and the degree of adjustment costs (Leary and Roberts, 2005) – the issue 
11 
 
here is that of the dynamics of the capital markets. Both transaction costs and the 
magnitude of those costs are intricate functions of the capital market perception of the 
firm and the firm-level characteristics – Both of which vary across firms and over 
time.  
Consequently, in prior papers, various approaches have been used to detect 
heterogeneity across firms, assuming uniform adjustment speed or looking to relative 
leverage (i.e. whether the firm is under or over leverage). Roberts and Leary (2005) 
shows that rebalancing options influenced adjustment costs and Hovakimian et al 
(2001) reported faster adjustment for overleverage firms and those firms that use debt 
reduction as preferred rebalancing option, and Flannery and Hankins (2007), noted 
the significant effects of size, equity price increase and debt capacity usage on the 
speed of adjustment.  
At best, the existing literature has provided mixed results on the speed of adjustment 
toward target leverage. For example, Flannery and Ranjan (2006) estimate 35.5 for 
market leverage and 34.2% for book leverage, Flannery and Hankins (2007) reported 
approximately 22% readjustment each year, Fama and French (2002) reported 
adjustment speed in a range of 7 to 18%, Huang & Ritter (2007) reported 23.2% for 
market leverage and 17% for book leverage, Lemmon et al. (2008) reported 25% for 
book leverage, and Roberts (2001) reports adjustment speed close to 100% for certain 
industries. My findings in this chapter lies somewhere between prior evidences. The 
adjustment speed for DCs depending on the econometric technique has a range of 34 
to 53%, 41 to 58% for MNCs (i.e. MNC broadly defined) and 52 to 74% for MNC10 
(i.e. MNCs with 10% or > of foreign tax ratio). It is imperative to note that, the speed 
at which firms adjust has important implications. If firms adjust rapidly, then 
historical financing decisions and stock price changes will have little effect on the 
12 
 
observed leverage, and the contrary should be true if firms adjust slowly. From 
another perspective, rapid adjustment to target may signify among others, relative 
lower transaction costs (such as  lower external financing costs), higher costs of 
deviating from target, rigid debt contractual agreements or superior financial 
flexibility.  
3. Research Question and formulation of Hypothesis: 
Given the vast amount of literature on capital structure dynamics, and yet relatively 
little research on the capital structure of US-based MNCs, this chapter attempts to 
investigate the related questions of whether MNCs and DCs adjust to target leverage at 
a similar rate of speed? And to further investigate the differing influence of certain 
speed factors of adjustment to target, and thus, the rebalancing behaviour following 
shock to market leverage? These related questions therefore motivate the following 
hypothesises: 
A. Hypothesis 1: Overall, MNCs on average adjust to target leverage slower than DCs  
B. Hypothesis 2: Assuming the three stylized facts below, agency costs and financial 
flexibility due to size and diverse nature of MNCs relatively and positively accelerates 
adjustment speed. 
I. MNCs have greater financial flexibility through internal financing channels 
among the corporate headquarter and its subsidiaries. 
II. MNCs have greater access to capital markets due to their tenure in the 
financial markets and information competitiveness (i.e. large firms are very 
well researched by financial analyst, and therefore, relatively more timely, 
relevant and reliable information is available) 
13 
 
III. Due to the size of average MNCs, the costs of monitoring is expected to be 
higher (i.e. element of agency costs), thus, prolonged deviation from target 
leverage is relatively costly. 
 
C. Hypothesis 3: Given the relatively limited financial markets in which DCs operate, the 
mitigating factors of external financing costs on capital structure adjustment speed are 
more pronounced for DCs than MNCs.  
 
4. Data  and Methodology 
 
My data set consists of annual Compustat data from the years 1991 through 2009. 
Financial firms (SIC codes 6000-6999) and regulated utilities (SIC codes 4900-4999) 
are excluded from the sample as the capital structure of these firms are affected by 
regulation, thus not market driven. I eliminated firm-years with missing values for all 
leverage factors, X, and observations with negative book value of equity (Flannery 
and Hankins 2007). Given the econometric methodology (dynamic panel estimators), 
firms with less than 5 years of data are excluded. From the main sample, firms that 
reported foreign taxes are classified into the broader MNC definition. Furthermore, in 
order to appropriately compute foreign tax ratios (FTR), negative and missing values 
of foreign and domestic taxes are excluded from MNC group (Chen et al, 1997). A 
firm may appear in both DC and MNC group if a firm did not report foreign taxes in a 
given year. To avoid this cross-listing or overlap between the two groups, I eliminate 
those firms in the DC group that are already in the MNC group. From the broader 
MNC definition (i.e. all firms with reported foreign taxes), I computed foreign tax 
ratio (FTR), and then generate the 10% threshold of FTR to obtain a second measure 
of MNC. Thus, MNC10 are all MNCs with 10% or more foreign tax ratio (i.e. 
MNC10 may be viewed as a degree of internationalization). Agriculture, Fishing and 
14 
 
non-classifiable industries are excluded as they constitute less than 1% of the total 
sample. To mitigate the probable impact of outliers, capital structure determinants are 
cut-off at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles. There are 15,325 firm years (i.e. MNCs, 7506 
and DCs, 7819), 1,539 firm participation (i.e. MNCs, 729 and DCs, 810), MNC10 has 
5,878 firm years and the average panel length is 10 years. Summary statistics are 
presented in Table 2. 
 
4a. Defining Leverage 
Several alternative definitions of leverage have been used in the literature. In prior 
studies, some form of debt ratio whether market or book values are used to study the 
composite nature of firms‟ capital structure. Leverage measures also differ whether long 
term debt or total debt is used. There is no general consensus which leverage measure is 
superior, given the fact that firms have different asset and liability structure. Nevertheless, 
recently, leverage measure using market value has higher frequency in the literature than 
book leverage. Market leverage is forward looking and it implies instantaneously account 
of all available information through the financial markets (i.e. efficient market 
hypothesis). On the other hand, market-based leverage are far more likely to be volatile 
than book leverage, and it is also not directly controlled by management. Book value 
based leverage, in contrast is a historical accounting output, determined through the 
accounting systems, and management may have significant influence over the reported 
figures.
13
 Nevertheless, major contributions in the literature are made through the 
                                                             
13
 On the issue of book value vs. Market value, Barclay et al. (2006) argued 
that the two measures are different. Some of the differences may be glean 
from the conflicting predictions of well known capital structure 
determinants when book leverage and market leverage are contrasted. For 
example, the predictions of trade off theory tend to favour book leverage, 
whereas pecking order and agency theories tend to be market-oriented. It is 
also critical to note that for book leverage, accounting figures can be 
manipulated. However, earnings management affect both leverage measures. 
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utilization of both measures. Given the aim of this chapter, the focus is on market-based 
leverage as a primary measure of leverage, and book leverage is used for simple 
comparison and for examining the rebalance behaviour of MNCs relative to DCs. I 
defined market leverage as the ratio of the sum of long-term debt due in 1yr and long-
term debt divided by the sum of long-term debt due in 1yr, long-term debt and market 
value of equity, and book leverage is defined as the ratio of the sum of long-term debt due 
in 1year and long-term debt to total assets. 
 
5. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 presents major prior empirical findings in connection to the relationship between 
major capital structure theories and the factor variables for both measures of leverage (i.e. 
Book & Market leverage). A detail discussion on the directional relationship of these 
variables is reserved for the empirical results section, where an integrative analysis 
provides focus on the fluidity and sometimes conflicting predictions among capital 
structure theories and the factor variables. Figure 1 graphically presents the over-arching 
concept of both optimal leverage and the adjustment process to target leverage. Within 
the trade-off scheme, managers weigh the costs and benefits of debt financing, mainly 
driven by tax advantages and probability of bankruptcy. Well noted in corporate finance 
is that, debt is relatively cheaper than equity
14
, thus in a broader scheme of financing 
costs, debt potentially minimizes the weighted average cost of capital (WACC). However, 
debt has a diminishing return to scale after reaching a certain threshold. That is, debt 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
 
 
14 One of the reasons has been the relatively lower informational asymmetry 
of debt financing. 
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could become a burden as the possibility of an involuntary bankruptcy rises
15
. The 
attributes in figure 1 are among the theoretical factors that influences optimal leverage 
determination. For instance, tangibility minimizes bankruptcy costs, because fixed assets 
can be sold in the process of bankruptcy and therefore enables capital recovery by 
creditors. Thus, collaterability is expected to be positively related to debt. In another 
instance, the pecking order theory predicts negative relationship between ROA (i.e. 
profitability) and leverage, because profitable firms can use the excess cash to finance 
investment projects instead of issuing debt or equity.  Similarly, in the adjustment 
process, firms weigh the costs of deviation from target and the costs of adjustment to 
target. Some elements of adjustment process are out of management‟s control and others 
depend on firm-level characteristics. Prior evidence suggests that, the two main deciding 
factors of adjustment to target are financial flexibility and external financing costs. As 
these factors or elements vary across firms; speed of adjustment is expected to differ 
across firms as well. Although, it appears that certain mitigating factors help minimize 
external financing costs, these factors also vary cross firms, implying varying capital 
structure adjustment speed among firms‟. Table 2, reports the summary statistics of 
leverage and factor variables for the pooled sample, MNCs and DCs. As prior researches 
on capital structure of MNCs have shown, MNCs on average have lower debt to equity, 
lower target leverage, and lower leverage ratio than DCs (also see table (4) panel B, and 
figure 2a and 2b).
16
 Both book and market leverage (i.e. bolded in table 2) are higher for 
DCs than MNCs. Book leverage and market leverage for DCs  are approximately the 
same, whilst  book leverage is higher than market leverage for MNCs. Cross-sectional 
                                                             
15 Certain indicators of financial distress such as operational risks, 
financial risks and debt-induced overall higher costs of financing may 
trigger involuntary bankruptcy.   
16
 Fatemi, Ali 1984, 1988; Burgman, T.1996; Lee & Kwok 1988; Michel & 
Shaked 1986; Doukas & Pantzalis, 2003; Shapiro, 1978. These authors’ have 
attributed the relatively lower level of leverage of MNCs to various 
factors including agency costs. 
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dispersion for DCs is roughly 17% for book leverage and 21% for market leverage. On 
the other hand, dispersion for MNCs is 13% for book leverage and 16% for market 
leverage. The relatively higher dispersion for market leverage likely reflects the volatility 
of equity prices. Tobin‟s Q and non-debt tax shield are almost identical for MNCs and 
DCs, which is likely due to the lower asset base of DCs. As expected, MNCs are on 
average larger than DCs based on log total assets. Financial distress costs (FDC) is 
significantly higher for DCs (27.62) relative to MNCs (2.68). MNCs on average have 
higher cash flows than DCs, as well as higher return on assets. However, DCs on average 
have higher capital expenditure than MNCs for the same sample period. The average 
panel length is approximately 11 years, with 5 years of minimum observations and 
maximum observation of 19 years. Table 3A to 3D provides the correlation matrix of the 
factors and leverage. The relationship between the factors and both measures of leverage 
shows the expected correlations. However, the strength of the correlation of factors with 
the two measures of leverage is not stable.  
Besides Tobin‟s Q, Cash Flows and Investment, the correlation is more pronounced for 
the book leverage. As expected, the two highest correlations for both book and market 
leverage was between size and financial distress cost (-.6411) and between tangibility and 
investment (.5970).  In table 4 panel A, I compute the number and percentage of positive 
equity returns by year and by group (i.e. DC, MNC, and MNC10). On a yearly basis for 
the sample period, higher number of MNC firms experienced higher equity returns than 
their domestic counterparts. Similarly, both leverage percentage returns (i.e. % of firms 
with positive returns out of the group subsample – 65% vs. 56%) and the overall median 
returns are higher for MNCs than DCs (i.e. 12% vs. 8%). These statistics supports the 
market-timing theory of inertia or slower relative adjustment speed for MNCs. Hence 
market-timing suggests that firms‟ capital structure is largely influenced by the 
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cumulative effect of past market equity prices where managers issue equity when market 
prices are favourable, the likely resulting effect is lower market leverage, and further 
deviation from the target, thus, an inertia or a much slower adjustment speed back to 
target leverage (Baker & Wurgler,2002; Welch, 2004). In table 5, I obtain by group, the 
number and the percentage of firms‟ with debt capacity more than unity (i.e. ppe/debt>1). 
The pecking order theory suggests that firms‟ that are under-leveraged adjust relatively 
faster to target leverage than over-levered firms‟. In table 5, average percentage of over-
levered firms‟ for DCs are 28% (i.e. 72% under-levered), 36% for MNC (i.e. 64% under-
levered), and 38% for MNC10 (i.e. 62% under-levered). Clearly, DC firms‟ are on 
average more under-levered than MNCs, suggesting overall relative faster adjustment for 
DCs. Finally, in table 6, I compute average percentage of firms‟ above-target leverage by 
group. The DC group on average have higher percentage of firms‟ above their target 
leverage than the MNC and MNC10 group, thus supporting the trade-off theory that 
above-target firms‟ adjust faster to target leverage than firms‟ below their target leverage. 
The combination of relatively lower equity returns, higher percentage of under-leverage, 
higher percentage of above-target leverage for DCs, and the relative lower debt-equity 
ratio lower leverage ratio for MNCs provides a strong recipe for overall relative faster 
adjustment for DCs. 
 
6. Partial Adjustment and Capital Structure  
To empirically assess adjustment of capital structure, i start with the two basic equations 
(i.e. market leverage and book leverage). However, market leverage is the main focus of 
this research. 
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Where:              AssetsTotalTAit _  
yrLTDTotalLTDDit 1__   
iceCloseOutShrsEit Pr_*_
 
M_Leverage = Market leverage, and B_leverage = Book Leverage 
 LTD_Total = Total Long-Term Debt 
LTD_1yr = Portion of Long Term Debt due within 1 yr (i.e. reclassified from long 
term to short term liabilities) 
Shrs_Out = Total Common Shares Outstanding 
Close_Price = Closing Price of the firms‟ shares at the end of the year 
Leading up to the main comparative dynamic partial adjustment model, I started with 
heteroskedastic consistent ordinary least squares (OLS) to preliminarily investigate 
the effect of capital structure determinants and their statistically differential effect on 
leverage for DCs relative to MNCs. Thus, the following linear equation is used: 
            (3) 
                                             (4) 
      Where:  i = 1, 2....., N, and t=1, 2....., T 
X‟ = (Size, Tangibility (Tang), Agency Costs (Q), Profitability (ROA), Cash 
Flows (FCF), Non-Debt Tax Shield (NDTS), Investment (INV), Financial 
Distress Costs (FDC)) MNCs*X‟ = interaction term of MNCs and capital 
structure determinants. The empirical results are reported at table 8 & 9. 
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Following prior work in dynamic trade-off framework [e.g., Jalilvand and Harris 
(1984), Fischer et al. (1989),  DeMiguel and Pindado (2001), Hovakimian, Opler and 
Titman (2001), Fama and French (2002), Mehotra, Mikkelsen, and Partch (2003), 
Strebulaev (2004), Frank and Goyal (2005), Drobetz and Wanzenried (2006), 
Flannery and Ranjan (2006)], I consider a dynamic leverage model in which desired 
(target) capital structure of firm i at time  t , M_Leverage*it  ,  is  modelled as a linear 
function of  both N  observed covariates, χ 
17
, ( j = 1,2.....,N) and the unobserved  firm 
fixed effects 
18
. The N observed covariates, χ, are among the well research factors in 
the capital structure literature and are found to be related with target leverage in 
gauging the trade-off between costs and benefits of debt of capital structure (Flannery 
and Ranjan, 2006, and Frank and Goyal, 2005). Thus, target leverage is formalized in 
equation 5 and 6. 
 
                                
         (5)                         
 
 
                                                                                                             (6) 
ηi is the firm specific effect (i.e. heterogeneity).  
The coefficients and unobserved heterogeneity in equations 5 & 6 are unknown. Thus, 
it is crucial to note that target debt ratio cannot be observe, and should therefore be 
estimated. It is equally imperative to note that, in a trade-off framework, the target 
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 See appendix for a definition and list of variables. 
18
 Existence of firm specific effects (heterogeneity) has been shown to be 
crucial in the dynamic capital structure model[Flannery and Ranjan (2006) 
and Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender (2006)].This is a plausible and substantive 
proposition, given the operational diversity and divergent competitive 
environment of firms. 
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leverage ratio is what firms‟ desire and would have chosen if the markets are perfect - 
that is, the absence of informational gap, transaction premium or adjustment costs 
related to issuance and retirement of debt and equity. However, in the presence of 
friction in the capital market, firms‟ actual capital structure, will likely not equal the 
target leverage ratio, i.e. M_Leverage*it ≠   M_Leverageit , implying that, in a normal 
cause of events or a shock to the capital structure, firms temporarily deviates from the 
target debt ratio and due to transaction costs, only partially adjust back to the target 
debt ratio.  
Following Flannery and Ranjan (2006), the baseline partial adjustment model is 
formalized with equation 7 & 8, to estimate and determine the difference in capital 
structure adjustment speed between MNCs and DCs. 
 
  10,1_*_1__   ititLeverageMitLeverageMitLeverageMitLeverageM        
                                                                                                                                              (7)   
  10,1_*_1__   ititLeverageBitLeverageBitLeverageBitLeverageB                                      
                                                                                                                                              (8)
 
Where  γ  measures the speed of adjustment towards the target capital structure, 
starting from prior year‟s leverage. In another words, γ, explains the actual change in 
observed leverage (M_Leverageit - . M_Leverageit-1) relative to the firm‟s distance 
from its target leverage (M_Leverage*it  - M_Leverageit-1).  
In prior studies, γ < 1, due to frictions in the broader financial markets
19
. Due to the 
associated costs of adjustment, a delay in adjustment to target from period t – 1 to 
                                                             
19 An imperfection in capital markets inevitably creates cost for firms 
which tempered the speed of adjustment to target leverage. This is so, as 
firms balance the cost of deviating from the target and the benefit of 
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period t is expected. From equation 7 & 8, if γ = 1, firms have instantaneously 
adjusted 100% to optimal leverage within one year, and if  γ > 1, then firms‟ have 
overshoot their adjustment and are not at optimal leverage. Effectively, the speed of 
adjustment is the portion of deviation from optimal leverage that is been eliminated in 
each period. From the above partial adjustment model, if there is a marginal increase 
in prior year deviation from target leverage, the difference between current and prior 
year leverage increases by the speed of adjustment, γ. It is very unlikely to have γit = 
0, which means, there is no adjustment at all. From equation 7 and 8, substituting the 
target leverage from equation 5 and 6 for M_Leverage*it  and B_Leverage*it  yields 
equation 9 and 10. 
(9) 
                                                                                                           
             
(10)   
Where υit is the white noise disturbance term. Finally, rearranging equation 9 and 10, 
the speed of adjustment, γ, for MNCs and DCs can be estimated with an integrated 
modified partial adjustment of equation 11 and 12, which is the subject of this 
empirical inquiry.  
                                                                                                                                                                                             
achieving the target, and also the cost of attaining the target leverage. 
Also, variations in the adjustment process across firms may be influenced 
by differences in cost and benefit of dynamic adjustment process across 
firms. Nevertheless, in a dynamic trade-off framework, firms still pursue a 
target debt ratio through partial adjustment in a given period (Flannery & 
Hankins 2007). It must be noted that, adjustment costs are often a 
nontrivial impediment to rapid adjustment (Leary & Roberts, 2005), and in 
prior studies, adjustment costs, consistently appears to be the 
differentiating factor among firms in the dynamic adjustment process. 
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(11) 
                                                                                                                                          
(12)                                        
Where   ititi  
 
                      
effecttimetitiiti   ,0][][][  
The empirical results of Eq. (11) are reported in table (10 & 11). 
Theoretically, in a dynamic adjustment model, the process of overall adjustment with 
respect to variations in explanatory variables depends on:
 
I. Passage of time – the use of lag instruments in dynamic panel estimators is 
meaningful in this respect. 
II. The difference between equilibrium leverage (Target) and prior year observed 
leverage 
The speed of adjustment can be obtain from equation 11 and 12 by subtracting one from 
the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable (i.e. for market leverage, (1- γ) 
M_Leverageit-1. The explanatory variables are listed and defined in the appendix, and the 
empirical result presented in table 10 and 11. Table 15a-15c is computed to substantiate 
the findings of the empirical results in table 10 and 11.  
 
7. Adjustment Speed Factors  
Prior assumptions concerning the uniformity of speed of adjustment across firms is 
recently been challenged with good reasons. Only when all firms are identical in terms of 
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risks, asset structure, and operating in a perfect market can uniformity assumption in 
target leverage and adjustment speed be sustained. Thus, my assumptions follows certain 
prior studies
20
 such as Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman (2001) and Roberts (2001), by 
hypothesizing that MNCs and DCs adjust to target leverage at different speed, and I have 
assumed in this chapter, that certain factors are the contributing elements to the 
adjustment speed differential between MNCs and DCs. Figure 1 highlights the adjustment 
speed factors representing financial flexibility, external financing costs and mitigating 
factors. Using equation (16), I estimate the influence of adjustment speed factors using 
the two- stage methodology (Flannery and Hankins, 2007)
21
. In the first stage, I estimated 
the target leverage with the traditional fixed effect instrumental variables estimator (FE 
IV), including year dummies (i.e. eq. 13). In the second stage (eq. 16), there are no 
dynamic elements (i.e. no lagged dependent variables), thus a heteroskedastic consistent 
robust OLS methodology is used to estimate the influence of adjustment speed factors. 
The final estimation (i.e equation 16, reported in table 12) is therefore motivated as 
follows; 
 
 
       (13)                                                                    
                                                             
20
 Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman (2001) shows adjustment process for over 
levered firms; Roberts (2001) relate adjustment speed to industry; MacKay 
and Phillips (2005), also relate adjustment speed to industry; Leary & 
Roberts (2005) shows the impact of various rebalancing options as 
determinants of adjustment speed. 
 
21 In the integrated modified partial adjustment model (eq. (11), table (10 
& 11), the speed factors explains both target leverage and the effect on 
adjustment speed. The two-stage methodology is a direct measure, 
individually, the effect of the speed factors on capital structure 
adjustment speed across MNCs and DCs. 
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Upon, estimating the target with combined fixed and time effect, I compute changes 
in actual leverage from period t-1 to t, and deviation as a difference between the 
estimated target leverage and the lagged dependent variable. 
1___  ititit LeverageMLeverageMLeverageM                                                                
                                                                                                            (14) 
Equation 14, is the actual change in leverage from period t-1 to t. 
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Equation 15. captures the distance from target leverage. Substituting equations 14 and 
15 into equation 9 and individually adding speed factors (Z) yield equation 16.which 
can be estimated with OLS.  
  itititit ZDeviationLeverageM   210_
                                                                                                                                              (16)          
Where Z are the speed of adjustment factors: [Tang, Z_Score, Returns, 
Debt_Capacity, FDN, OL, UL, BT, AT]
22
 
Given equation 16, I therefore made the following hypothesis: 
I. α2 = 0, that is, the speed factor or variable has no effect on the speed of 
adjustment 
II. α2 =DC=MNC=MNC10, that is, there is no difference in the impact of Z factors 
on adjustment speed among DCs, MNCs and MNC10s.  
The Z‟s and their expected relationships with adjustment speed are discussed in 
section 7A-7C, and table 12 reports the empirical results of equation 16. 
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 Variables are listed and defined in the appendix. 
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7A.    Financial Flexibility and speed of adjustment: 
Practically, a firm‟s capital structure adjustment speed depends on its rebalancing 
options, which is largely influenced by its financial flexibility and external financing 
costs.   I used ROA (i.e. profitability) and cash flows from financial statements to 
show a firm‟s financial flexibility. Profitability and cash flows can achieve two major 
objectives; they can be used for internal financing of projects and repurchase of shares 
or retirement of debt (Hovakimian et al. 2001) depending on the relative leverage 
position of the firm (i.e. whether the firm is over or under leveraged). Relative 
leverage has profound implications for capital structure theories as well as for 
dynamic adjustment process.  In pecking order framework, profitable firms with large 
cash reserves are expected to use less debt, on the other hand, in a dynamic trade-off 
scheme, profitability and cash availability may facilitate faster adjustment to speed 
through retirement of debt or repurchase of equity. However, in the weighing process 
of the cost of deviation from target and from the pecking order perspective, 
profitability and ROA may slow down adjustment speed, as firms continue to use 
internal financing of projects. And the capital market been aware of the firms‟ 
profitability may attach lesser costs to deviating from target. Thus, the dynamic 
adjustment process in which the trade-off theory is not mutually exclusive of the 
pecking order theory, the adjustment process becomes a conflation of both predictions 
of dynamic trade-off scheme and the dynamic pecking order predictions. 
 
B. External financing costs and speed of adjustment: 
The capital market continuously re-assesses listed firms, thus three factors are 
considered in this chapter to represent external financing costs.   Myers (1977) shows 
27 
 
that under-investment measured by Tobin‟s Q is a nontrivial determinant of debt 
financing. The influence of Tobin‟s Q on the speed of adjustment is best understood 
in the context of information asymmetry. Due to informational gap between managers 
and the capital markets, equity issuance, when market-book ratio is high can be 
perceived by capital market as manager‟s temporary exploitation of price increases23. 
On the other hand, price increase may be perceived as a result of superior 
performance of assets in place and growth opportunities of the firm. However, due to 
a relatively higher informational gap between managers and equity markets, cost of 
equity issuance may be prohibitively expensive, thus managers in an attempt to 
minimize this informational gap may turn to debt market as an alternative. In the debt 
market, creditors, concerned about under-investment problem (i.e. conflict between 
shareholders and debtholders) may also demand higher return, therefore increasing 
the cost of debt financing. Myers (1977) argues that, this dynamic interaction between 
market participants and management is an impedident to debt financing and therefore 
negatively related to leverage. In terms of adjustment process, agency theory implied 
positive relation between market-book ratio and adjustment speed. One of the 
dominant reasons for this relationship is to minimize conflict among interest groups, 
by pursuing target leverage favourable to all stakeholders.  
Another factor considered is the debt capacity, measured by total debt relative to fixed 
assets. From the trade-off theory perspective, firms with a debt capacity ratio of >1 
are perceived to have exceeded their debt capacity, because in an event of bankruptcy, 
all outstanding debt will not be repaid from the sale of fixed assets. So the higher this 
ratio, the faster the adjustment back to target leverage. However, this depends on 
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 This is the classic market-timing hypothesis (Baker and Wurgler, 2002). 
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whether the firm is above or below its target leverage. On the other hand, pecking 
order theory suggests faster adjustment for firms‟ operating below debt capacity.  
The final factor examined for external financing costs is financial deficit, measured by 
cash flows from operations minus capital expenditure
24
. As financial deficits goes up, 
the need for external financing rises. Managers in anticipation of such future deficits 
are more likely to adjust their leverage to target, and thus create a room for future debt 
financing needs. Again, this depends on firm‟s relative leverage position and whether 
they are above or below target. 
C. Mitigating factors and adjustment speed: 
The influence of four factors that mitigates external financing costs are examined and 
their negative effect on the speed of adjustment is analyzed. First, large firms on one 
hand have lower information asymmetry due to information competitiveness, thus  
size can mitigate costs of financing and leads to faster adjustment, on the other hand, 
large firms have extensive internal capital and relatively less volatile cash flows 
(Flannery and Ranjan, 2006), which minimizes the probability of financial distress, 
and thus reduces the need for immediate adjustment. So on one hand, size may speed-
up the adjustment process and yet slows down the adjustment process on the other 
hand
25
. The analysis of tangibility with respect to adjustment speed is similar to that 
of size.  Highly tangible firms have the necessary collateral to minimize financing 
cost and thus speed up adjustment process (Harris and Raviv, 1991), however, for the 
same reason; such firms may face less pressure to rebalance, thus resulting in slower 
                                                             
24 The ideal measure of financial deficit will also deduct dividends and all 
other contingent cash payments from cash flows from operations, but that is 
not possible in this chapter due to lack of continuous time series data.  
25 This is shown in the integrated modified partial adjustment model, where 
size increases target leverage, while the effect on adjustment speed is the 
opposite.  
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adjustment to target. Altman Z_score (i.e. probability measure of financial distress) is 
one of factors considered. Flannery and Hankins (2007) shows that firms in the 1
st
 
quartile of Altman‟s Z_score adjust faster, and those in the 4th quartile adjust slower. 
Finally, the effect of price appreciation on the speed of adjustment is examined. The 
issue of price appreciation and Tobin‟s Q are analogous. The effect of price 
appreciation on adjustment speed largely depends on market perception. If the market 
perceived an over-pricing of the firm‟s securities, then price increase may not 
necessarily have positive effect on the speed of adjustment. To further explore the 
issue of adjustment, I examined the effect on speed of adjustment using relative 
leverage measure (i.e. under-leverage vs. over-leverage firms), as well as firms that 
are over or below target leverage. Finally, in table (13), I examined the interaction of 
dominant factors (i.e. variables that are consistently employed in the capital structure 
literature) with over-leverage and above-target variables.  
8. Rebalancing of capital structure. 
 
Welch (2004) argues that US firms do not rebalance their book leverage after changes 
in market leverage, while Roberts and Leary (2005) counter-argued that, although at a 
slower rate, US firms do infact tend to rebalance their book leverage after sharp 
changes in market leverage. To test this competing hypothesis, I used equation 17, 
and define Z as a change in market value from period t-2 to t-1, and replace the 
dependent variable and deviation with change in book leverage and deviation of book 
target. 
(17) 
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To further explore the effect of sharp changes on subsequent rebalancing, I examine 
both positive and negative changes in equity prices. The empirical results of equation 
17 reported in table 14, partially confirms the position of both Welch (2004) and 
Roberts and Leary (2005). DCs exhibit no immediate rebalancing; however, MNCs 
and MNC10s do tend to rebalance after a negative shock to market leverage. 
 
9.    Estimators for dynamic panel data models  
GMM estimators are frequently use in autoregressive linear regression models with 
small T (time horizon) and large N (units) panels with  unobserved firm level 
heterogeneity (i.e. fixed effects) . Not considering unobserved heterogeneity faultily 
assumes zero correlation between the observed variables and unobserved firm-
specifics. The used of lagged dependent variable as a regressor in a model necessitates 
an application of dynamic models because the standard OLS estimators are biased and 
inconsistent (i.e. dynamic panel bias). Similarly, LSDV and Within Group estimators 
do not eliminate this dynamic panel bias (Nickell 1981). Often in the literature, 
standard panel estimators like the fixed effect estimators are employed; however, this 
technique is biased in a dynamic setting, where lagged dependent variables are 
included in the model
26
. A dynamic capital structure model with firm-specific effects 
posed at least two challenges; first, the error term, υit, tends to be correlated with the 
lagged dependent variable, M_Leverageit-1.;  second, other regressors may be 
correlated with firm-specific effect that is time-invariant. A traditional estimator for a 
dynamic panel model with firm fixed effects involves first-differencing the model to 
                                                             
26 Econometrically, an explanatory variable is said to be endogenous if it 
is correlated with the error term of the data generating process. 
Endogeneity caused OLS to be biased and inconsistent, thus making estimates 
of coefficients and inferences invalid. 
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eliminate the firm-specific effect
27
. Arellano and Bond (1991) also pointed out that a 
lagged dependent variable in a traditional fixed effect model is correlated with the 
error term, and therefore sufficiently endogenous. Taking first-differences will 
eliminate the fixed effects but the first difference of lagged dependent variable, Δ 
M_Leverageit-1. , is still correlated with the first difference of the error term, Δυit, 
through M_Leverageit-1 and υit, thus the fixed model may not necessarily resolve the 
endogeneity problem (Wooldridge, 2002).
28
 A plausible estimation alternative in a 
dynamic capital structure context with partial adjustment is the dynamic panel 
estimators, by utilizing instrumental variables
29
 estimation technique, through the 
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM), bias-corrected least squares dummy 
variables (LSDVC)
30
 or fixed effect instrumental variables (FE IV) methods. The 
justification for instrumentalizing in a dynamic model is not restricted to the concerns 
of endogeneity. Instruments are also necessary to address the fact that regressors may 
not be strictly exogenous. In other words, outside events that caused a shock to capital 
structure may also impact the regressors, and thus may be indirectly correlated with 
the present or past error terms. In an attempt to resolve these issues, Arellano/Bond 
                                                             
27 Anderson and Hsiao (1982), suggest a technique of solving the firm-
specific effect problem, by transforming 
the model into first differences to eliminate firm-specific effects, and 
then use the second lags of the dependent variable, either differenced or 
in levels, as an instrument for the differenced one-time lagged dependent 
variable, to eliminate the correlation with the error term. 
 
28 Fixed effect regression takes out the common time-invariant and firm 
specific effects out of the error term and through first differencing 
eliminate completely the fixed effect component of the model. However, in a 
dynamic panel estimation, where a lagged dependent is necessary, the first 
differencing is not sufficient to solve the endogeneity problem 
(Roberts/Leary 2005, Arellano/Bond 1991, Greene 2003, chap.13). 
 
29 Instrumental variables have to meet two conditions in a fixed effect 
model. First, they have to be correlated with the lagged dependent variable 
or independent variables (i.e. if more proxies are included); second, they 
have to be uncorrelated with the error term. 
30
 See Bruno (2005, 2005a, 2005b). 
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(1991) estimator suggests using instruments for the lagged dependent variables and 
endogenous regressors after first-differencing the model. Arellano/Bond (1991) 
estimator is a major leap forward, however, with a highly persistent data series such 
as leverage, these estimators are sometimes found to be biased when the co-efficient 
on lagged dependent variable is close to unity. Arellano and Bover (1995) and 
Blundell and Bond (1998) proposed the “system” GMM estimator. The system 
estimator transform the model into first differences, and then estimate the model as a 
“system” by using either the lagged first differences for level equations or lagged 
variables for differenced equations as instruments. The combination of these two sets 
of moment conditions is therefore the system (SYS) GMM estimator. The key point to 
bear in mind regarding the econometrics of capital structure is that there is no perfect 
technique. All the various techniques used in the literature have their relative 
strengths and weaknesses. Thus, this chapter starts with all four major dynamic 
models used in the literature to independently examine adjustment speed for the three 
groups (i.e. DC, MNC, and MNC10). I used the traditional fixed effect instrumental 
variables estimator (FEIV), which specifically instrumentalized the lagged dependent 
variable with its two own lagged, then the Arellano and Bond (1991) one stage and 
second staged differenced GMM estimators, and finally, the LSDVC dynamic 
estimator is used to estimate the adjustment speed for MNCs and DCs. According to 
Bruno (2005), bias corrected least squares dummy (LSDVC) performs better than 
other dynamic models, when estimating unbalanced dynamic panel data, however 
LSDVC do not generate system standard errors, and are therefore estimated through a 
bootstrapping technique. Generally, traditional statistical inference is predicated on 
assumptions about the distribution of the population from which the sample is taken 
and in regression analysis, the estimated standard errors are obtained based on 
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normality assumption. In a small sample, improved standard errors may be obtained 
by using bootstrap technique. Many prior studies have used bootstrap standard error 
estimates for their parameter estimates, and have suggested that inference based on 
bootstrap estimates of standard errors may be more accurate in small samples than 
inference based on asymptotic standard error estimates (Bruno 2005). Computer 
intensive statistical software programs (i.e. Stata) has commands for obtaining 
bootstrapped standard errors by evaluating the distribution of a statistic based on 
repeated random resampling of the original dataset. Theoretically, the bootstrapping 
works as follows: first,  random sample with replacement is repeatedly obtained from 
the sample dataset; second, desired statistics corresponding to these bootstrap samples 
are estimated and third, sample standard deviations‟ are calculated of the sampling 
distribution of repeated bootstrap samples . There is a lack of specific consensus in 
the literature regarding the number of resampling needed for obtaining bootstrapped 
standard errors. I suspect the number of iterations in the literature are most likely 
influenced by the amount of computing power, time and sample size. Hence 
increasing the number of repeated samples cannot increase the amount of information 
in the original data. Consequently, I started with 10 iterations, and by successively 
increasing the number of iterations, I found no efficiency gain in higher number of 
iterations relative to 10 iterations. In other words, the significance level of the 
estimated statistics did not change due to increasing iterations. Using Bootstrapped 
standard errors has certain specific benefits including the following: 
A) When the theoretical distribution of a statistic under investigation is complicated  
B) When the sample size is small for traditional statistical inference. 
C) Bootstrapped technique only assumes that the sample is representative of the 
population 
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The fixed effect instrumental variables (FEIV) tend to perform well with unbalanced 
panel data without generating too many instruments as in the case of GMM 
estimators, and it directly generates system standards errors. Thus, the comparative 
integrated dynamic partial adjustment model is estimated with the year-controlled, 
fixed effect instrumental variables estimator (FEIV).  
 
10. Empirical results 
10.1 Determinants of the target capital structure and speed of adjustment 
In table 7, an unequal variance t-test of the means of the determinants of target 
leverage across DCs, MNCs and MNC10s reveals that there are statistically 
significant differences between DCs and MNCs. This precursory evidence sets an 
appropriate platform for further investigation of differences in leverage and capital 
structure adjustment process between DCs and MNCs. Thus, table 8 and 9 presents 
the empirical results of year-controlled, heteroskedastic consistent linear regression of 
market based leverage and book leverage. The theoretical directional effects of capital 
structure determinants (i.e. column 1 & 3) supports prior findings in the literature. 
Importantly, MNCs have statistically significant lower leverage relative to DCs, 
confirming prior studies of MNCs capital structure (Fatemi, Ali 1984, 1988; 
Burgman, T.1996; Lee & Kwok 1988). In table 15a-15c, MNCs on average finance 
their net fixed assets with 71% of equity and 29% with debt, compared to 65% of 
equity and 35% of debt for DCs.  
In investigating the capital structure adjustment process, I initially employ four 
different dynamic models to independently determine adjustment speed for the groups 
(i.e. DC, MNC, & MNC10). This approach reveals an important fact in the capital 
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structure research, that the lack of consensus on adjustment speed in the literature is 
partly explained by econometric issues. All four econometric techniques suggest a 
different adjustment speed within the respective groups. The coefficient estimation 
results of the determinants of target leverage 

N
j
jit
1

 among the four estimation 
techniques, as expected are not consistent and sometimes conflicting. With the 
exception of MNC10, for all four estimators, size is significantly positively related 
with leverage as predicted by the trade-off theory, however, the effect is more 
pronounced for Arellano and Bond (1991) estimators. Large and diversified firms are 
perceived to have less volatile cash flows, and are therefore perceived to have lower 
default risk. Furthermore, from an agency theory perspective, large firms tend to be 
older, and have a relatively better reputation in the debt market, which may lower 
agency costs of debt and therefore increase leverage. However, in the context of 
international finance, size (i.e. MNCs) may introduce further uncertainty, and size 
therefore may not bear the same capital structure theoretical predictions as it has in 
the domestic context. A similar argument can be made for the equity market. Due to 
the long tenure of older firms in the financial markets, equity issuance could be 
relatively easier, and this may lead to an inverse relationship between size and 
leverage. The latter argument supports pecking order predictions. Though, it must be 
noted that, large, well- diversified firms have relatively larger asset base, which in 
turn, may exacerbate monitoring problems, and thus lower the leverage level – this 
possibility suggests an ambiguous prediction of pecking order theory. From the 
capital market perspective (i.e. agency theory), the positive relationship between size 
and leverage may also be interpreted as a result of the information efficiency, gained 
from competition among analysts regarding larger and older firms.  
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Tangibility shows an expected positive relationship with leverage as predicted by 
trade-off theory but the relationship is not strong for MNCs. Within the trade-off 
framework, tangibility is expected to be positively related to leverage. Tangible assets 
as the name implied, are easier to attach monetary value and can be used as collateral 
for marginal debt. It therefore, theoretically lowers expected bankruptcy costs, 
because it provides some assurance of capital recovery to existing debtors in the event 
of liquidation. The caveat here, pertains to the nature of the assets – if the firm is 
engaged in a very unique venture, the underlying assets may not have a liquid 
secondary market. From the agency theory perspective, tangibility may temper 
potential shareholder asset substitution hypothesis, thus minimizing agency-related 
problems. Effectively, a combination of lower expected bankruptcy costs and 
minimized agency problems, warrant a positive relationship between leverage and 
tangibility. The predictions of pecking order  are mixed, on one hand tangibility may 
reduce informational gap and make cost of equity relatively cheaper, which may yield 
negative relationship between tangibility and leverage, but if adverse selection is 
related to the perceived quality or performance of operational assets, costs of equity 
will be relatively higher, and managers will follow the pecking order, resulting in 
positive relationship between tangibility and leverage. Thus the pecking order 
prediction is at best ambiguous.  
Tobin‟s Q which is used as a measure of growth opportunities (Q) has s relatively 
higher impact on MNC10s than the broadly defined MNCs, and both MNC groups 
shows higher impact of growth opportunities than their domestic counterparts. In prior 
international finance literature, MNCs are shown to have higher agency costs (i.e. 
Tobin‟s Q) than DCs [Fatemi, Ali 1984, 1988; Burgman, T.1996; Lee & Kwok 1988; 
Doukas & Pantzalis, 2003]. Consequently, the relatively lower leverage of MNCs in 
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these prior studies has mainly been attributed to agency costs. In table (10), the 
consistent negative correlation between growth opportunities and leverage is 
consistent with both trade-off theory and dynamic pecking order theory (Frank and 
Goyal, 2007). The relatively higher impact of Tobin‟s Q on MNC10s suggests that the 
effect of agency costs may be a function of internationalization. That is, as MNCs 
expand, agency costs such as monitoring costs may increase as well. Under trade-off 
theory, growth increases agency costs of debt through debtholder-shareholder conflict 
(i.e. Agency theory). Similarly, growth increases the probability of financial distress 
through an expansion in investments, which requires additional financing. 
Theoretically, the simple version of pecking order predicts a positive correlation 
between growth opportunity and leverage, assuming that the returns on marginal 
investments are positive and steady. The point here also alludes to the accounting 
dynamics – that is, when investments grow faster than retained earnings, firms will 
resort to debt financing before the relatively more expensive equity financing. 
However, accounting retained earnings does not equal actual cash flows needed to 
finance investments. On the dynamic side of pecking order, growth is negatively 
related to leverage, as market to book ratio goes up, managers can issue equity 
cheaper than debt. Furthermore, in the spirit of both rebalancing of capital structure 
and maintaining financial flexibility, growth firms may instead issue equity to 
rebalance or create a space for future debt financing.  
The return on assets (ROA) and cash flows (CF) from operations are consistently 
relatively higher for MNCs and MNC10s than the DCs. Profitability (ROA) in prior 
studies shows mixed predictions but is generally accepted to be more consistent with 
the pecking order theory. Harris and Raviv (1991), Frank and Goyal (2007) and 
Kayhan/Titman (2007) have also find negative relationship between profitability and 
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leverage. The theoretical prediction (i.e. pecking order) is predicated on the notion 
that profitable firms have higher cash flows, in which case, internal funds are relied 
on first, before any external financing is pursued. However, the trade off-theory and 
agency concerns, suggest an opposite effect. That is, profitable firms should have 
higher leverage. First, if we assumed stability in future profits, equity market would 
have priced that expectation, and thus relatively reduce costs of equity financing. 
Second, shareholders can mitigate free cash flow problem by assuming more debt as a 
disciplinary tool. Furthermore, trade-off theory suggests that with more profit 
(assuming stability); firms would assume more debt to take advantage of the interest 
tax shield. Market timing although silent on profitability, is implicitly consistent with 
pecking order prediction in regards to the correlation between profitability and 
leverage. That is, firm‟s equity issuance is likely to coincide with favourable earnings 
announcement. Thus, market timing implicitly assumed managerial activism in the 
equity market for profitable firms‟. Overall, the empirical results shows, financial 
flexibility (i.e. ROA and CF) have relatively higher impact on the MNC groups. Table 
15a-15c provides a strong support for the internal financing by MNCs. For MNCs, on 
average, 41% of their capital invested is financed by retained earnings compared to 
24% for DCs.  
For NDTS, according to trade-off theory, higher tax rates increases tax benefits, 
therefore in a high tax environment, firms should take on more debt to take advantage 
of the interest tax shields. This argument is sound, however, prior studies found no 
compelling evidence of the predicted relationship, especially when firms are all 
operating within the same geographical boundaries. Most likely the statutory 
corporate tax rates will be the same for firms within a single national boundary, and 
tax thus cannot provide a good explanation for the cross-sectional variation of 
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leverage among firms. DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) shows that non-debt tax shields 
(NDTS) can be used as a surrogate for debt interest tax shield, and they predicted a 
negative relationship between non-debt tax shields and leverage. Yet, Titman and 
Wessels (1988) finds no significant impact of non-debt tax-shields on leverage. 
However, Harris and Raviv (1991) stated that leverage increases with non-debt tax 
shield. My findings are consistent with Titman and Wessels (1988); NDTS shows no 
significance or stability both across groups (i.e. DCs, MNCs, and MNC10s) and 
estimation techniques. As stated in the survey by Graham and Harvey (2001), tax 
shield advantages are not the primary focus of managers when making financing 
decisions. And the accumulation of non-debt tax shields, although improves net 
income, is nevertheless, a non-cash item that gets discounted by the market 
participants, therefore, it may not have much bearing on the dynamics of capital 
structure. Second, due to the inherent problem in measurement of variables, non-debt 
tax shield may not give a consistent prediction, especially when many firms in the 
sample data reports minimal figures for depreciation expense.  
Exclusively, the empirical results shows that investment is positively significant for 
DCs but not for the MNC groups. This positive relationship for DCs is expected due 
to interdependence of investment and financing decisions and relatively lesser 
financial flexibility of DCs. For MNCs, internal financing capabilities across the 
parent company and the subsidiaries may have cause a disconnection between 
investment and debt financing. From table 2, the average ratio of cash flow to 
investment for MNCs is 1.5076, and .8728 for DCs, similarly the average ratio of 
profitability (ROA) to inv for MNCs is 1.4885 and .2368 for DCs. These two key 
ratios suggest that DCs are more likely to sought external financing to support their 
investments than MNCs. Similarly, table 15a through c, shows that cash to total 
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capital invested is higher for MNCs than DCs, and a relatively higher percentage of 
MNCs investments are financed by retained earnings. Financial distress costs (FDC) 
appears to be more of a concern for MNCs than DCs, however the evidence is 
generally weak.  
From a theoretical perspective, and in conjunction with the above analysis of the 
empirical results, the dynamic pecking order and trade-off theory are not mutually 
exclusive in the dynamic adjustment process.  
As some of the variables give conflicting predictions and or insignificant coefficients 
in one data set relative to another, or from one estimation technique to another, it 
becomes part of a routine test in capital structure literature to test the joint 
significance of the variables. Therefore, I conducted the Wald test (Z1), to test the null 
hypothesis that the coefficients jointly equals zero. The Wald test (Z1) rejects the null, 
and shows that the coefficients are jointly and statistically significant at 1% and 5% 
level. Similarly, all categories and an estimation technique shows 1% statistically 
significance level for the year dummies (Z2) – These tests can be seen as a validation 
of the specification model of equation 11. In addition, the 2
nd
 order autocorrelation 
test by Arellano and Bond (1991) estimators (i.e. AB & ABC) shows no second order 
autocorrelation in the specification model. Finally, the validity tests of the instruments 
(i.e. Sargan test) are not rejected by Arellano and Bond estimators.  
To directly compare the adjustment speed differential between DCs and MNCs, a 
group dummy variable is need, and if necessary, an interactive term between the 
group dummy variables and the lagged dependent variable to obtain a p-value that is 
statistically significant. Given the relative strength of Fixed Effect Instrumental 
Variables (FEIV) for the sample characteristic of this chapter, I directly estimate and 
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compare the adjustment speed of capital structure between DCs and MNCs using 
FEIV (table 11). Overall, the DCs adjust faster than MNCs, which may be attributed 
to the combination of relatively higher leverage for DCs, relatively higher equity 
returns for MNCs, relatively lower incidence of under-leverage (i.e. debt capacity < 1) 
for DCs, and the relatively higher incidence of above-target leverage for DCs. 
However, the specific variables (i.e. agency costs, Cash flows, investments and 
tangibility) which are identified in prior literature to be relatively higher for MNCs, 
all appeared to have increased the adjustment speed for MNCs relative to DCs.  
10.2 Factors of speed of adjustment 
Table 12 and 13, reports the individual influence of speed factors [Tang, Z_Score, 
Price↑, Debt_Capacity, FDN, OL, UL, BT, AT] on the adjustment process. The speed 
factors in table 13, are representative of external financing costs (FDN = financial 
deficits, and Debt_Capacity), mitigating factors (Tangibility (Tang), Z_score, and 
equity price increase (Price↑)), and relative leverage (over-leverage (OL), above-
target leverage (AT)). Theoretically, external financing costs are positively related to 
adjustment, and the mitigating factors are to slow down the adjustment process, whilst 
relative leverage shows the relative speed effect for a firm. The empirical results in 
table 6, shows consistency with the predictions of the trade-off theory. Financial 
deficit (FDN) is positively significant at 1% level, for both DCs and MNCs, however, 
the effect is more pronounced for DCs. The underlying theoretical intuition of the 
effect of financial deficit on adjustment process, is that, if firms investment needs 
exceeds available cash, and. assuming the same for the foreseeable future, then those 
are more likely to be highly levered, which may trigger a relatively higher need for 
readjustment. In other words, firms can borrow so much before they reach a point of 
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risking bankruptcy and or higher cost of debt financing, and adjusting back to the 
desired level is one form of resolving such problems. It must be noted that, ultimately, 
the true effect of financial deficit may depend on whether the firm is above or below 
target leverage or whether the firm is over or under levered.  
The effect of debt capacity on adjustment speed is a positive one, but is more 
pronounced for MNCs than DCs. Leverage increases with debt capacity – that is, as 
the asset base increases, the underlying collateral for debt increases, which in turn 
may support marginal debt financing. Following this logic, the overall leverage level 
will increase, and may further shift the firm from the target leverage, and thus requires 
faster adjustment back to target leverage depending on whether the firms is above or 
below target. An interesting observation is made for the 1
st
 and 4
th
 quartile of debt 
capacity across DCs and MNCs. Both categories (i.e. DCs and MNCs) in the 1
st
 
quartile adjust on average more rapidly than their overall respective groups. For 
example, the 1
st
 quartile of DCs adjusts at 12.37% compare to the average DC group 
of 1.43%, and the opposite effect is shown for the 4
th
 quartile. This may be so, 
because as leverage level goes up, adjustment may become difficult, depending on 
both financial flexibility and external financing costs.  
In the mitigating category, tangibility and equity price increases, slows the adjustment 
process. Note that, tangibility is insignificant for the MNC groups, perhaps 
underscoring the monitoring and valuation challenges of the assets of MNCs which 
are widely spread around the world. Price increases slows down adjustment speed, 
from at least two perspectives; first, equity price increase mechanically lowers market 
leverage, further widening the distance between observed and target leverage; second, 
equity price increase is related to profitability, which may allow the firm to avoid the 
capital market imposed penalty for deviating from the target – that is as long as the 
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firm is profitable, costs of deviation from the target may be avoided for some time. 
The Z-score has similar mitigating effect on adjustment speed. The higher the Z-
score, the better the perception of the firm in the capital markets. MNCs show slower 
effect for Z_Score than DCs. DCs in the 1st quartile shows positive adjustment speed, 
whilst MNCs in the 4
th
 quartile appears to adjust faster than their average group.  
The relative leverage measures (i.e. overleverage, above target leverage) shows the 
expected positive relationship, although, the effects are more pronounced for DCs 
than MNCs. In table 13, the interaction of factor variables with relative leverage 
shows a major different impact for DCs and MNCs in regards to the interaction of 
financial flexibility (ROA and CF) and relative leverage. Other interactive terms 
shows mixed results.   
 
10.3 Capital structure rebalancing 
The results of table 14, partially confirmed the findings of prior research (Welch, 
2004; Roberts and Leary, 2005), that, there are no strong support of rebalancing for 
DCs and MNC when equity prices are favourable, implying a practice of market-
timing, however, MNCs exhibit a 1% statistically significance level of rebalance their 
book leverage following negative equity price shock.  
 
 
 
 
 
44 
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
The study of capital structure dynamics is one of the widely researched areas in 
finance, however, relatively little attention is been given to the differences between 
the capital structure of MNCs and DCs. Most importantly, the differences in capital 
structure adjustment process of MNCs relatively DCs have not been considered in 
prior studies. The study of MNCs capital structure relative to DCs is a natural test of 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) assumption that regardless of how risk is repackaged or 
rearranged, value will not be affected. MNCs tend to have multiple subsidiaries in 
multiple countries, underscoring both rearrangement of risk and opportunities. 
According to major finance theories, risk characteristics ultimately affect expected 
payoffs and value. Similarly, if a firm is viewed as a bundle of contracts, then MNCs 
due to their international presence are far more likely to have more diverse contracts 
than DCs. This may imply different capital structure adjustment process through 
differences in the overall structure of capital structure, conflict among investors, 
financial flexibility, and capital market access – that is, in addition to the parent 
company‟s capital markets; MNCs can access international markets relatively cheaper 
through their subsidiaries‟.  
In prior studies, the association between lower leverage and MNCs has been mainly 
attributed to higher agency costs [Lee and Kwok 1988]. However, there has not been 
a direct estimate of the effect of such specific factors on capital structure adjustment 
speed for  MNCs relative to DCs. This study attempts to address this issue, together 
with the examination of the effect of speed factors on the adjustment process and 
rebalancing of capital structure between MNCs and DCs.  
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In addressing the specific research questions of this chapter, various quantitative 
methods are employed, and the major findings of adjustment speed differential 
between DCs and MNCs included: 
1)  Overall, DCs on average adjust faster to target leverage than their MNC 
counterparts.  
2) Finds support for market-timing, trade-off and pecking order theories of capital 
structure as it relates to relative leverage and equity prices. 
3) Prior studies attribute relative lower leverage of MNCs to agency costs and cash 
flows; and this study finds that agency costs, cash flows, investments and 
tangibility increases the capital structure adjustment speed for MNCs more than 
DCs. 
Using the two-stage methodology, the individual effects of the speed factors of 
adjustment and capital structure rebalancing shows different level of impact  
between DCs and MNCs. The key findings include: 
1) Impact of speed factors are consistent with capital structure theories (i.e. 
both trade-off and pecking order theories), however the impact is different 
across DCs and MNCs. 
2) Over-levered DCs adjust faster than their MNC counterparts. 
3) DCs that are above target leverage adjust faster, but no evidence of faster 
adjustment for MNCs.  
4) DCs shows no evidence of rebalancing of capital structure 
5) MNCs do in fact rebalance their capital structure, but the evidence only 
supports rebalancing when equity shock is negative. 
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As the first direct test of capital structure adjustment speed, and capital structure 
rebalancing dynamics between US based MNCs and DCs, this research has profound 
implications for various constituents such as corporate managers, investors, and 
governments. For example, for corporate managers, it may aid in considering various 
adjustment costs while altering the financing decisions with other variables like 
financial flexibility, direct cost of debt and equity (i.e. from the perspective of agency 
cost and capital market access). For investors, the level of adjustment speed may 
signal risk and value of their investments. Governments (especially foreign 
governments); for example, may consider the risk and financial viability of US 
multinationals in relation to factors such as domestic employment and tax revenue. 
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Appendix: Variable Definitions 
 
Debt Long-term debt  +  debt in current liabilities 
Equity Common shares outstanding  *  share price @ end of period t 
M_Leverage Debt / (Debt + Equity) 
B_Leverage Debt / Total Assets 
Tobin‟s Q /Q (Equity + Debt) / Total Assets 
Non-debt tax shield (NDTS) (Depreciation + Amortization) /Total Assets 
Tangibility/Tang PPE / Total Assets  
Size Log (Total Assets) 
Financial Distress Costs (FDC) Std.Dev. of EBIT / Total Assets 
EBIT Earnings before interest and taxes 
Cash Flows Cash flow from operations / Total Assets 
ROA (EBIT – Total taxes) / Total Assets 
Z_Score ((3.3*EBIT)/Total Assets)+(Total revenue/Total Assets)+((1.4*RE)/Total Assets)+((1.2*WC)/Total Assets 
RE Retained Earnings 
WC Working Capital 
Price↑ Positive returns 
Returns (Equity @ t – Equity @ t-1) / Equity @ t-1 
Financial Deficit (FD) (Cash Flows from operations – Capital Expenditures) / Total Assets 
Debt Capacity Debt / PPE 
PPE Net Property, Plant and Equipment (Fixed Assets) 
Under-Leverage (UL) Debt Capacity < 1 
Over-Leverage (OL) Debt Capacity > 1 
Below-Target Leverage (BT) Deviation from Target > 0 
Above-Target Leverage (AT) Deviation from Target < 0 
Deviation Target Leverage – Lagged leverage 
Market-Shock (Zp, Zn) –table 8 Lagged leverage @ t-1 – lagged leverage at t-2 
Debt-Equity Ratio Book Debt/Book Equity 
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Table 1. Relationship (Theoretical predictions) between selected latent variables and capital structure.
1
 
Latent variables                                   Capital structure theories   
Trade-off Theory  Agency Costs               Pecking order theory                Market timing      
 BL           ML               BL            ML                    BL           ML                         BL       ML 
     
Size            (+)          (+)     (+)          (+) (±)          (±)                  (Silent)     
Q            (+)           (-)     (+)           (-) (+)          (±) 
2
                 (see footnote)
3
          
Tang            (+)          (+)     (+)          (+) (±)           (±)                  (Silent)     
FDC            (-)           (-)     (-)           (-) (±)           (±)                  (Silent)     
ROA                                              (+)          (-)
4
     (+)          (-) (-)            (-)                   (see footnote)
5
           
CF            (+)          (±)     (+)          (±) (-)            (-)                  (±)        (±)  
INV             (+)         (+)     (+)          (+) (±)           (±)                   (Silent)         
NDTS
6
                     (-)           (±)                   (-)          (±) (±)            (±)  (Silent 
                                                          
1
 The relationship between variables and leverage are sometimes conflicting across theories and the choice of 
measurement of leverage. BL=Book leverage, ML = Market leverage, + = positive, - = negative, and ± = ambiguous. 
2 Pecking order implies that firms with higher growth opportunity, holding profitability constant, should have more 
debt over time. But, in its dynamic form, growth may be negatively correlated with leverage (Fama & French, 2002). 
3 Higher M/B, however, may be influenced by mispricing of equity. If capital structure decisions are influenced by 
market timing, higher M/B should be negatively related to leverage as managers exploit equity mispricing through 
equity issuances (Baker & Wurgler, 2002). 
4
 Strebulaev (2007) shows that in a dynamic trade-off, the relationship between profitability and leverage is 
negative. Note that profitability is reflected in stock prices, thus negatively affect market leverage.  
5 Although, market timing is silent on profitability, the implied effect within market timing framework is negative. 
Profitable firms are more likely to experience equity value appreciation, which in turn may trigger market timing 
behaviour. However, it could also be argued from the free cash flow perspective (agency cost) that, profitable firms 
need more debt as a disciplinary tool against certain managerial actions.  
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Figure1: Summarizes the underlying concept of the dynamics of capital structure determination and adjustment speed to target.
7
 
              Adjustment after deviation from the optimum/target 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
6
 This variable was first suggested by Titman and Wessels (1988) as a competing proxy for debt tax shield, thus an 
inverse relationship is expected. 
7
 The list of variables in the above figure is not by any means exhaustive. The list contains those factors that are 
relevant in this research. 
Optimal Leverage Speed of Adjustment 
Weighs 
Advantages of Debt Financing Disadvantages of Debt Financing 
Weighs 
Rebalancing costs Costs of deviation  
Rebalancing options available to firms 
1. Debt  Retirement - Overleveraged 
2. Debt Issuance - Underleveraged 
3. Equity Repurchase - Underleveraged 
4. Equity Issuance - Overleveraged 
Financial 
Flexibility 
= Internal 
Financing 
Capital 
markets = 
External 
Financing 
1. Cash Inflows: 
A. ROA=Profitability 
B. Cash Flows 
C. Financial Surplus 
2. Constraints: 
A. Investments 
 
Tax Shield Potential costs of distress 
1. Non-debt tax shield 
2. Financial distress cost 
3. Tobin’s Q 
4. Size 
5. ROA = Profitability 
6. Tangibility/Investment 
7. Cash Flows 
 
Well Researched Attributes 
1. Access to capital markets - agency costs and information 
asymmetry: (COSTS) 
A. Tobin’s Q = information asymmetry/agency costs 
B. Financial deficit 
C. Debt Capacity – if the firm is above its target leverage 
2. Mitigating factors: (BENEFITS) 
A. Tangibility 
B. Size 
C. Z_score – measure of probability of distress 
D. Positive stock return 
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Table 2. Summary Statistics  
The sample consists of annual Compustat data for years 1991 - 2009. Financial firms (SIC codes 6000-6999) and regulated utilities (SIC codes 
4900-4999) are excluded. Also excluded are firm-years with missing values for leverage factors, years with negative book value of equity, firms 
with less than 5 years of data, and negative and missing values of foreign and domestic taxes (i.e. for MNCs). MNC consist of firms with 
reported foreign taxes and DCs are firms with zero reported foreign taxes, and MNC10 are firms with 10% or more of foreign tax ratio (FTR).  
 
Factors N Mean   Std.Dev. Min. Max. 
      
M_Leverage 
MNC 
DC 
15,325 
7506 
7819 
.2150 
.1936   
.2354  
.1868 
.1605 
.2069 
.0003 
.0003 
.0003 
.8593 
.8185 
.8593 
B_Leverage 
MNC 
DC 
15,325 
7506 
7819 
.2206 
.2105 
.2303 
.1511 
.1325 
.1665 
.0014 
.0015 
.0014 
.7386 
.6368 
.7386 
TobinsQ 
MNC 
DC 
15,325 
7506 
7819 
1.4665 
1.4656 
1.4672 
.9875 
.8235 
1.1227 
.2712 
.3775 
.2712 
8.9999 
5.9575 
8.9999 
NDTS 
MNC 
DC 
15,325 
7506 
7819 
.0465 
.0431 
.0497 
.0251 
.0192 
.0293 
.0043 
.0079 
.0043 
.2072 
.1236 
.2072 
Tang 
MNC 
DC 
15,325 
7506 
7819 
.3130 
.2746 
.3499 
.2061 
.1678 
.2311 
.0163 
.0250 
.0163 
.9133 
.8126 
.9133 
Size 
MNC 
DC 
15,325 
7506 
7819 
6.0440 
7.2012 
4.9328 
2.0353 
1.5818 
1.7881 
1.2410 
3.3051 
1.2410 
10.7609 
10.7609 
9.4560 
FDC 
MNC 
DC 
15,325 
7506 
7819 
15.4088 
2.6847 
27.6236 
35.4980 
5.4303 
46.2273 
.0161 
.0161 
.0553 
464.4231 
61.6849 
464.231 
CF 
MNC 
DC 
15,325 
7506 
7819 
.0690 
.0787 
.0597 
.0978 
.0576 
.1240 
-2.0299 
-.2956 
-2.0299 
1.4391 
.7407 
1.4391 
ROA 
MNC 
DC 
15,325 
7506 
7819 
.0463 
.0777 
.0162 
.1112 
.0412 
.1441 
-.9251 
-.1358 
-.9251 
.2355 
.2018 
.2355 
Inv 
MNC 
DC 
15,325 
7506 
7819 
.0605 
.0522 
.0684 
.0531 
.0359 
.0645 
.0019 
.0060 
.0019 
.3718 
.2117 
.3718 
 
Panel Length 15,325 10.557 5.086 5 19 
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Correlation Tables: 
 
Table 3A. 
 
 
 
 
M_Leverage 
 
 
                
 
TobinsQ 
 
 
 
 
NDTS 
 
 
 
 
Tang 
 
 
 
 
Size 
 
 
 
 
FDC 
 
 
 
 
FCF 
 
 
 
 
ROA                      Inv       
 
 
 
 
 
M_Leverage 1.0000         
TobinsQ -0.5127 1.0000        
NDTS  0.0484 0.0021 1.0000       
Tang 0.2240 -0.1130 0.4952 1.0000      
Size 0.0421 -0.0354 -0.1515 0.0410 1.0000     
FDC -0.0510 0.0811 0.1241 -0.0423 -0.6411 1.0000    
CF 0.1095 -0.2499 0.1582 0.2020 0.1664 -0.1700 1.0000   
ROA 0.0004 -0.1193 -0.1166 0.0804 0.3326 -0.3041 0.4666 1.0000  
Inv -0.0336 0.0856 0.4468 0.5970 -0.0277 -0.0250 0.1291 0.0668                1.0000  
  
Table 3. B B_Leverage TobinsQ NDTS Tang Size FDC FCF  ROA Inv 
B_Leverage 1.0000         
TobinsQ -0.2055 1.0000        
NDTS 0.0584 0.0021 1.0000       
Tang 0.2517 -0.1130 0.4952 1.0000      
Size 0.1168 -0.0354 -0.1515 0.0410 1.0000     
FDC  -0.0702 0.0811 0.1241 -0.0423 -0.6411 1.0000    
CF  -0.0047 -0.2499 0.1582 0.2020 0.1664 -0.1700 1.0000   
ROA  0.0266 -0.1193 -0.1166 0.0804 0.3326 -0.3041 0.4666 1.0000  
Inv  0.0201 0.0856 0.4468 0.5970 -0.0277 -0.0250 0.1291 0.0668 1.0000 
 
Table 3.A: M_Leverage (LTD_1yr + Total_LTD)/ (LTD_1yr + Total_LTD + MVE) and Table 3. B: B_ Leverage (LTD_1yr+Total_LTD)/Total_Assets 
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Table 3: C. MNC M_Leverage TobinsQ NDTS Tang Size FDC FCF ROA Inv 
 
M_Leverage 
 
1.0000 
        
TobinsQ -0.5543 1.0000        
NDTS -0.0102 0.0162 1.0000       
Tang 0.1509 -0.0909 0.5691 1.0000      
Size 0.0574 0.0807 -0.0813 0.0939 1.0000     
FDC -0.0341 -0.0830 -0.0193 -0.0891 -0.6408 1.0000    
CF  0.0835 -0.2835 0.2779 0.2402 0.0185 -0.0235 1.0000   
ROA -0.3639 0.5597 -0.0254 -0.0254  0.0939 -0.0813 0.0753 1.0000  
Inv -0.1035 0.1251 0.6355 0.6355 -0.0038 -0.0554 0.1532 0.1270 1.0000 
 
 
Table 3: D. DC M_Leverage TobinsQ NDTS Tang Size FDC FCF ROA Inv 
 
M_Leverage 
 
1.0000 
        
TobinsQ -0.4954 1.0000        
NDTS  0.0560 -0.0045 1.0000       
Tang 0.2395 -0.1274 0.4449 1.0000      
Size 0.1725 -0.1189 -0.1039 0.2261 1.0000     
FDC -0.1197 0.1139 0.1017 -0.1356 -0.6992 1.0000    
CF 0.1390 -0.2469 0.1450 0.2250 0.1903 -0.1600 1.0000   
ROA  0.1202 -0.2711 -0.0970 0.1815 0.2850 -0.2380 0.5149 1.0000  
Inv -0.0310 0.0723 0.3931 0.5722 0.1074 -0.0940 0.1451 0.1163 1.0000 
 
Table 3.C: M_Leverage (LTD_1yr + Total_LTD)/ (LTD_1yr + Total_LTD + MVE) and Table 3. D: B_ Leverage (LTD_1yr+Total_LTD)/Total_Assets 
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Figure 2a&b: The figures present yearly debt to equity ratio and an average ratio over sample period. Debt-equity ratio is computed as book debt 
to book equity. Book equity is derived by taken the product of book value per share and the number of common shares outstanding. All variables 
are directly obtained from compustat annual firm financial data. 
 
 
Figure 2a [Yearly debt-equity ratio] 
 
Figure 2b [Average debt-equity ratio over sample period] 
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Table 4. Panel A presents the return statistics: The % of positive yearly returns (Preturns) out of total yearly returns; average % of 
positive yearly returns and the overall median returns. Panel B presents target leverage for DCs and MNCs. Target leverage is 
estimated by equation 11.  
Panel A: DC  MNC  MNC10 
 
 
Year # returns # Preturns % Preturns # returns #Preturns % Preturns # returns #Preturns % Preturns 
1991 230 162 70% 243 196 81% 186 152 82% 
1992 260 173 67% 268 203 76% 201 151 75% 
1993 331 222 67% 298 220 74% 220 162 74% 
1994 369 145 39% 318 192 60% 232 144 62% 
1995 413 247 60% 339 280 83% 255 211 83% 
1996 454 287 63% 387 300 78% 281 214 76% 
1997 470 317 67% 390 335 86% 280 246 88% 
1998 479 203 42% 402 174 43% 291 127 44% 
1999 467 206 44% 415 194 47% 321 156 49% 
2000 466 210 45% 432 227 53% 333 169 51% 
2001 487 312 64% 396 270 68% 312 206 66% 
2002 482 201 42% 389 156 40% 311 116 37% 
2003 518 427 82% 429 369 86% 346 295 85% 
2004 489 337 69% 491 376 77% 407 308 76% 
2005 463 266 57% 527 322 61% 425 261 61% 
2006 432 264 61% 516 369 72% 421 315 75% 
2007 418 192 46% 512 295 58% 437 256 59% 
2008 330 49 15% 425 50 12% 359 44 12% 
2009 280 198 71% 310 233 75% 260 201 77% 
Avg. % Preturns   56%   65%   65% 
Median Return 8%   12%   12%   
 
Panel B. 
Target Leverage            Obs. Mean Std. Dev. 
DC           7,819                .2354 .1228 
MNC           7,506                .1936  .0892 
MNC10           5,878                .2059  .0901 
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Table 5. Presents the debt capacity statistics: The number of firms in a sample year, number of firms with debt capacity >1, % of 
firms with debt capacity > 1 per year of sampled firms, and the average % of firms with debt capacity > 1 over the sample period 1. 
Debt capacity is determined by the ratio of debt to property, plant, and equipments (PPE).  
 
 
 DC  MNC  MNC10 
 
 
Year # Firms Debt-
Capacity > 
1 
% Debt-
Capacity > 
1 
# Firms Debt-
Capacity > 
1 
% Debt-
Capacity > 
1 
# Firms Debt-
Capacity > 
1 
% Debt-
Capacity > 
1 
1991 230 57 25% 243 42 17% 186 38 20% 
1992 260 59 23% 268 59 22% 201 49 24% 
1993 331 80 24% 298 70 23% 220 58 26% 
1994 369 91 25% 318 82 26% 232 62 27% 
1995 413 99 24% 339 86 25% 255 68 27% 
1996 454 115 25% 387 101 26% 281 77 27% 
1997 470 114 24% 390 119 31% 280 90 32% 
1998 479 152 32% 402 146 36% 291 108 37% 
1999 467 148 32% 415 159 38% 321 132 41% 
2000 466 151 32% 432 162 38% 333 133 40% 
2001 487 158 32% 396 162 41% 312 134 43% 
2002 482 143 30% 389 160 41% 311 128 41% 
2003 518 145 28% 429 177 41% 346 149 43% 
2004 489 146 30% 491 219 45% 407 184 45% 
2005 463 143 31% 527 241 46% 425 203 48% 
2006 432 137 32% 516 236 46% 421 199 47% 
2007 418 143 34% 512 240 47% 437 207 47% 
2008 330 98 30% 425 214 50% 359 182 51% 
2009 280 80 29% 310 155 50% 260 130 50% 
Avg. %    28%   36%   38% 
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Table 6. Presents the above-target leverage statistics: The number of firms in a sample year, number of firms with above-target 
leverage, % of firms with above-target leverage per year of sampled firms, and the average % of firms with above-target leverage. 
Target leverage is estimated using equation 11. Above- target leverage is computed by subtracting the lagged leverage from target 
leverage. If deviation from target is negative, the firm is above target. 
 
 
                             (13) 
 
Panel A: DC  MNC  MNC10 
 
 
Year # Firms # Firms 
above 
target 
leverage 
% Firms 
above 
target 
leverage 
# Firms # Firms 
above 
target 
leverage 
% Firms 
above 
target 
leverage 
# Firms # Firms 
above 
target 
leverage 
% Firms 
above 
target 
leverage 
1992 260 96 37% 268 65 24% 201 47 23% 
1993 331 119 36% 298 94 32% 220 67 30% 
1994 369 118 32% 318 90 28% 232 68 29% 
1995 413 138 33% 339 119 35% 255 91 36% 
1996 454 159 35% 387 117 30% 281 79 28% 
1997 470 173 37% 390 142 36% 280 96 34% 
1998 479 124 26% 402 81 20% 291 61 21% 
1999 467 158 34% 415 121 29% 321 93 29% 
2000 466 154 33% 432 127 29% 333 103 31% 
2001 487 190 39% 396 127 32% 312 107 34% 
2002 482 151 31% 389 112 29% 311 89 29% 
2003 518 225 43% 429 141 33% 346 114 33% 
2004 489 203 42% 491 181 37% 407 151 37% 
2005 463 187 40% 527 201 38% 425 161 38% 
2006 432 164 38% 516 221 43% 421 174 41% 
2007 418 148 35% 512 191 37% 437 164 38% 
2008 330 62 19% 425 79 19% 359 70 19% 
2009 280 125 45% 310 132 43% 260 113 43% 
Avg. %    35%   32%   32% 
itti
N
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Table 7. T-test for difference in mean of capital structure variables, with unequal variances. Null hypothesis = equal 
means=Ho: diff = 0. */**/*** denotes statistical significance at 1%/5%/10% respectively. 
 
 
Null = ],,,,,,,[,),10()()( FDCINVNDTSCFROAQTangSizeXVarVarMNCXMNCXDCX jsititit


 
 
 Means   Means   Means  
            
Variable DC MNC t-Test  DC MNC10 t-Test  MNC MNC10 t-Test 
            
Size 4.93 7.20   (-2.27) -83.26*  4.93 7.29         (-2.36) -81.49*  7.20 7.29          [-.09] -3.11* 
 
Tang .35 .27       (.08) 23.15*  .35 .27              (.08) 22.46*  .27 .27              [.00] .45 
 
Q 1.47 1.46     (.00) .10  1.47 1.42            (.05) 2.63*  1.46 1.42            [.04] 2.94* 
 
ROA .02 .08       (-.06) -36.19*  .02 .07             (-.05) -34.01*  .08 .07              [.01] 4.09* 
 
CF .06 .08       (-.02) -12.23*  .06 .08             (-.02) -11.33*  .08 .08              [.00] .98 
 
NDTS .05 .04       (.01) 16.59*  .05 .04              (.01) 16.06*  .04 .04              [.00] .19 
 
INV .07 .05       (.02) 19.35*  .07 .05              (.02) 20.20*  .05 .05              [.00] 1.95*** 
 
FDC 27.62 2.68  (24.94) 47.36*  27.62 2.59        (25.04) 47.45*  2.68 2.59            [.09] 1.03 
 
#Obs. 7819 7506   7819 5878   7506 5878  
Note: The figures in parentheses indicate the differences from the means of the corresponding DC groups, and figures in brackets 
indicate differences in means between MNC and MNC10. 
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Table 8. OLS regression
8
. Using market leverage, this table shows the preliminary relationship between capital structure variables and the 
theoretical predictions. */**/***/ represents statistical significance at 1%/5%/10% respectively. Heteroscedastic-Consistent Standard Errors are 
in brackets.  
 
 
    Eq. (3) 
 
 
Leverage Factors Coef./Robust Std. Errors 
(1 - MNC) 
Coef./Robust Std. Errors 
(2 - MNC) 
Coef./Robust Std. Errors 
(3 – MNC10) 
Coef./Robust Std. Errors 
(4 – MNC10) 
Size .0100  (.0009)* .0124  (.0016)* .0052  (.0009)* .0039  (.0012)* 
Tang .2214  (.0092)* .2296  (.0121)* .2413  (.0091)* .2512  (.0111)* 
Q -.0894 (.0017)* -.0826 (.0022)* -.0898 (.0017)* -.0841 (.0020)* 
ROA -.0973 (.0136)* -.0846 (.0147)* -.1202 (.0136)* -.1088 (.0142)* 
FCF -.0430 (.0198)** -.0022 (.0217) -.0414 (.0199)** -.0069 (.0217) 
NDTS -.1509 (.0681)** -.0406 (.0822) -.2211 (.0686)* -.1548 (.0789)*** 
INV -.5107 (.0342)* -.4782 (.0390)* -.4911 (.0343)* -.4582 (.0377)* 
FDC .0000  (.0000) .0001  (.0001) .0001  (.0001) -.0000  (.0001) 
MNC/MNC10 -.0487 (.0032)* .0664  (.0154)* -.0178  (.0029)* .0509  (.0158)* 
MNC/MNC10 *Size  -.0052 (.0020)*  .0024 (.0019) 
MNC/MNC10 *Tang  -.0114 (.0177)  -.0192 (.0185) 
MNC/MNC10 *Q  -.0160 (.0036)*  -.0219 (.0039)* 
MNC/MNC10 *ROA  -.1438 (.0511)*  -.0472 (.0582) 
MNC/MNC10 *FCF  -.2693 (.0435)*  -.2985 (.0478)* 
MNC/MNC10 *NDTS  -.1685 (.1372)  -.0463 (.1485) 
MNC/MNC10 *INV  -.2453 (.0740)*  -.3171 (.0820)* 
MNC/MNC10 *FDC  -.0007 (.0004)*  -.0007 (.0004)*** 
Cons .3014(.0101)* .2545  (.0119)* .3064  (.0102)* .2945  (.0117)* 
               
                                                          
8
 Regressions include year dummies. 
ittititit MNCsMNCsLeverageM  
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Table 9. OLS regression
9
. Using book leverage, this table shows the preliminary relationship between capital structure variables and the 
theoretical predictions. */**/***/ represents statistical significance at 1%/5%/10% respectively. Heteroscedastic-Consistent Standard Errors are 
in brackets.  
 
 
  Eq. (4) 
 
 
Leverage Factors Coef./Robust Std. Errors 
(1 - MNC) 
Coef./Robust Std. Errors 
(2 - MNC) 
Coef./Robust Std. Errors 
(3 - MNC10) 
Coef./Robust Std. Errors 
(4 - MNC10) 
Size .0135  (.0008)* .0182  (.0014)* .0100  (.0008)* .0115  (.0013)* 
Tang .2341  (.0084)* .2477  (.0109)* .2492  (.0083)* .2636  (.0101)* 
Q -.0272 (.0013)* -.0199 (.0016)* -.0275 (.0013)* -.0235 (.0015)* 
ROA .0356 (.0135)* .0306 (.0146)** .0184 (.0135) .0061 (.0141) 
FCF -.1910 (.0187)* -.1481 (.0194)* -.1898 (.0187)* -.1511 (.0192)* 
NDTS -.0136 (.0630) .0639 (.0748) -.0668 (.0632) -.0306 (.0720) 
INV -.4387 (.0332)* -.3791 (.0376)* -.4239 (.0333)* -.3766 (.0363)* 
FDC .0001 (.0000) .0002  (.0001)* .0001  (.0001) .0001  (.0001)** 
MNC/MNC10 -.0358 (.0029)* .1224  (.0138)* -.0123  (.0027)* .1063  (.0142)* 
MNC/MNC10 *Size  -.0113 (.0018)*  -.0063 (.0017)* 
MNC/MNC10 *Tang  -.0229 (.0163)  -.0317 (.0170)** 
MNC/MNC10 *Q  -.0257 (.0029)*  -.0228 (.0032)* 
MNC/MNC10 *ROA  -.1433 (.0509)*  .2130 (.0573)* 
MNC/MNC10 *FCF  -.3017 (.0367)*  -.3231 (.0392)* 
MNC/MNC10 *NDTS  .0421 (.1279)  .1234 (.1371) 
MNC/MNC10 *INV  -.4259 (.0700)*  -.4333 (.0773)* 
MNC/MNC10 *FDC  -.0019 (.0003)*  -.0019 (.0004)* 
Cons .3014(.0101)* .1038  (.0103)* .1575  (.0084)* .1314  (.0097)* 
                                                          
9
 Regressions include year dummies. 
ittititit MNCsMNCsLeverageB  
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Table 10. Dynamic Panel Estimation of Adj. Speed, using four econometric methods. Panel A pertains to DCs, Panel B is the 
broadly defined MNCs, and panel C is the MNCs with FTR >= 10%.  FE IV is fixed effect IV; AB is Arrelano & Bond one-step, ABC 
is the two-step corrected (Windmeijer, 2005), and then LSDVC. Robust std. errors are in (). */**/*** denotes 1%/5%/10% 
significance. 
 
 (Market leverage)                                                        Eq. (11) 
                      
                   Panel A: DC   Panel B: MNC    Panel C. MNC10 
 FE IV AB ABC LSDVC FE IV AB ABC LSDVC FE IV AB ABC LSDVC 
M_Leverageit-1 .4657* 
(.0224) 
.5209* 
(.0890) 
.4997* 
(.1053) 
.6595* 
(.0076) 
.4243* 
(.0230) 
.4588* 
(.0813) 
.4300* 
(.0897) 
.5935* 
(.0036) 
.4082* 
(.0270) 
.3577* 
(.0914) 
.2593** 
(.1109) 
.5828* 
(.0107) 
Size .0578* 
(.0050) 
.1953* 
(.0652) 
.2268* 
(.0851) 
.0347* 
(.0055) 
.0316* 
(.0041) 
.1604* 
(.0603) 
.1500** 
(.0674) 
.0183* 
(.0004) 
.0360* 
(.0046) 
.2051* 
(.0650) 
.2346* 
(.0848) 
  .0224 
 (.0185) 
Tang .1586* 
(.0232) 
.5206 
(.3226) 
.5220*** 
(.3057) 
.0976* 
(.0171) 
.0227 
(.0273) 
.6639*** 
(.3447) 
.5367 
(.3708) 
.0214 
(.0978) 
.0260 
(.0309) 
.5938*** 
(.3325) 
.5633 
(.4318) 
   .0127 
 (.0440) 
Q -.0473* 
(.0025) 
.0369*** 
(.0220) 
.0420 
(.0257) 
-.0417* 
(.0011) 
-.0540* 
(.0027) 
-.0185 
(.0221) 
-.0249 
(.0244) 
-.0476* 
(.0067) 
-.0572* 
(.0031) 
-.0479** 
(.0236) 
-.0441*** 
(.0242) 
 -.0501* 
  (.0022) 
ROA -.2079* 
(.0228) 
-.1163 
(.2341) 
-.0990 
(.2706) 
-.1612* 
(.0340) 
-.3152* 
(.0482) 
-.6074 
(.4288) 
-.5766 
(.5618) 
-.2658* 
(.0935) 
-.3194* 
(.0552) 
-.5175 
(.4348) 
-.4657 
(.5618) 
  -.2785* 
  (.0409) 
CF -.1100* 
(.0164) 
.1009 
(.1690) 
.0814 
(.1829) 
-.1206* 
(.0190) 
-.1414* 
(.0252) 
.1884 
(.1738) 
.1949 
(.2088) 
-.1850* 
(.0007) 
-.1661* 
(.0304) 
-.1975 
(.1664) 
-.1938 
(.2247) 
  -.1843* 
  (.0408) 
NDTS -.1033 
(.1181) 
2.6689 
(1.6584) 
3.6713** 
(1.7764) 
-.4258* 
(.0459) 
-.0616 
(.1428) 
.0499 
(1.8151) 
-.2690 
(1.9771) 
-.2128 
(.3330) 
.1732 
(.1636) 
.9519 
(1.6073) 
1.2536 
(1.7705) 
  -.1761* 
  (.0634) 
INV .0596 
(.0407) 
.6485** 
(.2977) 
.7588** 
(.3285) 
.1527* 
(.0118) 
-.0714 
(.0610) 
.3242 
(.4026) 
.2499 
(.4277) 
.0908 
(.0944) 
-.0694 
(.0725) 
.5105 
(.3670) 
.3870 
(.4618) 
.1172*** 
  (.0679) 
FDC .0001 
(.0001) 
-.0001 
(.0001) 
-.0000 
(.0007) 
.0000 
(.0001) 
-.0017** 
(.0009) 
.0077* 
(.0023) 
.0066** 
(.0033) 
-.0017 
(.0011) 
-.0016 
(.0010) 
.0077* 
(.0023) 
.0068 
(.0047) 
   -.0019 
  (.0042) 
Constant -.1292* 
(.0280) 
   -.0139 
(.0323) 
   -.0377 
(.0367) 
   
Year Dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
#Obs 5,181 5,181 5,181 5,181 4,639 4,639 4,639 4,639 3,678 3,678 3,678 3,194 
#Groups 795 795 795  707 707 707  631 631 631  
Z1 926(8)* 18(8)** 16(8)**  815(8)* 38(8)* 16(8)**  667(8)* 53(8)* 22(8)*  
Z2 478(16)* 148(16)* 95(16)*  507(16)* 144(16)* 82(16)*  420(16)* 144(16)* 90(16)*  
Sargan  108(42) 108(42)   226(42) 226(42)   242(42) 242(42)  
2
nd
 Order Aut. 
Hausman 
 
560(25)* 
.062** .114*   
347(25)* 
.315* .482*   
255(25)* 
.686* .627* 
 
 
Adj Speed (γ) 53% 48% 50% 34% 58% 54% 57% 41% 59% 64% 74% 42% 
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Table 11. Dynamic Panel Estimation of Adj. Speed, using FE IV (Fixed Effect Instrumental Variable).Std. errors are in (). */**/*** 
denotes 1%/5%/10% significance. 
 
(Market Leverage)      Eq. (11) 
   
 Pooled DC MNC MNC10 (A)DC V. MNC (A)DC V. MNC10 
M_Leverageit-1 
Size 
Tang 
.4585*  (.0195) 
.0476*  (.0032) 
.1109*  (.0171) 
.4657*  (.0224) 
.0578*  (.0050) 
.1586*  (.0232) 
.4243*  (.0230) 
.0316*  (.0041) 
.0227  (.0273) 
.4082*  (.0270) 
.0360*  (.0046) 
.0260    (.0309) 
.4230*   (.0998) 
.0451*   (.0036) 
-.0475    (.0413) 
.4815*   (.0913) 
.0444*   (.0032) 
-.0510    (.0371) 
Q -.0499* (.0018) -.0473* (.0025) -.0540*  (.0027) -.0572* (.0031) -.0285*  (.0413) -.0293*  (.0041) 
ROA -.2181* (.0186) -.2079* (.0228) -.3152*  (.0482) -.3194* (.0552) -.1560*  (.0202) -.1660*  (.0197) 
CF -.1166* (.0130) -.1100* (.0164) -.1414*  (.0252) -.1661* (.0304) -.1325*  (.0157) -.1331*  (.0150) 
NDTS -1386    (.0886) -.1033   (.1181) -.0616    (.1428) .1732  (.1636)  .0501    (.0960)  -.0714   (.0904) 
INV .0434    (.0319) .0596     (.0407) -.0714    (.0610) -.0694  (.0725)   .1794*  (.0322)   .1731*  (.0314) 
FDC -.0000   (.0000) .0001    (.0001) -.0017** (.0009) -.0016  (.0010)    .0001   (.0001)    .0000   (.0001) 
MNC/MNC10 
MNC/MNC10_LML 
MNC/MNC10_ROA 
MNC/MNC10_Q 
MNC/MNC10_INV 
MNC/MNC10_SIZE 
MNC/MNC10_TANG 
MNC/MNC10_CF 
MNC/MNC10_NDTS 
MNC/MNC10_FDC 
LML_Q 
LML_TANG 
MNC/MNC10_LML_Q 
MNC/MNC10_LML_TANG 
 
Constant 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-1105  (.0208) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-.1292* (.0280) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-.0139  (.0323) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-.0377  (.0367) 
   .0514   (.0509) 
  .5150*  (.1039) 
  -.0640   (.0596) 
   .0043   (.0055) 
-.2808*  (.0774) 
  -.0038   (.0043) 
    .0566   (.0518) 
-.0642** (.0336) 
 -.0242    (.1772) 
  -.0005   (.0010) 
   -.2681*(.0402) 
   .7178*  (.1281) 
   -.1489*(.0454) 
   -.8221*(.1502) 
 
-.0975*  (.0343) 
 -.0170   (.0314) 
  .4121*  (.0905) 
  -.0537  (.0627) 
   .0051  (.0054) 
-.3026*  (.0823) 
   .0002  (.0030) 
.0813***  (.0429) 
-.0890**  (.0369) 
  .3739**  (.1772) 
  -.0008   (.0009) 
   -.2705*  (.0374) 
   .6348*   (.1180) 
   -.1599*  (.0426) 
   -.6454*  (.1363) 
   
-.0769*  (.0277) 
Year Dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y 
#Obs 9,820 5,181 4,639 3,678 9,820 9,820 
#Groups 1,502 795 707 631 1,502 1,502 
Z1 1,713(8) 926(8)* 815(8)* 667(8)* 3,212(22)* 3,160(22)* 
Z2 860(16) 478(16)* 507(16)* 420(16)* 594(15)* 579(15)* 
Hausman       971(25)      560(25)*        347(25)*      255(25)*   
Adj Speed (γ) 54% 53% 58% 59% 58% 52% 
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Table 12. Factors of adjustment speed. A two-stage estimation of adjustment speed is used. The target, M_Leverage*it , is generated in the first 
stage using FE IV. Deviation is the difference between the target and the current market leverage. Δ is the actual change in leverage from t-1 to t. 
Z is the adjustment speed factors in columns. */**/*** denotes 1%/5%/10% respectively. Heteroskedastic consistent robust Std.Errors in ( ). 
 
        Eq. (16)                                                                                
  
 
FDN 
 
 
 
DCap 
 
 
Tang 
 
 
Z 
 
 
Price↑ 
 
 
OL 
 
 
UL 
 
 
AT 
 
 
BT
 
 
Deviation_DC .2318* 
(.0090) 
.2802* 
(.0096) 
.2393* 
(.0090) 
.2400* 
(.0092) 
.1805* 
(.0078) 
.3027* 
(.0097) 
.3027* 
(.0096) 
.2470* 
(.0150) 
.2470* 
(.0150) 
γDC -Zit .0437* 
(.0028) 
.0143* 
(.0012) 
-.0149* 
(.0059) 
-.0031* 
(.0006) 
-.1100* 
(.0024) 
.0785* 
(.0037) 
-.0785* 
(.0037) 
.0045* 
(.0048) 
-.0045* 
(.0048) 
Deviation_MNC .2497* 
(.0096) 
.2852* 
(.0100) 
.2418* 
(.0097) 
.2560* 
(.0100) 
.1935* 
(.0087) 
.2819* 
(.0101) 
.2819* 
(.0101) 
.2412* 
(.0153) 
.2412* 
(.0153) 
γMNC-Zit .0347* 
(.0033) 
.0161* 
(.0011) 
.0080 
(.0065) 
-.0123* 
(.0013) 
-.0721* 
(.0020) 
.0435* 
(.0024) 
-.0435* 
(.0024) 
.0001 
(.0034) 
-.0001 
(.0034) 
Deviation_MNC10 .2468* 
(.0106) 
.2831* 
(.0112) 
.2369* 
(.0107) 
.2510* 
(.0110) 
.1910* 
(.0095) 
.2837* 
(.0113) 
.2837* 
(.0113) 
.2437* 
(.0170) 
.2437* 
(.0170) 
γMNC10-Zit .0378* 
(.0037) 
.0167* 
(.0013) 
.0011 
(.0076) 
-.0131* 
(.0016) 
-.0764* 
(.0023) 
.0471* 
(.0027) 
-.0471* 
(.0027) 
.0026 
(.0040) 
-.0026 
(.0040) 
γ1st Qrtle - DC-Zit  .1237* 
(.0173) 
-.0145 
(.0740) 
.0023* 
(.0007) 
     
γ1st Qrtle - MNC-Zit  .0513* 
(.0120) 
.0319 
(.0697) 
.0004 
(.0031) 
     
γ1st Qrtle -MNC10-Zit  .0639* 
(.0139) 
.0068 
(.0774) 
   .0012 
(.0031) 
     
γ4th Qrtle - DC-Zit  .0045* 
(.0001) 
-.0663* 
(.0241) 
-.0013 
(.0026) 
     
γ4th Qrtle - MNC-Zit  .0090* 
(.0014) 
.1256 
(.3705) 
-.0072* 
(.0026) 
     
γ4th Qrtle -MNC10-Zit  .0083* 
(.0014) 
.0109 
(.0229) 
-.0061** 
(.0030) 
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Table 13. Dominant Factors
10
 Analysis on adjustment speed. A two-stage estimation of adjustment speed is used. The target, M_Leverage*it , 
is generated in the first stage using FE IV. Deviation is the difference between the target and the current market leverage. Δ is the actual change 
in leverage from t-1 to t. Z is the interaction of dominant factors and over-leverage as well as the interaction of dominant factors and above target 
leverage. */**/*** denotes statistical significance of 1%/5%/10% respectively. Heteroskedastic consistent robust Std.Errors in ( ). 
 
 
                                                        Eq. (16) 
 
 
 Size*OL Size*AT Q*OL Q*AT ROA*OL ROA*AT CF*OL CF*AT DCap*AT Z_Score*OL Z_Score*AT 
 
γDC 
 
.0121* 
(.0007) 
 
 
.0008 
(.0009) 
 
.0155* 
(.0015) 
 
 
-.0082* 
(.0011) 
 
-.0063 
(.0228) 
 
-.0562* 
(.0190) 
 
-0009 
(.0382) 
 
-.0982* 
(.0244) 
 
.0087* 
(.0009) 
 
.0053* 
(.0013) 
 
-.0020* 
(.0009) 
 
 
γMNC .0048* 
(.0003) 
 
-.0004 
(.0004) 
.0120* 
(.0011) 
-0075* 
(.0010) 
.3275* 
(.0255) 
-.0940* 
(.0276) 
.3018* 
(.0352) 
-.0868* 
(.0302) 
.0086* 
(.0011) 
.0147* 
(.0010) 
-.0036* 
(.0012) 
 
 
γMNC10 .0052* 
(.0003) 
 
-.0000 
(.0005) 
.0127* 
(.0013) 
-.0087* 
(.0013) 
.3422* 
(.0298) 
-.0916* 
(.0334) 
.3316* 
(.0374) 
-.0845** 
(.0355) 
.0095* 
(.0013) 
.0161* 
(.0012) 
-.0033** 
(.0015) 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
10
 Dominant factors are those variables that are consistently statistically significant at 1% as adjustment speed 
factors.  
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Table 14. Heteroskedastic consistent robust OLS: Capital Structure Rebalancing. In Panel A. a two-stage estimation of adjustment speed is used. 
The target, M_Leverage*it , is generated in the first stage using FE IV. Deviation is the difference between the target and the current book 
leverage. Δ is the actual change in leverage from t-1 to t. Z is the change in market leverage from period t – 2 to t – 1(shock) and Zpositive and 
Znegative  are positive and negative shock to market leverage. */**/*** denotes  statistical significance at the 1%/5%/10% level. Robust Std. errors 
are in parenthesis. Panel B. Reports debt ratio and target leverage. 
 
                                                                                                    Eq. (17) 
 
      
γDeviation_DC .1566* 
(.0090) 
γDeviation_DC .1272* 
(.0125) 
γDeviation_DC .1821* 
(.0140) 
γZit .0195*** 
(.0110) 
γZit positive -.0108 
(.0188) 
γZit negative .0076 
(.0250) 
γDeviation_MNC .1679* 
(.0083) 
γDeviation_MNC .1518* 
(.0120) 
γDeviation_MNC .1659* 
(.0126) 
γZit     .0294** 
(.0126) 
γZit positive -.0121 
(.0225) 
γZit negative .0833* 
(.0271) 
γDeviation_MNC10 .1666* 
(.0092) 
γDeviation_MNC10 .1496* 
(.0134) 
γDeviation_MNC10 .1640* 
(.0139) 
γZit 
 
.0299** 
(.0139) 
γZit positive -.0209 
(.0246) 
γZit negative .0868* 
(.0303) 
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Table 15a-c & figure 3a-c: 
                        
          
15a.DC       1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Avg 
          
Invested capital or net assets 
                     
          
Cash 
   
4% 5% 4% 4% 4% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 7% 7% 8% 7% 7% 7% 6% 6% 7% 6% 
          
Working capital requirements (WCR) 
 
18% 17% 17% 18% 16% 15% 17% 16% 15% 14% 13% 14% 12% 11% 10% 10% 9% 8% 6% 13% 
          
Net fixed assets (NFA) 
  
78% 77% 79% 79% 79% 79% 78% 79% 80% 81% 80% 80% 79% 83% 83% 83% 85% 86% 87% 81% 
          
Total invested capital or net assets 
 
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
          
Capital employed 
                      
          
Short-term debt (debt due in 1yr) 
 
2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 3% 2% 2% 3% 2% 3% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 1% 2% 
          
Long-term financing: 
                      
          
 
Long-term debt 
 
32% 34% 32% 31% 32% 30% 31% 35% 35% 34% 34% 34% 32% 34% 32% 35% 37% 37% 37% 34% 
          
 
Owners' equity ( OE) 
 
66% 64% 66% 67% 66% 68% 67% 62% 62% 63% 63% 65% 65% 65% 66% 63% 60% 61% 61% 64% 
          
Total capital employed 
  
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
          
Break-out  (O E) 
                      
          
  
Pure Equity 
 
28% 31% 36% 37% 37% 40% 41% 36% 34% 22% 35% 43% 43% 43% 45% 45% 45% 44% 46% 40% 
          
  
RE 
 
38% 34% 30% 30% 29% 28% 26% 25% 28% 41% 28% 22% 22% 22% 21% 18% 16% 17% 15% 24% 
          
    
66% 64% 66% 67% 66% 68% 67% 62% 62% 63% 63% 65% 65% 65% 66% 63% 60% 61% 61% 64% 
          
Total Long-term financing 
 
98% 98% 98% 98% 98% 98% 98% 97% 98% 98% 97% 98% 97% 98% 98% 98% 98% 98% 99% 98% 
          
                        
          
Prorated Long-term debt financing of NFA  
 
32% 34% 32% 32% 33% 30% 32% 36% 36% 35% 35% 34% 33% 34% 33% 36% 38% 38% 38% 35% 
          
Prorated total equity financing of NFA 
 
68% 66% 68% 68% 67% 70% 68% 64% 64% 65% 65% 66% 67% 66% 67% 64% 62% 62% 62% 65% 
          
  
Total NFA 
 
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
          
                        
          
Prorated Pure Equity financing of NFA 
(E/NFA) 
 
29% 31% 37% 37% 37% 41% 42% 37% 35% 22% 36% 43% 44% 44% 46% 45% 46% 45% 47% 41%           
Prorated RE financing of NFA (RE/NFA) 
 
39% 34% 31% 31% 30% 29% 26% 26% 29% 42% 29% 23% 23% 22% 22% 19% 16% 17% 16% 24% 
          
    
68% 66% 68% 68% 67% 70% 68% 64% 64% 65% 65% 66% 67% 66% 67% 64% 62% 62% 62% 65% 
          
 
ST/LTD 
  
6% 6% 6% 6% 6% 7% 5% 8% 6% 6% 9% 5% 8% 5% 6% 5% 6% 6% 4% 6% 
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15b. MNC       1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Avg 
Invested capital or net assets 
                     Cash 
   
6% 6% 7% 7% 6% 7% 6% 5% 6% 6% 7% 9% 10% 11% 10% 10% 9% 9% 8% 8% 
Working capital requirements (WCR) 
 
14% 13% 12% 12% 13% 12% 12% 11% 10% 10% 8% 8% 9% 9% 9% 9% 8% 9% 10% 10% 
Net fixed assets (NFA) 
  
80% 80% 81% 81% 81% 81% 82% 83% 84% 84% 84% 83% 81% 80% 81% 81% 83% 82% 83% 82% 
Total invested capital or net assets 
 
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Capital employed 
                      Short-term debt (debt due in 1yr) 
 
3% 3% 3% 3% 2% 2% 2% 3% 3% 3% 3% 2% 3% 3% 3% 2% 3% 2% 2% 3% 
Long-term financing: 
                      
 
Long-term debt 
 
30% 31% 29% 27% 27% 25% 27% 29% 30% 30% 33% 30% 31% 27% 25% 24% 26% 27% 27% 28% 
 
Owners' equity 
 
67% 66% 68% 71% 71% 72% 71% 68% 67% 67% 64% 68% 65% 70% 71% 73% 71% 70% 71% 69% 
Total capital employed 
  
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Break-out Owners' Equity 
                      
  
Pure Equity 
 
16% 21% 24% 28% 31% 29% 31% 29% 26% 27% 26% 31% 27% 28% 29% 32% 31% 29% 27% 28% 
  
RE 
 
50% 45% 44% 43% 40% 43% 39% 40% 41% 40% 38% 37% 38% 41% 42% 41% 41% 42% 44% 41% 
    
67% 66% 68% 71% 71% 72% 71% 68% 67% 67% 64% 68% 65% 70% 71% 73% 71% 70% 71% 
6 
9% 
Total Long-term financing 
 
97% 97% 97% 97% 98% 98% 98% 97% 97% 97% 97% 98% 97% 97% 97% 98% 97% 98% 98% 97% 
                        Prorated Long-term debt financing of NFA  31% 32% 30% 28% 28% 26% 28% 30% 31% 31% 34% 30% 32% 28% 26% 25% 27% 28% 28% 29% 
Prorated total equity financing of NFA 
 
69% 68% 70% 72% 72% 74% 72% 70% 69% 69% 66% 70% 68% 72% 74% 75% 73% 72% 72% 71% 
  
Total NFA 
 
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
                        Prorated Pure Equity financing of NFA  
 
17% 22% 25% 28% 32% 30% 32% 29% 27% 28% 27% 32% 28% 29% 30% 32% 31% 29% 28% 29% 
Prorated RE financing of NFA (RE/NFA) 52% 46% 45% 44% 41% 44% 40% 41% 42% 41% 40% 38% 40% 43% 44% 42% 42% 43% 44% 42% 
    
69% 68% 70% 72% 72% 74% 72% 70% 69% 69% 66% 70% 68% 72% 74% 75% 73% 72% 72% 71% 
 
ST/LTD 
  
10% 9% 10% 9% 9% 9% 7% 9% 10% 9% 9% 8% 11% 10% 14% 10% 10% 8% 7% 10% 
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15c.MNC10       1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Avg 
Invested capital or net assets 
                     Cash 
   
7% 6% 7% 7% 6% 7% 6% 5% 6% 6% 7% 9% 10% 12% 11% 10% 9% 9% 12% 9% 
Working capital requirements (WCR) 
 
12% 11% 11% 10% 13% 12% 13% 11% 10% 10% 8% 7% 9% 8% 9% 9% 9% 10% 10% 10% 
Net fixed assets 
  
81% 82% 82% 83% 81% 81% 81% 84% 84% 84% 85% 83% 82% 80% 80% 80% 82% 81% 78% 82% 
Total invested capital or net assets 
 
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Capital employed 
                      Short-term debt (debt due in 1yr) 
 
3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 2% 3% 4% 3% 3% 2% 4% 3% 4% 2% 3% 2% 2% 3% 
Long-term financing: 
                      
 
Long-term debt 
 
35% 35% 35% 33% 32% 31% 31% 35% 34% 34% 36% 31% 34% 28% 27% 24% 27% 27% 29% 28% 
 
Owners' equity  (OE) 
 
62% 62% 61% 64% 66% 67% 66% 62% 63% 63% 61% 67% 63% 70% 70% 73% 71% 71% 69% 69% 
Total capital employed 
  
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Break-out  (OE) 
                      
  
Pure Equity 
 
9% 15% 12% 14% 20% 14% 19% 15% 18% 19% 21% 30% 26% 29% 28% 32% 29% 29% 23% 31% 
  
RE 
 
53% 47% 49% 50% 46% 52% 47% 47% 44% 44% 40% 37% 36% 41% 41% 41% 42% 42% 46% 38% 
    
62% 62% 61% 64% 66% 67% 66% 62% 63% 63% 61% 67% 63% 70% 70% 73% 71% 71% 69% 69% 
Total Long-term financing 
 
97% 97% 97% 97% 97% 97% 98% 97% 96% 97% 97% 98% 96% 97% 96% 98% 97% 98% 98% 97% 
                        Prorated Long-term debt financing of NFA  36% 36% 36% 34% 33% 32% 32% 36% 35% 35% 37% 31% 35% 28% 28% 25% 28% 28% 29% 29% 
Prorated total equity financing of NFA 
 
64% 64% 64% 66% 67% 68% 68% 64% 65% 65% 63% 69% 65% 72% 72% 75% 72% 72% 71% 71% 
  
Total NFA 
 
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Prorated Pure Equity financing of NFA  
 
9% 15% 12% 14% 20% 15% 20% 15% 19% 20% 21% 31% 27% 30% 29% 33% 30% 29% 23% 31% 
Prorated RE financing of NFA (RE/NFA) 55% 49% 51% 52% 47% 54% 48% 49% 46% 45% 41% 38% 38% 42% 43% 42% 43% 43% 47% 39% 
    
64% 64% 64% 66% 67% 68% 68% 64% 65% 65% 63% 69% 65% 72% 72% 75% 72% 72% 71% 71% 
 
ST/LTD 
  
10% 9% 10% 10% 9% 9% 8% 10% 11% 9% 9% 7% 11% 10% 14% 9% 10% 8% 7% 9% 
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   Chapter 3 
 
Industry Dynamic Capital Structure Adjustment Speed:  US MNCs & DCs 
       Abstract 
This chapter uses the newly developed bias-corrected least squares dummy variable 
(LSDVC) panel methodology to examine whether or not industries of US-based 
Multinationals (MNCs) and their domestic counterparts (DCs) have different speed of capital 
structure adjustment toward the target  level, particularly manufacturing industry which 
constitutes about 60% of the total sample. In addition, the chapter sheds new light on the 
capital structure herd migration hypothesis. The results from parametric analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) show that industry leverage across MNCs and DCs are different as well as the 
determinants of target leverage. Imperfect capital markets suggest that capital structure 
adjustment may be costly; and firms may temporarily deviate from their target leverage. 
Thus, the chapter independently examines the adjustment speed for industries of MNCs and 
DCs, and imperatively, it directly investigates the adjustment speed difference for 
manufacturing industries for MNCs relative to DCs. Employing the well-known firm specific 
variables, the two-stage partial adjustment methodology shows higher influence of agency 
costs, financial flexibility and financial distress costs on the adjustment speed of  industries of 
MNCs than DCs. While equity price increases, over-leverage, and distance from industry 
median all affect adjustment speed, the impact is more pronounced for industries of DCs than 
the MNCs. Empirical results indicate a relatively faster adjustment for manufacturing 
industry of MNCs. Finally, the results supports prior evidence of herd migration among 
manufacturing industry for the DC group, however, the results provide no evidence of herd 
migration for other industries across MNCs and DCs.  
Keywords: Industry capital structure, Dynamic panel analysis, adjustment speed, Herd 
Migration, MNCs, DCs 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Capital structure matters to all stakeholders. It concerns the implications of the 
structural dimension of capital employed by type (i.e. Equity and Debt) in a business. 
“It doesn‟t matter whether a company is big or small, capital structure matters. It 
always has and always will” (Michael Milken, WSJ April, 21, 2009). A disciplined 
capital structure is essential not only for shareholder value maximization, but also its 
impact on a firm‟s ability to effectively compete. Thus capital structure is a dynamic 
embodiment of both value proposition and risk (i.e. both operational and financial 
risk) 
As to value, we have learned from capital budgeting decision process that the mix of 
capital is an important input in deriving the cost of capital (WACC) of a firm, which 
affects both investment decision and the expected return on investment. Thus, the 
overall cost of capital varies with capital structure. In such a dynamic setting, 
managers have to determine the impact of marginal financing decision on overall cost 
of capital, firm value, and investment decisions. Eg. A firm with relatively lower cost 
of capital may be better positioned to benefit from favourable financing and value 
maximization (i.e. wedge between cost of capital and expected return on 
investment)
1
.  
As to risk, over leverage
2
 can force the firm into involuntary bankruptcy or 
undermine its ability to effectively compete. Generally, an over-levered firm is 
                                                             
1 This may give rise to competitive advantage in areas such as investment 
expansion, including mergers and acquisitions, and attraction of certain 
regulated governmental or specialized funds – funds that can invest in only 
investment-grade companies. It must be noted that the debt level of a firm 
is an important input in the grading process of firm’s financial viability.   
2 In the literature over-leverage is usually measured by debt capacity (i.e. 
debt/ppe > 1, see appendix for variables), but it can also be viewed from 
an operational perspective, where enough income is not generated to meet 
fixed financial obligation. 
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perceived by the capital markets as relatively riskier, which indirectly affects firm 
value through costs of capital, whilst under-levered firm may under certain 
circumstances be viewed as having poor tactical capital structure management; it may 
be viewed as a symptom of managerial inefficiency and value destruction.
3
 
Nevertheless, in a broader context, leverage affects all stakeholders in one form or 
the other. 
The relationship between capital structure and industry membership has received 
considerable attention in the extant literature. However, the empirical inquiry of this 
relationship has not been extended to the estimation of differences in industry capital 
structure adjustment speed across US-based MNCs and DCs.  
The capital structures of MNCs are different from their domestic counterparts. Some 
of the sources of capital structure differences between MNCs and DCs include capital 
structure ambiguity and the intricate network of stakeholders. The relative structural 
complexity of MNC
4
 capital structure and the associated agency costs requires 
efficient firm behaviour in order to add value and minimize conflict among various 
interest groups. In addition, MNCs operating in various international jurisdictions are 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
 
3
 Debt compared to equity, has less information asymmetry problem and thus 
relatively cheaper than equity. Due to interest tax shield, it lowers WACC. 
Thus under-leverage does not optimize cost of capital, which may otherwise 
result in profitable investment. 
4 MNC is viewed in this study as a firm that engages in foreign direct 
investment, either through acquisitions and mergers, or primary entrance 
into foreign market with established physical presence. To differentiate 
foreign direct investment from pure international trade, a tax approach is 
used to define MNCs. A subsidiary of an MNC pays taxes in the country it is 
located, thus firms with reported foreign tax are classified as MNC. MNCs 
are very important in a globalized economy. Arguably, globalization is 
predominantly led by MNCs. Some MNCs have an economy surpassing the GDP of 
most countries. Their lobbying power can affect foreign residents where the 
subsidiaries are located, and a sudden withdrawal of MNCs from a foreign 
market may cause a major macro-economic dilemma, including monetary policy 
determination. DCs are the strictly US-based domestic firms.  
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more exposed to higher capital market imperfections (Caves 1971, Fatemi 1988, 
Dunning 1977). 
From a financial perspective, the ambiguity of MNCs capital structure lies in the 
consolidated financial statements prepared by the US based-MNC. The aggregated 
capital structure is a result of a pooling of several independent capital structures, each 
of which is influenced by different national accounting standards (Lee 1986)
5
. The 
consolidation mechanism differentiates MNCs capital structure from DCs in at least 
two major ways. First, investors not familiar with foreign accounting standards may 
interprete the combined capital structure differently (Choi 1993). The partial solution 
to this problem is, to de-consolidate the financial statements for analysis, but this 
process will enormously increase agency costs, not only between equity investors and 
management, but also between equity investors and debt investors. Second, it 
complicates the assessing of risk at both subsidiary and parent level. Capital structure 
theorists argued that capital structure can serve a signalling function to mitigate 
uncertainty (Ross 1977), but in the case of MNCs, capital structure may increase 
uncertainty. For example, at the subsidiary level, a banker may not rely just on the 
subsidiaries capital structure without a guarantee from the parent. Likewise, at the 
parent level, an investor may need to evaluate individual entities that make up the 
consolidated capital structure in order to reasonably assess sources of risk. In effect, 
the signalling function of capital structure in mitigating risk may not be as effective 
for MNCs as it may be for DCs. 
                                                             
5
 US GAAP requires that foreign financial statements be translated before 
consolidation at the parent level; however, the detail transactions 
culminating into a full independent capital structure of the subsidiary are 
generally prepared in accordance with the national accounting standards 
where the subsidiary is located. That is, a taxable income has to be 
ascertained locally. 
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From a stakeholder perspective, Prior research shows that capital structure matters to 
a whole spectrum of interest groups (Cornell & Shapiro 1987). MNCs compared to 
their domestic counterparts (DCs), have a larger and more complex network of 
interest groups, and this complexity increases as MNCs continue to grow through 
mergers and acquisitions. Put differently, underlying independent capital structures of 
MNCs effectively represents heterogeneity in all stakeholder-categories. Furthermore, 
members of similar interest groups within the MNC may have conflicting goals 
depending on the subsidiary/entity (Slovin & Sushka 1997).
6
 For example, it is not 
rare for a parent firm to guarantee a loan to the subsidiary, or infuse cash or equity 
into a subsidiary, however, such actions may incidentally improve the position of 
investors in the subsidiary, but it may increase risk for the investors in the parent 
company (i.e. type of wealth transfer). As a result, the capital structure of MNCs is 
much more complex than in the national case. 
From firm behaviour efficiency perspective, the operational and structural 
complexities of MNCs may be justified. As nations compete for foreign direct 
investment, MNCs may become the beneficiaries of incentivized taxation schemes. 
MNCs can bypass certain externalities such as transportation costs and tariffs, by 
directly going to the foreign market through acquisitions and mergers. Through their 
subsidiaries, MNCs may gain favourable access to the inputs of production and 
therefore build economies of scale, and more efficient distribution channels [Shapiro 
1996]. In addition, MNCs through their subsidiaries can directly control proprietary 
technology (i.e. contrary to licensing agreement), and also be able to implement in the 
                                                             
6 This type of conflict may arise from differences in investor 
characteristics, jurisdictional heterogeneity, and most importantly, 
transfer of wealth from the investors of one entity group to another or 
from one interest group to another. 
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final product market, price discriminations that may not be possible for their domestic 
counterparts. 
 Given the overwhelming evidence in prior literature, regarding both lower 
leverage and higher agency costs for MNCs (Fatemi 1988; Burgman.1996; Lee & 
Kwok 1988; Doukas & Pantzalis 2003), this chapter hypothesized that within the 
dynamic trade-off framework, MNCs adjust to target leverage relatively faster than 
DCs, determined not only by firm characteristic variables but also by industry 
membership across MNCs and DCs. The shareholder value loss argument (Denis et al 
2002) and debt holder-shareholder conflict (Myers 1977) are consistent with the 
notion of faster capital structure adjustment speed for industries in MNC group. The 
premise of shareholder value loss argument is that the capital markets, discounts the 
uncertainties associated with the globally diversified firms, especially when debt level 
increases (Doukas & Kan 2006). Furthermore, the broadly diversified debtholder-
shareholder category, of MNCs is expected to intensify conflict of interest between 
the investor classes. For all these reasons, a relatively lower leverage and faster 
leverage adjustment speed is a necessary condition to minimize the risk and cost of 
capital for industries in the MNC group. 
To my knowledge, this is the first chapter that has focused on closely related aspects 
of industry capital structure dynamics of US-based MNCs relative to DCs. To that 
effect, the chapter contributes to the existing literature in four ways. One, by using a 
newly developed econometric technique (LSDVC) to estimate adjustment speed 
across industries of MNCs and DCs. Two, by using a two-stage methodology to 
investigate idiosyncratic effects of relevant variables on the overall speed (i.e. factors 
of adjustment speed) across industries of MNCs and DCs. Three, by directly 
comparing the capital structure adjustment speed for the dominant industry group (i.e. 
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manufacturing) for MNCs relative to DCs, and four, by using dynamic panel data to 
examine herd migration behaviour across industries of MNCs and DCs. 
The chapter is divided into ten sections. The first section briefly reviews relevant prior 
studies of capital structures. The second section developed and formulates related 
research questions and hypothesises. The aim of this section is to fill the gap in the 
literature. The third section discusses the data generating process (DGP) and the 
methodology used to obtain the final sample for estimation. The fourth section simply 
defines leverage measures and briefly discusses the ongoing debate around the two 
main leverage measures. The fifth section discusses the descriptive statistics as a 
precursor to the main empirical estimation. This section discusses some of the key 
characteristics of industries across MNCs and DCs, which are essential connective 
tissue to the overall understanding of the empirical findings. In the sixth section, the 
partial adjustment and industry capital structure are explained with the integrated 
modified partial adjustment process. This section discusses partial adjustment of 
capital structure and develops the equations for empirical testing. The seventh section 
suggests Adjustment speed factors. The aim of this section is to investigate the 
individual effect of specific factors on adjustment speed across industries of MNCs 
and DCs. The eight section discusses the econometric approach for testing adjustment 
speed. The ninth section discusses the empirical results. The tenth section presents 
herd migration among industries across MNCs and DCs, suggests the econometric 
followed by a summary and conclusion.  
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2. Prior research on the relationship between industry and capital 
structure 
 
Underlying the irrelevance theory (Modigliani and Miller 1958) is the assumption of 
homogeneity of risk among firms. However, the introduction of bankruptcy costs 
(Baxter, 1967; Kim, 1978, Kraus and Lichtenberger, 1973, and Stiglitz, 1972), 
information asymmetry (Myers, 1977), debt tax shield (DeAngelo and Masulis, 1980), 
and agency costs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976,), suggested that firms do not belong to 
a similar risk class. Similarly, different industries have different sets of challenges 
which may be unique to the firms within the particular industry. The connection 
between industry membership and leverage is been widely examined in the literature. 
Using industry belonging as a proxy for risk class, prior studies found a relationship 
between financial leverage and the cost of equity (Hamada 1972). In subsequent 
periods, other researchers concluded that industry specific optimal leverage do infact 
exists (DeAngelo-Masulis 1980, Masulis 1983, Schwartz and Aronson 1967). Several 
other researchers have found a relationship between leverage and industry 
membership (Scott 1972, Bowen et al 1982, Cordes and Sheffrin 1983, and Bon-
Horim et al 1987, Boquist and Moore's 1984, Mandelker and Rhee 1984, Harris and 
Raviv 1991
7
, Bradley et al 1984, Long and Malitz 1985, and Jianjun Miao 2005). 
However, there is no general consensus regarding the major drivers of the dispersion 
of capital structure among industries. For example, some researchers point to tax 
shield and tax rates (DeAngelo-Masulis 1980) and (Masulis 1983), while others noted 
the relevance of earnings volatility (Bradley et al 1984). In sum, prior research has 
                                                             
7 However, G.Shanmugasundaram (2008) among others found evidence of intra-
industry variation of leverage in pharmaceutical industry in India. Alman 
A. & Molina C. (2002) noted leverage dispersion of leverage among firms in 
U.S. industries. Thus besides Inter-industry variation in leverage, there 
is ample evidence in the literature for intra-industry leverage dispersion. 
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used various firm characteristics to explore the dynamics of firms‟ capital structure 
belonging to similar industry. One of the gaps in previous literature is the lack of 
formal investigation of capital structure adjustment speed across industries of MNCs 
and DCs. 
 
In this study, the focus is on inter -industry leverage dynamics across MNC and DC 
groups. In addition to the examination of industry leverage variations, the effect of 
multinationality (i.e. MNC) and industry membership is examined specifically for 
manufacturing group (i.e. largest industry group) using firm characteristics common 
to all firms. Treading on prior evidence that MNCs have lower leverage than DCs 
(Fatemi, Ali 1984, 1988; Burgman, T.1996; Lee & Kwok 1988; Michel & Shaked 
1986; Doukas & Pantzalis, 2003; Shapiro, 1978), this study is, in effect extending the 
literature by examining industry leverage dispersion and capital structure adjustment 
speed differential for MNC and DC industries.  
 
3. Research Questions and formulation of Hypothesis 
From the review of prior literature, it became apparent that further empirical research 
is needed to examine potential differences in industry capital structure adjustment 
process, especially the capital structure adjustment speed differential for 
manufacturing industry of  DCs relative to MNCs. Many prior industry capital 
structure studies were focused on manufacturing industry, because it usually provides 
a relatively large sample size. In addition, prior research shows evidence of industry 
herd migration behaviour regarding leverage, however, no empirical testing has been 
done to evaluate the herd migration hypothesis across the industries of MNCs and 
DCs. These gaps in the literature motivate the following related research questions; 
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1. Does capital structure adjustment speed differ across industries of MNCs and 
DCs, especially for manufacturing industry, and if so, what factors contribute to 
the adjustment differential? 
2. Does the impact (i.e. intensity) of adjustment speed factors on adjustment process 
differ across industries of MNCs and DCs? 
3. Do industries across MNCs and DCs follow a herding behaviour regarding 
leverage? 
Consequently, the following hypothesise are formulated in order to empirically 
examine the above related questions; 
I. Firms in different industries across MNCs and DCs have the same 
adjustment speed towards target leverage.  
II. There is no difference in herd migration of leverage of firms in 
different industries across MNCs and DCs.  
 
4. Data  and Methodology 
 
The sample consists of annual Compustat data from the years 1991 through 2009. 
Financial firms (SIC codes 6000-6999) and regulated utilities (SIC codes 4900-4999) 
are excluded from the sample as the capital structure of these firms are affected by 
regulation, thus not always market driven. I eliminated firm-years with missing values 
for all leverage factors, X, and observations with negative book value of equity 
(Flannery and Hankins 2007). Given the econometric methodology (dynamic panel 
estimator), firms with less than 5 years of data are excluded. From the main sample, 
firms that reported foreign taxes are classified as MNC. Furthermore, negative and 
missing values of foreign and domestic taxes are excluded from MNC group (Chen et 
al, 1997). In the filtering process, a firm may appear in both DC and MNC group if a 
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firm did not report foreign taxes in a given year. To avoid this cross-listing or overlap 
between the two groups, I eliminate those firms in the DC group that are already in 
the MNC group. The rationale was that, it is practically difficult for MNCs to revert to 
DC status than DCs to advance to MNC status. Also, a firm may not pay foreign taxes 
for a particular year because the subsidiary of the MNC may not have a taxable 
income for that year. Agriculture, Fishing and non-classifiable industries are excluded 
as they constitute less than 1% of the total sample. To mitigate the probable impact of 
outliers, all variables are cut-off at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles. Six industry groups 
(Mining, Manufacturing, Services, Transportation & Communication, Wholesale and 
Retail) are the subjects of the investigation
8
. As expected, for both DCs and MNCs, 
manufacturing dominated the industry groups followed by services and retail 
respectively. Mining industry for both DCs and MNCs has the smallest 
representation. Altogether, there are 15,325 firm years (i.e. MNCs, 7506 and DCs, 
7819), and 1,539 firm participation (i.e. MNCs, 729 and DCs, 810).   
 
5. Defining Leverage 
 
Several alternative definitions of leverage have been used in the literature. In prior 
studies, some form of debt ratio whether market or book values are used to study the 
composite nature of firms‟ capital structure. Leverage measures also differ whether 
long term debt or total debt is used. There is no general consensus which leverage 
measure is superior, given the fact that firms have different assets and liability 
structure. Nevertheless, recently, leverage measure using market value has higher 
frequency in the literature than book leverage. Market leverage is forward looking and 
                                                             
8 See table 1. Panel A. and Panel B. for the classification scheme (i.e. in 
accordance with US Department of Labor) and distribution of industries 
across DCs and MNCs. 
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it supposes to instantaneously account for all available information through the 
financial markets (i.e. efficient market hypothesis). On the other hand, market-based 
leverage are far more likely to be volatile than book leverage, and it is also not 
directly controlled by management. Book value based leverage, in contrast is a 
historical accounting output, determined through the accounting systems, and 
management may have influence over the reported figures.
9
 Nevertheless, major 
contributions in the literature are made through the utilization of both measures. 
Given the aim of this chapter, the focus is on market-based leverage as a primary 
measure of leverage. I defined market leverage as the ratio of the sum of long-term 
debt due in 1yr and long-term debt divided by the sum of long-term debt due in 1yr, 
long-term debt and market value of equity
10
, and book leverage is defined as the ratio 
of the sum of long-term debt due in 1year and long-term debt to total assets. 
 
6. Descriptive Statistics 
The summary statistics (table 1 – 4, figure 1a – 1e, and the appendix11) does not only 
provides the precursory glance into sample characteristics, but also highlights major 
differences between the industries across MNCs and DCs. Table 1 panel A, reports 
the distribution of industry, and number of observations and firms across MNCs and 
                                                             
9
 On the issue of book value vs. Market value, Barclay et al. (2006) argued 
that the two measures are different. Some of the differences may be glean 
from the conflicting predictions of well known capital structure 
determinants when book leverage and market leverage are used together. The 
predictions of trade off theory tend to favour book leverage, whereas 
pecking order and agency theories tend to be market-oriented. It is also 
critical to note that book leverage measure is highly susceptible to 
accounting manipulations. 
10
 Some prominent authors involved in capital structure research who used 
this proposed measure of leverage are Fama & French (2002), Welch (2004), 
Barker and Wurgler (2002),Leary & Roberts (2005)Frank and Goyal (2005)and 
Flannery & Rajan(2006) 
 
 
11 The appendix provides a table of industry mean and median leverage by 
year across MNCs and DCs, with corresponding graphs. 
 
 
 
13 
 
DCs. Manufacturing industry is the dominant industry in the sample for both MNCs 
and DCs, with 9,019 firm-year observations out of total sample firm-year observation 
of 15,325 (i.e. 58.9%), thus the empirical results of manufacturing industry across 
MNCs and DCs is particularly important for this empirical analysis. The total 
observation is nearly evenly divided between MNCs and DCs (i.e. MNCs have 7,506, 
and DCs have 7,819). As expected, mining industry is the least represented industry in 
the overall sample with 550 firm-year observation. Table 1 panel B, reports the 
groupings of industries according to U.S Department of Labour industry 
classification. It is important to note that, this is a broad classification scheme (i.e. 
sub-groups are consolidated into a defining industry group). Table 2, summarizes 
industry leverage mean ,median, dispersion and panel length,  by MNC and DC for 
both market and book leverage . The market leverage measure shows relatively higher 
industry mean leverage for DCs in all industry groups except for wholesale, and four 
out of six industries for DCs shows relatively higher median leverage. As for the book 
leverage, four DC industries exhibit higher industry mean leverage. The average panel 
length is approximately 11 years. Figure 1a, graphically presents industry median 
leverage across MNCs and DCs using market leverage. Median leverage is later used 
in the empirical section to compute firms‟ leverage level from the industry median 
(i.e. distance from the industry median), and its effects on adjustment speed. Figure 
1b &1c, shows industry leverage dispersion (standard deviation) across MNCs and 
DCs by Market Leverage and by Book Leverage respectively. Market Leverage is 
computed as the ratio of total debt to the sum of total debt and market value of equity, 
and book leverage computed as the ratio of total debt to total assets. Both leverage 
dispersion figures shows relatively higher intra-industry leverage variation for DCs 
than MNCs, although the dispersion is more pronounced for market leverage measure 
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than the book leverage
12
. Figure 1d & 1e, shows the industry mean leverage across 
MNCs and DCs for market and book leverage. Table 3, reports key balance sheet, 
income statement and market valuation data for the industries across MNCs and DCs. 
All data categories are significantly higher for MNCs than DCs. And finally table 4, 
reports the summary statistics of capital structure determinants by industry across 
MNCs and DCs. The effect of these determinants on related capital structure 
dynamics is the subject of inquiry of this study. The most striking observation in table 
(4) is the relatively wider dispersion (standard deviation) of the capital structure 
variables for industries in the DC group compared to those in the MNC group. 
 
 
7. Partial Adjustment and Industry Capital Structure 
This section starts equations that defines leverage, and with a diagnostic linear 
regression to gain an understanding of the effect of capital structure variables, and 
more importantly to gauge the influence of the interaction term of industry and MNC 
on leverage. 
                                
itit
it
it
ED
D
LeverageM

_
   (1)
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12
 The relatively higher intra-leverage dispersion shown for market leverage 
may be due to the volatility of equity prices. This is an important 
observation concerning the ongoing academic debate on the appropriate 
measure for leverage (Book v. Market). Book leverage is less volatile and 
extends more control to management. However, it is relatively more 
susceptible to manipulations and does not reflect the exigencies of the 
capital markets. On the other hand, market leverage is relatively more 
volatile, less managerial control, and most importantly it reflects the 
sentiments of the investors or the capital markets at large.  
13 This measure of leverage is the subject of investigation (see footnote 
#12)  
 
 
 
15 
 
                                it
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D
LeverageB _
                                           (2)                                                                            
 
 
Where:              AssetsTotalTAit _  
yrLTDTotalLTDDit 1__   
iceCloseOutShrsEit Pr_*_
 
(M_Leverage = Market leverage; and B_leverage = Book Leverage; LTD_Total = 
Total Long-Term Debt; LTD_1yr = Portion of Long Term Debt due within 1 yr (i.e. 
reclassified from long term to short term liabilities); Shrs_Out = Total Common 
Shares Outstanding; Close_Price = Closing Price of the firms‟ shares at the end of the 
year; it = firm i, at time t).  
The preliminary diagnostic test of the relationship between the variables and leverage 
are estimated with the following linear regression; 
ititit MNCINDXLeverageM   __
            (3)
      
Where X = [Size, Tangibility, Growth Opportunity, NDTS, FDC, CF, ROA, and 
INV)
14
 and an interactive dummy variable (IND_MNC). The interactive term explains 
whether leverage for an industry belonging to MNC group is different from the DC 
group. The empirical results of equation (3) are reported in table 9. 
The distinguishing feature of the trade-off theory is that firms have an optimal 
leverage, and deviation from this optimum level necessitates readjustment process. 
                                                             
14
 Variables, X, are defined and reported in the appendix. 
 
 
 
16 
 
However, an observed large cross-sectional variation of leverage among firms has 
provoked many research questions, and researchers have attempted to explain the 
factors that may influence financing decisions, including the partial adjustment 
behaviour. Other major competing capital structure theories such as pecking order and 
market timing theories do not subscribe to the idea of optimal capital structure, thus 
readjustment dynamics are not contained in their theoretical construct.  
The extant literature determines the target leverage as a linear function of widely used 
capital structure determinants. Thus, in recognition of unobserved firm heterogeneity, 
a partial adjustment model is developed following (Flannery and Ranjan 2006) as 
follows; 
                                                                                                              
(4)
15
 
                                                                                                
              
Where the estimated target leverage, M_Leverage*it, is a function of X, [size, 
tangibility, growth opportunity, ROA, cash flows from operations, NDTS, investment 
and financial distress costs], and the unobserved firm characteristics ηi, (i =1,2.....,N) 
and (t = 1,2.....,T). It is important to note that equation (4) implies that target leverage 
varies across firms within the industries and over time. The panel is thus characterized 
by (N x T) observations. In equation 4, the co-efficient are unknown, thus by  
adopting (Flannery and Ranjan 2006) partial adjustment model; i can estimate the 
                                                             
15
 Equation (4) is estimated by combined fixed-time effect regression (table 
10) to obtain fitted values for target leverage for each industry across 
MNCs and DCs. The fitted values of equation (4) are used in equation (9) to 
compute deviation (M_Leverage
*
it - M_Leverageit-1). However, actual empirical 
evaluation of capital structure adjustment speed is a dynamic model and is 
estimated by equation (7).  
tiitit XLeverageM  
*_
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speed of adjustment, through changes in leverage  relative to the firm‟s deviation from 
its target as follows; 
  10,1_*_1__   ititLeverageMitLeverageMitLeverageMitLeverageM
                            (5) 
In equation 5, υit is the disturbance term, and the adjustment speed (γ) explains the 
actual changes in capital structure from period t-1 to t (M_Leverageit - . M_Leverageit-
1). Due to capital market frictions (such as costs of adjustment), the adjustment speed 
lies between the two parameters (0 < γ < 1). The implication of partial adjustment is 
that the observed leverage is never at the optimum level, and this is true whether the 
adjustment speed (γ) is within the boundaries of 0-1, or outside of the boundaries. 
When adjustment speed (γ) equal 0, it means zero adjustment (i.e. Inertia), and 
adjustment speed (γ) > 1, signifies overshooting of target leverage. In either scenario, 
the observed leverage is not at the optimum. The static trade-off model assumes that 
adjustment speed (γ) equals 1, which represents instantaneous 100% adjustment16. 
The latter scenario is rare, because it assumes perfect capital markets, with zero 
transaction costs.  
Substituting the target leverage from equation (4) for  M_Leverage*it  , yields 
equation (6) 
  10,1_1__   ititLeverageM
tiit
XitLeverageMitLeverageM             
            (6)
 
                                                             
16 The dynamic trade-off theory extend the static trade-off by allowing for 
partial adjustment (i.e. instead of 100% instantaneous adjustment), 
suggesting that firms do adjust to target but only partially as managers 
weigh the costs of deviation from the target and the benefit of achieving 
the desire leverage level. 
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Although, it has been stated earlier that the co-efficient of equation (4) is unknown, 
however, by rearranging equation (6), the adjustment speed (γ) can be estimated with 
unknown β and ηi. Thus equations 7&7b are developed and they are the main subject 
of the inquiry of adjustment speed differential across industries of MNCs and DCs. 
    10,
1
_1_ 

  it
tiit
LeverageM
it
XitLeverageM
                                                  (7) 
(7b) 
Equation 7b is specifically used to estimate capital structure adjustment speed for 
manufacturing industry of MNCs relative to DCs, as it represents about 60% of the 
total sample. Tables 11 and 12 reports the results of equations 7 and 7b using 
LSDVC
17
. 
Where   ititi  
 
                      
effecttimetitiiti   ,0][][][  
                                                             
17 Due to relatively small observations available for certain industries, 
the  unbalanced dynamic panel bias corrected least squares dummy (LSDVC) 
variable approach developed by Bruno (2005) offers a relatively better  
method for estimating the capital structure adjustment speed for industries 
across MNCs and DCs. The traditional Instrumental variables (IV) and the 
well-used Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimators have appealing 
properties for large and balanced panels, but have tendency to perform 
poorly in small and unbalanced panels. Similarly, the number of instruments 
generated by GMM estimators tends to be higher than the number of 
observations in small samples, which creates a great concern for the 
reliability of the coefficient estimates. It must be noted that, a good 
test of the validity or plausibility of partial adjustment model, using any 
econometric techniques is to have a positively statistically significant 
lagged dependent variable, preferably not too close to unity.     
 
     itv
ti
eLagLeveragMNCMNC
it
LeverageM
it
X
it
LeverageM 

  *
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8. Adjustment Speed Factors 
 
Imperfect capital markets and variations in firm specific characteristics may affect the 
speed of adjustment to target leverage through financial flexibility (i.e. fundamentals) and 
market perception of the firm (i.e. informational gap, conflict between interest groups). 
Thus, management‟s decision to adjust to target may depend on both transaction costs and 
the goodwill of specific firm characteristics such as size, and growth opportunities 
available to the firm. Consequently, the influences of six (6) factors are independently 
considered on the overall capital structure adjustment speed across industries of MNCs 
and DCs.  
Based on capital structure theories, these factors tend to either hinder or improve the 
adjustment process
18
. Using two stage methodology, target leverage is estimated for each 
firm within the industry at the first stage using instrumental variable regression (FE IV), 
and an Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression with heteroskedastic consistent standard 
errors are used in the second stage. Because, there is no dynamic component to the 
second stage, OLS is sufficient to determine the effect of the speed factors of adjustment 
on speed.  
Following a hausman test, table (10) reports the pooled FE IV regression results (i.e. 
Equation 4) for the pooled sample, and the fitted values are then obtained for each 
industry, which were used in equation (9). 
                                                             
18 It must be noted that the influence of speed factors depends on variety 
of circumstances, including the competitive landscape, maturity, and market 
perception of the industry. For example, exploratory nature of mining 
industry may be more risky than manufacturing. Similarly, mining industry 
for DCs may be relatively riskier than MNCs due to limited prospects or 
supply of natural resources within the borders of a given single country. 
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Equation (8-10) summarizes the estimation process, where; the actual change in leverage 
is; 
1___  ititit LeverageMLeverageMLeverageM
            (8)
 
From the estimated target leverage (equation 4), a deviation from target is derived as 
follows; 
1_*_  ititit LeverageMLeverageMDeviation
                                                                              (9)
  
Substituting deviation and actual change (i.e. equation 8 & 9) into equation (6) yields eq. 
(10).  The results of eq. (10) are reported in table (13).
 
  itititit ZDeviationLeverageM   210_
                                   (10)
 
Where Z= [Risk, Distance from industry median leverage (DIST), growth opportunity, 
size, stock returns, and over-levered).
19 
The factors are selected based on their relevance to the capital structure theory and the 
preponderance of evidence in prior literature that firm specific factors such as risk, 
size, over-leverage and opportunity growth are reliable determinants of capital 
structure (Frank and Goyal 2005). Similarly, capital market indicator such as equity 
returns (Welch 2004) and industry indicator such as industry median leverage (Fama 
& French 1997) do have influence on leverage. For example, industries competing in 
different product markets may naturally faced different operational risk (i.e. cash 
                                                             
19 Variables are defined in the appendix. 
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flows risk), or the leverage level of firms in matured industries may cluster around 
industry median leverage. Prior studies, attributed the effect of growth opportunity on 
leverage to capital market perception (i.e. agency costs regarding assets in place and 
future investment opportunity (Myers 1978)) of the firms‟ motive for security 
issuance, however, firms‟ in different industries across MNCs and DCs may differ 
both in asset structure and growth opportunities. The distance from industry median 
leverage, DISTit, is an absolute difference. It is important to note that, industry 
median leverage is used here as the target leverage, thus equation 11 is used to derive 
absolute distance from industry median leverage, DISTit. 
ititit leverageMLeverageMDIST _*_                                                                                                                                                         
(11)
 20
   
 
 
9.  LSDVC estimator for dynamic panel data model 
The trade-off theory requires good understanding of the mechanics of capital structure 
adjustment process. However, there is minimal consensus in the literature on what 
reliably drives the adjustment process. The literature so far reported a wide range of 
speed estimates from 7% to 100%.
21
 
The dissension is partly due to data generating process (DGP), and econometric 
techniques. From an econometric perspective, dynamic panel estimation of 
                                                             
20
  Where M_Leverage*it represents the industry median leverage for firms 
within the particular industry across MNCs and DCs. The median industry 
leverage is calculated for each year for each industry across MNCs and DCs, 
and then distance is computed by subtracting actual leverage from the 
industry median for each firm within the industry across MNCs and DCs. It 
is important to note that the target leverage in equation (11) not be 
mistaken for the target leverage in equation (4) - which is used to derive 
deviation in equation (9). DIST is a variable in equation 10, reported in 
table 13. 
21 Roberts 2002, reported almost 100% for certain industries, and Fama & 
French 2002, estimated a speed of 7-18%. 
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adjustment speed poses higher challenges than a cross-sectional investigation. 
Dynamic panel models must recognize unobserved firm level heterogeneity and 
correlation of the lagged dependent variable with the error terms
22
.  Due to relatively 
small observations available for certain industries, the  unbalanced dynamic panel bias 
corrected least squares dummy (LSDVC) variable approach developed by (Bruno 
2005) offers a relatively better  method for estimating the capital structure adjustment 
speed for industries across MNCs and DCs. The traditional Instrumental variables 
(IV) and the well-used Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimators have 
appealing properties for large samples, but have tendency to perform poorly in small 
samples. Similarly, the number of instruments generated by GMM estimators tends to 
be higher than the number of observations in small samples, which creates a great 
concern for the reliability of the coefficient estimates. Thus, I adopt the LSDVC 
methodology, which controls for panel length bias of fixed effects estimation (Nickell 
(1981)) without eliminating firms with fewer observations from the empirical 
analysis. Essentially, the LSDVC computes bias-corrected least-squares dummy 
variable (LSDV) estimators for the standard autoregressive panel-data model using 
the bias approximations in (Bruno 2005a, 2005b)
23
 for unbalanced panels. LSDVC 
employs multiple steps; it first generates a consistent estimate of the short panel bias 
and then subtracts this bias from the LSDV estimate mainly with bootstrapped 
variance-covariance matrix. For example, (Judson and Owen 1999) using Monte 
Carlo simulations, finds that the LSDVC estimator performs far better than GMM 
estimators for all panel lengths. 
 
 
                                                             
22 See Flannery and Ranjan 2006, Robert et al 2008, and Roberts 2001  
23 Bruno 2005a, 2005b is an extension of Bruno 2005, and also extends Kiviet 
1995 to unbalanced panels. 
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10. Empirical results 
The section contains the analysis of the empirical results reported in table 5 through 
14. Related aspects of capital structure are investigated and analyzed across industries 
of MNCs and DCs, using a combination of parametric analysis of variance 
(ANOVA), biased-corrected least square dummy variable (LSDVC), fixed-effect 
instrumental variable (FE IV), and ordinary least squares (OLS).  
Parametric Anova 
In table 5, I obtain the variance results of capital structure determinants on the cross-
section of industries of MNCs relative to DCs by using one-way parametric analysis 
of variance (ANOVA). The sample is stratified into six broad industry groups using 
U.S Department of Labor classification scheme. The industry groups are compared 
across MNC relative to DC in “one way”, using industry mean of the determinants of 
target capital structure.  The F-statistic shows that a significant difference exists when 
any two or multiple industry means across MNCs and DCs are compared. The one-
way ANOVA rejects the null hypothesis that the industry mean of capital structure 
variables are the same for firms in different industries across MNC and DC groups at 
1% significance level, except in few instances as shown in bold in table 5. This 
overwhelming evidence provides a strong foundation for testing the differential 
capital structure adjustment speed across industries of MNCs and DCs. Prior 
diagnostic statistics (table 1-4, and figure 1a-1e) indicated that, in addition to inter-
industry differences between MNC and DC groups, intra-industry variations both 
market and book leverage existed. Thus, for the purpose of exposition, table 6 and 7 
reports, by year the results of parametric (ANOVA) for intra-industry leverage for 
 
 
 
24 
 
MNCs and DCs.
24
 Again, the F-statistic overwhelmingly rejects the hypothesis of no 
difference in leverage among firms in the same industry irrespective of market or 
book leverage. Finally, ANOVA, in table 8 shows an extremely strong evidence for 
differences in inter-industry mean leverage across MNCs and DCs.   
 
10.1 Determinants of the target capital structure and speed of 
adjustment 
Prior to testing adjustment speed differential of industries across MNCs and DCs, I 
conducted a preliminary investigation in table (9), of the capital structure variables 
and more importantly the effect of the interaction of MNC and Industry 
membership. The analysis confirmed the existing theoretical predictions of capital 
structure variables, and the interactive term (industry*MNC) is statistically 
significant at 1% level, suggesting that industry and multinationality may influence 
to capital structure. The consistency of the directional signs of the coefficients of the 
variables and capital structure theory implies suitability of selected variables in 
estimating capital structure adjustment speed in tables 11 and 12. The results of the 
estimation of adjustment speed using Bias-Corrected Least Squares Dummy 
Variable regression (LSDVC), are reported in tables 11 and 12. The LSDVC is 
estimated with AH
25
 estimator, with the dependent variable lagged two times, used 
as an instrument for the first-differenced model with no intercept, and a bootstrap 
                                                             
24 Although not directly under investigation, exposition of intra-industry 
dispersion of leverage lend support to one of the hypothesis tested in 
table 14(i.e. Herd migration hypothesis). 
25 Anderson and Hsiao 1982(AH) proposes two fairly simple IV estimators that, 
upon transforming the model in first differences to eliminate the 
unobserved individual heterogeneity, use the second lags of the dependent 
variable, either differenced or in levels, as an instrument for the 
differenced one-time lagged dependent variable. The central aim of this 
technique is to eliminate the fixed effect and also instrumentalized the 
lagged dependent variable to account for endogeneity. 
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variance-covariance matrix for LSDVC using 10 iterations (repetitions).
26
 All 
estimations included year dummies, furthermore, the joint significance of coefficient 
of variables are tested (i.e. Wald test) and are statistically significant at 1% level. 
Manufacturing, representing the largest industry group in the sample, shows 
significant adjustment speed difference between MNCs and DCs (i.e. 10% 
difference)
27
. The extremely relatively higher impact of profitability and cash flows 
for MNCs in manufacturing suggest that MNCs in manufacturing industry have 
lower leverage. And according to the dynamic trade-off theory, highly profitable 
firms, especially with high cash flows from operations have higher financial 
flexibility, which enables firms to retire existing debts, or forego the issuance of 
debt by internally financing investment opportunities. In fact, table 11, results shows 
investment (INV) increases debt for firms in the DC group at 1% statistically 
significant level, but insignificant for MNC firms. Thus, for DCs in manufacturing 
industry, increasing debts due to investment shock, may caused further deviation 
from target leverage, and incidentally temper the speed of adjustment process. In 
addition, the summary statistics of key balance sheet and income statement items 
(table 3) suggest that capital markets accessibility is likely to be easier for MNCs in 
manufacturing than their DC counterparts. Although, size and tangibility could be a 
mitigating factor for DCs to access the capital markets, MNCs on average are larger 
and have higher collaterability than DCs, thus size and tangibility although 
significant for DCs in manufacturing industry may not be considered as a 
                                                             
26 LSDVC does not report traditional standard errors. Prior literatures 
circumvent this issue by obtaining a bootstrapped variance-covariance 
matrix, using at minimum 2 iterations (repetitions), to obtain standard 
errors for the co-efficient estimates.  
27 This finding is particularly important, hence manufacturing industry 
represents more than half of the total sample, the agreement between the 
speed of adjustment of manufacturing and the prior empirical chapter of 
overall MNC adjustment speed is essential, to establish a reliable and 
consistent analytical position. 
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distinguishing factor in terms of capital market accessibility in the readjustment 
process. Agency costs (Myers 1978) of under-investment (Growth opportunities - 
Q) are significant for all industry groups, but more pronounced for industries of 
MNCs, with an exception of mining industry and services.
28
 This suggests the 
profound influence of agency cost on capital structure adjustment process. The two 
industries of DCs relatively affected most by under-investment (i.e. type of agency 
costs) appeared to have relatively higher adjustment speed, whilst industries of 
MNCs showing relatively higher agency costs (Q) exhibit faster adjustment speed. 
The underlying economic reasoning behind this phenomenon is that, industries 
associated with higher under-investment adjust faster to minimize the costs of 
deviation from the target leverage, because sustained or prolonged deviation further 
increases agency costs and the subsequent financing costs (Myers 1977). Four 
industries including the largest group (i.e. manufacturing industry) out of six 
industries shows higher effect of agency cost for MNCs, consistent with prior 
evidences (Fatemi, Ali 1984, 1988; Burgman, T.1996; Lee & Kwok 1988; Michel & 
Shaked 1986; Doukas & Pantzalis, 2003; Shapiro, 1978) that MNCs on average 
have lower leverage due to higher agency costs. The adjustment speed differential 
for firms in manufacturing industry across MNCs and DCs appears to be influenced 
by financial flexibility (i.e. Profitability and cash flows), and agency cost (i.e. 
Under-investment). Given the disproportionate percentage of manufacturing 
industry of total sample, table 12, directly estimates capital structure speed 
                                                             
28
 Prior research of MNCs suggest that relatively lower leverage for MNCs is 
due to higher agency costs(see Fatemi, Ali 1984, 1988; Burgman, T.1996; Lee 
& Kwok 1988; Michel & Shaked 1986; Doukas & Pantzalis, 2003; Shapiro, 
1978). The relatively higher coefficient for mining industry of DCs may be 
caused by the relatively higher domestic concentration of mining industry 
coupled with extremely higher uncertainty of successful explorations. In 
addition, U.S generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) treatment of 
depletions and reserves for underground exploratory firms may have 
influence on agency costs.  
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differential between MNCs and DCs, and the results shows that manufacturing 
industries on average adjust faster to target leverage than their domestic counterpart.  
Consistent with manufacturing industry, the two DC industries (i.e. mining and 
services) with higher adjustment speed appeared to be influenced by financial 
flexibility and agency cost. Transportation and Communication industry for MNCs 
adjust faster than their domestic counterpart due to the impact of both agency cost 
and costs of financial distress (i.e. Bankruptcy costs). Although, cash flows are 
significant for transportation and communication industry of DCs, the significance 
of financial distress costs for MNCs, consistent with capital structure theoretical 
predictions, appears to have driven the adjustment speed faster for MNCs. The 
intuition here is that, due to a relatively lower effect of agency costs for DCs, cash 
flows for DCs may be employed in financing investments or payment of dividends 
instead of readjustment of leverage. In fact, as expected, the investment variable is 
not significant for DCs , suggesting financing of investment with internal liquidity. 
On the other hand, according to the trade-off theory, the significance of financial 
distress costs for MCs implies at least two predictions. First, firms with higher 
financial distress costs should have relatively lower target leverage. Second, by 
achieving the first, deviation from the target leverage is assumed to be relatively 
narrower, thus adjusting back to the target leverage should be relatively faster. 
Consistent with the theory, the empirical results show that MNCs in transportation 
and communication industry adjust faster, and this appears to be influenced by 
agency costs and financial distress costs.  
As for wholesale industry, agency costs empirically impact the MNCs more than the 
DCs. The analysis of the wholesale industry is consistent with that of transportation 
and communication, except the financial distress costs. Although, financial 
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flexibility impacts the DCs, the relatively higher impact of agency costs for MNCs 
appears to be a major driver of faster adjustment speed for MNCs.  
Finally, the retail industry for MNCs adjusts faster than their domestic counterparts, 
empirically influenced by relatively higher impact of financial flexibility and agency 
costs. In addition, financial distress costs appear to be of great concern for MNCs, 
which is not significant for the DCs. Finally, the slower adjustment for DCs appears 
to come from the impact of investment on leverage (i.e. 22% positive elasticity with 
leverage at 1% significant level). In accordance with the trade-off theory, 
investment increases leverage, and incidentally exacerbate the deviation from target. 
All else equal, a relatively wider deviation slows the adjustment process.  
The overall empirical finding shows consistently, the influence of agency cost, 
financial flexibility, investment (i.e. constraint) and financial distress costs on 
capital structure adjustment process. 
 
10.2 Factors of speed of adjustment 
 
Here, the empirical results of relevant factors of adjustment speed are discussed. 
The dynamic trade-off theory postulates the importance of the influence of financial 
flexibility and capital market accessibility both for determining target leverage and 
adjustment to target leverage. Thus, the effect of six [Risk, Dist, Q, Size, Dummy 
for equity appreciation, and a dummy for over-leverage] speed factors on the 
adjustment process are considered.  However, a shift in thinking is needed in the 
interpretation of the empirical results of the factors of adjustment speed; hence the 
results should normally compliment the earlier findings in tables 11 and 12 or more 
precisely, the theoretical underpinnings of trade-off theory. The speed  
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factors of adjustment are any variables within the theoretical construct of capital 
structure that may influence the adjustment speed from two perspectives. First, the 
overall internal business environment (i.e. firm characteristics perspective), and 
second, the external business environment (i.e. capital market perspective). That is, 
certain firm characteristics may provide flexibility in the adjustment process, as well 
as the capital market perception of the firm.  The empirical inquiry is conducted in 
two stages.  First, after a hausman test, I obtained the fitted values for target 
leverage by estimating the model in equation (4), with combined fixed-time effect 
linear panel regression. Table (10) reports the pooled sample regression, suggesting 
superiority of fixed-effect model over the random effect model. Subsequently, a 
fitted value is similarly obtained for all six industries across MNCs and DCs, which 
provides a target leverage estimate for each industry across MNCs and DCs. With 
estimated industry target leverage, a deviation from target is computed by 
subtracting the lagged dependent variable from the estimated target leverage by 
industry and across MNCs and DCs (i.e. equation 9). Change, in equation (8) is 
simply the change in leverage from period t-1 to period t.  In the second stage, 
equation (10) is estimated with heteroskedastic consistent ordinary least squares 
(OLS).  There is no dynamic component in equation (10); therefore, OLS adjusted 
for clustering is sufficient, and the results are reported in table (13). 
The volatility of cash flows from operations (i.e. operational risk/Risk) is a firm 
characteristic and the capital markets generally discount the risk elements of firm‟, 
therefore according to the trade-off theory, risk is detrimental to firms in terms of 
financing costs. As volatility of cash flows from operations increases, uncertainty of 
debt financing (i.e. payment of interest and principal) increases. Thus, probability of 
involuntary bankruptcy and cost of debt financing (i.e. new issuance of debt) 
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increases. To pre-empt these undesirable occurrences, firms are expected to 
maintain a desired level of debt. To this effect, the theoretical prediction of risk and 
adjustment speed is a positive one. The caveat here is that, the risk on adjustment 
speed needs to be examined in conjunction with relative leverage (i.e. whether firms 
are over-levered or under-levered). A faster positive contribution on adjustment 
speed is expected when a firm is both risky and over-levered, in comparison to when 
the firm is risky and under-levered. The empirical results in table (13) shows that 
risk (RISK), significantly and positively (i.e.1% level) increases adjustment speed 
for mining and wholesale industries and 10% significant for services industry for 
DCs, and 1% statistically positively significant for manufacturing industry for 
MNCs. Among the industries of MNCs with an exception of manufacturing 
industry, cash flow volatility appears to have no statistical effect on adjustment 
speed. Plausible explainations for this risk phenomenon may be attributed to five 
key observations. First, leverage level is on average low for MNCs (see table 2), so 
cash flow risk may not induce immediate managerial reaction. Second, on average 
the year by year variation in industry leverage (standard deviation) is less for the 
industries of MNCs (see table 2, fig.1, and table 1 of the appendix), which may 
essentially provide immunization for fluctuations in cash flows. Third, debt to cash 
ratio (computed from table 3) is on average higher for industries of DCs, indicating 
weak balance sheet cash position relative to industries for MNCs. Fourth, debt to 
asset ratio (computed from table 3) is on average much higher for industries of DCs, 
indicating relatively higher leverage for DCs, and therefore relatively higher 
sensitivity to risk. Fifth, working capital on average is stronger for industries for 
MNCs, therefore mitigating the cash flow risk. In order words, industries for MNCs 
are more liquid and in a relatively better position to meet short-term financial 
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obligations given a cash flow volatility. Perhaps the most important result in regards 
to risk is that of manufacturing industry. of MNCs. The results shows the sensitivity 
of adjustment speed to risk at 1% significance level for manufacturing industry of 
MNCs, but no effect on their DC industry counterparts. A combination of 
continuous investment in property, plant and equipments associated with 
manufacturing business, and the higher agency cost associated with MNCs is likely 
the contributing factor of the estimated sensitivity manufacturing industry of MNCs. 
As expected, the effect of over-leverage (Over-Levered) on speed adjustment is 
positively statistically significant for all industries across MNCs and DCs; however, 
the speed effect is consistently more pronounce for Industries of DCs relative to 
MNCs. Given the fact that, industries for DCs have relatively higher leverage, debt 
to cash ratio, debt to asset ratio and relatively weaker working capital than their 
MNC counterparts, suggests that over-leverage for the DCs will be less welcome by 
the capital markets, implying an involuntary faster adjustment.  
Distance from the industry median (DIST) leverage is to measure whether firms‟ 
within an industry actively strive to remain close to the overall industry median 
leverage
29
.  The effect of distance is strikingly positively significant (i.e. 1% level) for 
all industries across MNCs and DCs, but the impact is on average more pronounced 
for DCs than MNCs. The issue here may be a structural one. MNC generally are 
                                                             
29 This is related but different from the herd migration hypothesis examined 
by equation (13) in table (15). Here, the effect of distance (absolute 
distance) from industry median on adjustment speed is examined, whereas in 
the herd migration hypothesis, the inquiry is on managers’ effort to 
maintain in totality the industry median leverage (i.e. contrary to 
rationality). That is, to investigate whether firms’ pegged their target 
leverage to industry median leverage. Distance from industry median has 
practical implications in the capital markets. Financial analysts routinely 
carry-out comparative analysis, where firm characteristics are usually 
normalized within the industry and compared with the overall industry 
averages. Thus deviation from industry averages may be negatively perceived 
in the capital markets. 
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conglomerates, and is more likely for an MNC to consolidate one or more subsidiaries 
belonging to a different sub-industry group; therefore the underlying effect of distance 
on adjustment speed may be non-linear. Nevertheless, distance appears to be the 
single factor with the highest impact among the six speed factors of adjustment, used 
in this chapter. This strongly implies that industry membership is important for capital 
structure dynamics. 
Market to Book (Q) according to capital structure theory is negatively related to debt. 
This is so, because when equity market values exceeds the replacement costs of 
assets, conflict (i.e. agency costs) rose between debt investors and equity investors 
(i.e. Myers 1984 under-investment hypothesis). Typically, the theory prediction is that 
higher market to book ratio should result in lower leverage, as debtholders will 
demand higher returns, thus increasing the overall cost of capital for the firm. 
However, in the adjustment process, higher market to book is a mitigating factor. In 
other words, the capital markets attach a positive relationship between high market to 
book ratio and profitability. Hence profitable firms are less likely to default, the 
capital market gives allowance for slower adjustment to target leverage for firms with 
higher market valuation. All industries except mining industry for DCs shows 
expected and significant effect of market to book on adjustment speed, and are on 
average more pronounced for industries of MNCs. 
The view on size (SIZE) according to the trade-off theory and prior evidence is that, 
size is positively related to leverage (Titman et al. 2005, Leary & Roberts 2005, Frank 
and Goyal 2005, and Flannery & Rajan 2006), indicating that size is a proxy for low 
probability of bankruptcy. Applying similar logic to adjustment process, size has a 
negative effect on adjustment speed (Drobetz and Wanzenreid 2006, Flannery and 
Ranjan 2006, Flannery & Hankin 2007). There are two opposing views on the 
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directional effect of size on adjustment speed. First, larger firms, due to information 
competitiveness (i.e. analyst coverage) have lower informational gap, suggesting a 
relatively lower cost of financing and rapid adjustment. Second, large firms due to 
internal financing channels tend to have less cash flow volatility which minimizes 
bankruptcy costs and therefore reduces expected adjustment speed.The empirical 
results for size in table (13) are quite mixed for industries across MNCs and DCs. Size 
effect on speed for Manufacturing, Mining and Retail industries for MNCs are 
negatively significant and negatively significant for Mining, Services, Transportation 
& Communication, and Wholesale industries for DCs. The evidence in terms of 
directional effect appears to be consistent with (Drobetz et.al 2006), and (Flannery 
and Ranjan 2006). 
Equity price appreciation (↑PRICE) is a signal of favourable opinion of capital 
markets of a firm
30
, thus extending confidence to the firm, which in turn reduces costs 
of capital. However, stock price appreciation directly lowers the market-based 
leverage, which may further drive away firms from target leverage. Consistent with 
(Flannery and Hankin 2007), and (Drobetz et.al 2006), the empirical results (table 
13); shows equity appreciation slows adjustment process. The results shows that the 
slowing effect of equity price appreciation on adjustment speed exists for all 
industries across MNCs and DCs, however, the adjustment of industries for DCs are 
consistently slower than industries for MNCs. 
 
                                                             
30
 Price appreciation may be intrinsically justified or it could simply be a 
bubble. The view taken in this chapter is that, the price appreciation is 
based on the intrinsic value of the firm. If the bubble view is assumed, 
then price appreciation will not have impact on the adjustment speed. That 
is, the market correction will cancel-out the opposing effects. 
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11. Herd Migration Hypothesis 
Although financial theory appears to be linked to behavioural phenomenon through a 
cross fertilization of economics and psychology, very limited research is been 
conducted in the area of behavioural aspect of firms‟ financing decisions. One such 
study is the herd migration hypothesis (Patel, Zeckhauser and Hendricks, 1991, 
Filbeck et al 1996) and the leader-follower hypothesis (Filbeck et al. 1996). Herd 
migration hypothesis regarding capital structure is to investigate whether firms within 
an industry tend to maintain an industry median leverage. There are serious 
implications for these behavioural phenomena, because the existence of herd 
migration relating to capital structure points to mental accounting and irrationality, 
instead of managers making rational financing decisions. Both (Patel et al. 1991) and 
(Filbeck et al 1996) in a cross-sectional model found herding behaviour among U.S. 
firms in the manufacturing industry. According to (Patel et al 1991), a statistically 
significant co-efficient on the lagged industry leverage indicates a tendency for herd 
migration. Thus I followed the model suggested by (Patel et al 1996), by using a panel 
model to test herding behaviour of industries across MNCs and DCs. 
ititititit gedianLeveraIndustryMeLeverageMLeverageMLeverageM    1210 ___                                                                                                                                         
(13) 
I regress the firm‟s leverage on two own lags and one industry median lag for each 
industry group across MNCs and DCs. The empirical results in table (14) confirms the 
findings (Patel et al. 1991, and Filbeck et al 1996) that domestic manufacturing 
industry exhibit herding behaviour, However, the results for manufacturing industry 
for the MNCs rejects the herd migration hypothesis. In addition, all other industries 
for both MNCs and DCs rejects herd migration behaviour. 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Few areas of corporate finance are under as much scrutiny as capital structure and the 
corresponding adjustment process to target leverage. Both prior empirical and survey 
evidences indicate that leverage is at the heart of corporate financial decision making. 
Prominent capital structure theories such as trade-off theory and pecking order theory 
attempts to describe the interdependence of leverage and firm specific characteristics. 
However, there is a surprising lack of comparative empirical inquiry on industries of 
U.S. based MNCs and DCs in regards to the determinants of time sensitive speed of 
adjustment to target leverage, as well as industry leverage herding hypothesis. In a 
dynamic trade-off framework in conjunction with imperfect capital markets, firms 
temporarily deviate from the target leverage. And the existence of transaction costs 
and trade-off between costs of deviation from target leverage and reaching a target, 
often allows for only partial adjustment back to target leverage. In such a fluid 
environment, firms within a particular industry across MNCs and DCs may adjust 
quite differently, depending on not just industry characteristics but also on whether 
the firm is a multinational or domestic U.S. corporation.  
In prior studies, the association between lower leverage and MNCs has been 
attributed to higher agency costs, which is consistent with the agency theory of capital 
structure (Lee and Kwok 1988, Chen et al 1997). However, previous studies do not 
directly estimate adjustment speed differential among industries across MNCs and 
DCs, especially the manufacturing industry. This study attempts to address this issue, 
together with herding behaviour among industries across MNCs and DCs.  
The chapter presents evidences on differences in leverage, adjustment speed, and 
leverage herding behaviour, among the industry groups of U.S. based MNCs and 
DCs. First, I used parametric one-way variance analysis (ANOVA), and document an 
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overwhelming evidence of the influence of industry membership and 
internationalization (i.e.MNC) on leverage (see table 6 – 8). Second, the chapter 
provides evidence from ANOVA that the mean of the determinants of target capital 
structure are influenced by both industry membership and internationalization (see 
table 5 and 9). Furthermore, the interaction of industry and MNC in table (9) shows 
that on average, industries in MNC group have lower leverage than DCs. This is 
consistent with prior studies, but more importantly, it extended the evidence of 
relative lower leverage to industries of MNCs. In accordance with the assumptions of 
trade-off theory, the differences in leverage, and in factors of capital structure of 
industries across MNCs and DCs (table 5-9), implies a differing capital structure 
adjustment process across industries of MNCs and DCs. Thus, the ANOVA test 
results have provided plausibility for the existence of differential adjustment speed 
among industries across MNCs and DCs.  
Using a dynamic adjustment model and the recently developed bias-corrected least 
squares dummy variable (LSDVC) panel methodology (see table 11 and 12, equations 
7 and 7b), I find that on average differing adjustment speed for industries across 
MNCs and DCs. A direct examination of manufacturing industry shows that 
internationalization and industry membership matters for capital structure adjustment 
speed.  
The major findings of capital structure adjustment speed for industries across MNCs 
and DCs included: 
1) On average, industries of MNC group have higher impact of agency costs of debt 
(Q) than DCs. Precisely, the regression results from table (11 and 12) shows that 
industries with relatively higher impact of agency cost, adjust faster across MNC 
and DC group (4 industries for MNC, and 2 industries for DC). This is consistent 
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with both agency theory of capital structure and the dynamic adjustment process 
implied by trade-off theory.  
2) Manufacturing industry of MNCs adjust faster than their DC counterparts. 
3)  In addition to agency costs, industries showing relatively stronger impact of 
financial flexibility (i.e.  ROA and Cash Flows) and relatively higher impact of 
bankruptcy cost (FDC) tend to adjust faster.  
 
Using two-stage methodology, I investigated individual effects (i.e. positive or 
negative) of the specific relevant factors on capital structure adjustment speed.  
Consistent and major empirical findings of table (13) included: 
1) Firms in industries of DC group are more sensitive (i.e. adjust faster) to 
distance (DIST) from their respective industry median leverage, than their 
MNC counterparts.  
2) Agency costs (Q) slows adjustment process for all industries, but is more 
pronounced for industries in MNC group than DC group. This is consistent 
with the previous analysis regarding agency costs and adjustment speed in 
table 11. 
3) Price increase slows adjustment process, but consistently pronounced for 
industries of DC group than industries of MNC group. 
4) Over-leverage increases adjustment speed for all firms in all industries 
across MNCs and DCs, but the effect is consistently more pronounced for 
industries of DC group than their MNC counterparts. 
Notably, whenever a particular factor has significant impact on all industries 
of MNCs and DCs, the impact on average is more pronounced for the DC 
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group. It appears that the market participants rationally attached reward and 
risk to the DC group for performance. 
Capital structure herding behaviour was found in the manufacturing industry 
of U.S. firms (Patel, Zeckhauser and Hendricks 1991, Filbeck et al. 1996), 
however, using alternative industries, the evidences did not support herding 
behaviour (Filbeck et al. 1996). Utility maximizing theory of individual 
behaviour has provided a foundation for finance researchers to investigate 
behavioural aspects of capital structure. Dominant economic theories implied 
that agents do not always make rational decisions, therefore in an imperfect 
capital market; it may be beneficial for firms to stay with the herd (i.e. other 
firms in the industry) to avoid certain externalities such as adverse selection by 
the bankers or by other market participants.  
The empirical testing of herd migration hypothesis partially confirms the 
findings of (Patel et al. 1991) and (Filbeck et al. 1996) regarding 
manufacturing industry for domestic U.S. firms, but not for MNC group. I find 
no support for herding behaviour of firms of manufacturing industries of U.S. 
multinationals (MNC), and strikingly no support of herding behaviour for all 
other industries across MNC and DC – this provides support for prior findings 
(Filbeck et al. 1996). The difference in herd migration behaviour for 
manufacturing industry between DC and MNC groups is particularly 
important for the overall results, because manufacturing represents 
approximately 60% of the overall sample. Based on the testing of herd 
migration hypothesis, I concluded that herding behaviour will be much more 
difficult for MNC firms‟ in manufacturing industry due to the complexity of 
their capital structure and diverse operational nature of their subsidiaries 
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across the U.S. border. Overall, the results suggests that firms do not 
irrationally maintain the industry leverage, but rather react rationally by 
weighing the costs and benefits of leverage, as the capital structure theory 
predicts. In other words, firms, especially in MNC group make financing 
decisions based on firm specific characteristics and time variant factors such 
as investment needs (for MNC, investment includes overseas mergers and 
acquisitions), agency costs and financial distress costs. Rationality as implied 
by the empirical results is consistent with the trade-off theory of capital 
structure. 
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Appendix: Variable Definitions 
Debt Long-term debt  +  debt in current liabilities 
 
Equity 
 
Common shares outstanding  *  share price @ end of period t 
 
M_Leverage 
 
Debt / (Debt + Equity) 
 
B_Leverage 
 
Debt / Total Assets 
 
Tobin‟s Q /Q 
 
(Equity + Debt) / Total Assets 
 
Non-debt tax shield (NDTS) 
 
(Depreciation + Amortization) /Total Assets 
 
Tangibility/Tang 
 
PPE / Total Assets 
 
Size 
 
Log (Total Assets) 
 
Financial Distress Costs (FDC) 
 
Std.Dev. of EBIT / Total Assets 
 
EBIT 
 
Earnings before interest and taxes 
 
Cash Flows 
 
Cash flow from operations / Total Assets 
 
ROA 
 
(EBIT – Total taxes) / Total Assets 
 
Price↑ 
 
Positive returns 
 
Returns 
 
(Equity @ t – Equity @ t-1) / Equity @ t-1 
 
PPE 
 
Net Property, Plant and Equipment (Fixed Assets) 
 
Over-Leverage (OL) 
 
Debt Capacity > 1 
 
Deviation 
 
Target Leverage – Lagged leverage 
 
Market-Shock (Zp, Zn) –table 8 
 
Lagged leverage @ t-1 – lagged leverage at t-2 
 
DIST 
 
Industry Median Leverage – M_Leverage 
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Table 1.   Summary of the composition of the sample, number of firms by industry, number of observations by industry and SIC Code classification. 
Panel A. 
Industry # of Obs. # of Firms DC - # of Obs. DC - # of  Firms MNC - # of Obs. MNC - # of  Firms 
Mining 550 60 297 35 253 25 
Manufacturing 9,019 882 3,536 372 5,483 510 
Services 2,114 245 1,315 151 799 94 
Transp_Comm 1,179 112 890    82 289 30 
Wholesale 758 76 455 43     303 33 
Retail 1,705 164 1,326 127 379 37 
Total 15,325 1,539 7,819 810 7506 729 
% Share of Total - DC 51% 53%     
% Share of Total - MNC 49% 47%     
Panel B. 
 
Industry SIC Code (Range)
1
 
MINING 1000 - 1400 
MANUFACTURING 2000 - 3990 
SERVICES 7011 - 8744 
TRANSPORATION – COMMUNICATION 4011 - 4991 
WHOLESALE 5000 - 5190 
RETAIL                     5200 - 5990 
                                                          
 
1
 The range reflects firms included in the sample. The industries are based on US Department of Labor classification. 
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Table 2. Summary of industry mean, median and standard deviation and average panel length across MNCs and DCs, by market leverage and book leverage. 
 
 Mining Manufacturing Services Trans_Comm Wholesale Retail 
 
 DC                     MNC DC                     MNC DC                     MNC DC                     MNC DC                     MNC DC                     MNC 
M_Leverage:           Mean 
                               Median 
                           Std(Mean) 
 
.2777                  .2016 
.2522                  .1740 
.1880                  .1521 
.2050                  .1917 
.1392                  .1556 
.1948                  .1583 
.2489                  .1587 
.1892                  .1154 
.2246                  .1557 
.3192                  .2674 
.2803                  .2528 
.2113                  .1617 
.2626                  .2716 
.2160                  .2435 
.2053                  .1802 
.2282                  .1707 
.1718                  .1228 
.2026                  .1525 
B_Leverage:            Mean 
                               Median 
                           Std(Mean) 
.3005                  .2338 
.3105                  .2283 
.1563                  .1292 
.2015                  .2094 
.1713                  .2006 
.1506                  .1294 
.2593                  .1882 
.2347                  .1628 
.1912                  .1490 
.3194                  .2662 
.2347                  .2577  
.1761                  .1327 
.2297                  .2395 
.2057                  .2308 
.1548                  .1350 
.2033                  .1933 
.1838                  .1662 
.1487                  .1236 
       
Panel Length :         Mean   11                       11    11                       10    11                       11     11                      11    11                       11      10                      11 
 
 
Figure 1 a: Histogram of Comparative Median Industry Leverage across MNCs and DCs by Market Leverage. Market Leverage is computed as the ratio of total 
debt to the sum of total debt plus market value of equity. 
 
 
Mining Manufacturing Services Trans_Comm Wholesale Retail 
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Figure 1 b & c: Histogram of Comparative Industry Leverage Dispersion across MNCs and DCs by Market Leverage (Figure 1b) and by Book Leverage 
(Figure 1c). Market Leverage is computed as the ratio of total debt to the sum of total debt plus market value of equity, and Book Leverage is computed as the 
ratio of total debt to total assets. 
 
 
                                             Figure 1b - STD (Market Leverage) 
 
                                         Figure 2c - STD (Book Leverage) 
Mining Manufacturing Services Trans_Comm Wholesale Retail 
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Figure 1 d & e: Histogram of Comparative Distribution of Industry Leverage (Mean) Across MNCs and DCs by Market Leverage (Figure 1d) and by Book 
Leverage (Figure 1e). Market Leverage is computed as the ratio of total debt to the sum of total debt plus market value of equity, and Book Leverage is 
computed as the ratio of total debt to total assets. 
 
 
Figure 1d - Mean (Market Leverage) 
 
  Figure 1e - Mean (Book Leverage) 
Mining Manufacturing Services Trans_Comm Wholesale Retail 
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics of key income statement, balance sheet and market valuation. [Assets, MVE = market value of equity, cash, debt, Intang = 
intangibles, Rev = revenue, W.C = working capital, C.Exp = capital expenditure, PPE = fixed assets] 
 
  
                    Domestic – (DC) 
 
Multinationals – (MNC) 
 
 
 
 
Mining 
 
 
Manuf. 
 
 
Services 
 
 
Trans_Comm 
 
 
Wholesale 
 
 
Retail 
 
 
Mining 
 
 
Manuf. 
 
 
Services 
 
 
Trans_Comm 
 
 
Wholesale 
 
 
Retail 
 
Assets  – Mean 
               - (Std) 
 
955.37 
(1,546) 
 
 
300.18 
(829) 
 
529.73 
(1,069) 
 
1,194.51 
(1820) 
 
705.74 
(1,478) 
 
982.45 
(1,724) 
 
5,111.42 
(8,202) 
 
 
4,073.50 
(7,231) 
 
7,361.78 
(10,993) 
 
2,937.72 
(4,317) 
 
5,650.85 
(7,626) 
 
3,110.52 
(4,970) 
 
MVE    – Mean 
               - (Std) 
854.53 
(1,469) 
 
325.60 
(835) 
536.38 
(1,095) 
938.61 
(1,703) 
834.09 
(2,138) 
1,077.34 
(2,362) 
5,682.23 
(9,818) 
5,639.91 
(13,988) 
7,961.51 
(15,539) 
2,398.63 
(4,725) 
8,318.44 
(14,944) 
3,789.79 
(6,970) 
Cash     – Mean 
               - (Std) 
28.58 
(71) 
 
17.21 
(53) 
30.74 
(88.92) 
61.44 
(176) 
28.73 
(110) 
41.01 
(87) 
284.98 
(574) 
249.85 
(647) 
306.62 
(517) 
154.44 
(306) 
426.96 
(714) 
242.52 
(509) 
Debt     – Mean 
               - (Std) 
335.89 
(605) 
 
73.05 
(208) 
189.40 
(479) 
426.04 
(730) 
139.56 
(240) 
240.20 
(580) 
1,077.52 
(1,684) 
900.49 
(1,845) 
2,055.09 
(3,737) 
591.68 
(719) 
1,172.60 
(2,071) 
692.13 
(1,633) 
Intang.  – Mean 
               - (Std) 
45.85 
(175) 
 
45.85 
(186) 
138.93 
(372) 
267.31 
(511) 
116.34 
(317) 
86.66 
(249) 
383.59 
(1,078) 
898.33 
(2,065) 
2,066.68 
(4,732) 
 
451.81 
(904) 
533.15 
(924) 
895.33 
(1,893) 
Rev.     – Mean 
               - (Std) 
548.79 
(1,219) 
 
381.29 
(1,752) 
436.89 
(978) 
797.78 
(1,186) 
2,199.99 
(6,197) 
2,031.54 
(3,660) 
 
2,894.49 
(4,632) 
4,020.51 
(7,453) 
5,548.58 
(9,123) 
7,368.94 
(15,554) 
10,972.83 
(14,753) 
2,437.21 
(3,574) 
W.C     – Mean 
               - (Std) 
21.39 
(112) 
 
57.19 
(145) 
43.01 
(118) 
39.91 
(135) 
217.56 
(399) 
177.01 
(380) 
402.75 
(874) 
510.33 
(1,097) 
338.08 
(831.74) 
683.91 
(878) 
611.74 
(1,045) 
200.78 
(470) 
C. Exp. – Mean 
               - (Std) 
129.04 
(240) 
 
17.34 
(61) 
32.91 
(75) 
108.19 
(185) 
21.74 
(47) 
80.80 
(165) 
466.86 
(836) 
196.24 
(418) 
513.56 
(860) 
83.90 
(119) 
426.32 
(618) 
114.73 
(259) 
PPE      – Mean 
               - (Std) 
675.25 
(1,103) 
109.61 
(404) 
218.95 
(499) 
639.86 
(1170) 
105.76 
(213) 
404.61 
(789) 
3,153.83 
(5,637) 
1106.13 
(2,312) 
3,002.68 
(4,839) 
467.91 
(757) 
2,667.39 
(4,689) 
548.31 
(1,411) 
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Table 4: Descriptive Statistics of determinants of target capital structure across industries and across MNCs and DCs. 
 
 NDTS FDC Q CF ROA Size Tang. Inv 
         
 
X

                
 
X

                
 
X

                
 
X

                
 
X

                
 
X

                
 
X

                
 
X

                
 
Mining – DC 
Mining – MNC 
 
.0745    (.0364) 
.0626    (.0204) 
29.94    (60.06) 
2.65      (5.657) 
1.38      (.8811) 
1.42      (.6074) 
.1064    (.0813) 
.0894    (.0581) 
.0365    (.0994) 
.0669    (.0471) 
5.39        (2.05) 
7.37        (1.68) 
.7026    (.1749) 
.5727    (.1544) 
.1539    (.0925) 
.0979    (.0465) 
 
 
Manuf. – DC 
Manuf. – MNC 
 
.0466    (.0266) 
.0423    (.0176) 
35.99    (50.87) 
2.90       (5.85) 
1.60        (1.30) 
1.47      (.8223) 
.0413    (.1326) 
.0785    (.0555) 
-.0145   (.1772) 
.0803    (.0406) 
4.32        (1.56) 
7.13        (1.60) 
.2913    (.1768) 
.2648    (.1429) 
.0537    (.0514) 
.0492    (.0317) 
 
 
Services – DC 
Services – MNC 
 
.0495    (.0308) 
.0428    (.0221) 
32.86    (50.79) 
2.74        (4.85) 
1.54        (1.09) 
1.67      (.9608) 
.0531    (.1140) 
.0721    (.0518) 
.0201    (.1350) 
.0698    (.0463) 
4.80        (1.83) 
7.05        (1.48) 
.3258    (.2553) 
.1841    (.1521) 
.0579    (.0548) 
.0455    (.0373) 
 
 
T_C – DC 
T_C – MNC 
 
.0620    (.0344) 
.0537    (.0236) 
10.57    (26.54) 
1.88        (2.67) 
1.27      (.8292) 
1.18      (.5339) 
.0900    (.1000) 
.0985    (.0723) 
.0422    (.0984) 
.0630    (.0309) 
6.05        (1.63) 
7.59        (1.79) 
.4861    (.2496) 
.4378    (.1980) 
.0992    (.0820) 
.0797    (.0487) 
 
 
Wholesale – DC 
Wholesale – MNC 
 
.0299    (.0187) 
.0258    (.0138) 
13.73    (22.41) 
1.67        (2.87) 
1.18      (.7223) 
1.06      (.5256) 
.0622    (.1151) 
.0597    (.0819) 
.0611    (.0625) 
.0649    (.0307) 
5.49        (1.51) 
7.28        (1.21) 
.1829    (.1422) 
.1651    (.1448) 
.0395    (.0419) 
.0319    (.0251) 
 
 
Retail – DC 
Retail – MNC 
.0514    (.0250) 
.0487    (.0189) 
15.81    (32.85) 
.8673      (1.06) 
1.29      (.8912) 
1.55      (.8565) 
 
.0839    (.1247) 
.0887    (.0540) 
.0570    (.0725) 
.0842    (.0400) 
5.66        (1.73) 
7.92        (1.24) 
.4168    (.2178) 
.3705    (.1849) 
.0883    (.0624) 
.0744    (.0353) 
Note: X

 represents the mean and   represents the standard deviation/dispersion from the mean. 
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Table 5: Parametric (ANOVA) of the mean X

 of factor variables across industries of MNCs and DCs. */**/*** denotes 1%/5%/10% statistical significance. 
 
 NDTS FDC Q CF ROA Size Tang. Inv 
         
 F-ratio        d.f    
 
F-ratio        d.f    
 
F-ratio        d.f    
 
F-ratio        d.f    
 
F-ratio        d.f    
 
F-ratio        d.f    
 
F-ratio        d.f    
 
F-ratio        d.f    
 
 
Mining  21.31*        549 
 
 
51.78*        549 .40              549 7.70*          549 19.93*        549 149.59*      549 83.91*        549 76.06*        549 
Manufacturing 84.91*      9018 
 
 
2273.67*  9018 34.02*      9018 339.10*    9018 1453.07*  9018 6797.56*  9018 61.03*      9018 26.90*      9018 
Services  29.20*      2113 
 
 
279.23*    2113 7.25*        2113 19.76*      2113 101.26*    2113 868.26*    2113 202.43*    2113 31.67*      2113 
T_C  14.65*      1178 
 
 
30.79*      1178 3.22***    1178 1.81          1178 12.50*      1178 186.66*    1178 9.00*        1178 14.66*      1178 
Wholesale  10.50*        757 
 
 
86.78*        757 5.93**        757 .11              757 .94              757 302.39*      757 2.83***      757 8.08*          757 
Retail  
 
3.90**      1704 78.42*      1704 25.17*      1704 .53            1704 49.15*      1704 562.18*    1704 14.20*      1704 17.04*      1704 
Note: d.f represents total degrees of freedom, the between groups (MNC vs DC) degree of freedom is 1 which corresponds to the reported f-ratio.  
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Table 6: Parametric (ANOVA) of Intra- industry using market leverage. One-way analysis of variance by pooled, MNC and DC for the sample period 1991 – 
2009. */**/*** denotes 1%/5%/10% statistical significance. 
               Pooled : M_Leverage              DC : M_Leverage                   MNC : M_Leverage 
Year F-ratio d.f F-ratio d.f F-ratio d.f 
1991 3.22* 472  2.61** 228 1.75 243 
 
1992 2.77** 527 2.53** 258 1.54 268 
 
1993 1.74 628 1.48 328 1.61 299 
 
1994 4.75* 686 1.86 367 3.01** 318 
 
1995 6.95* 751 3.39* 410 4.11* 340 
 
1996 9.77* 840 5.21* 453 5.78* 386 
 
1997 10.98* 859 6.72* 467 5.37* 391 
 
1998 5.97* 880 3.13* 477 7.61* 402 
 
1999 3.82* 881 1.52 465 4.90* 415 
 
2000 3.86* 897 2.66** 463 3.05** 433 
 
2001 4.29* 882 2.89** 485 3.94* 396 
 
2002 5.53* 870 3.88* 479 2.13*** 390 
 
2003 6.26* 946 5.88* 517 1.50 428 
 
2004 4.32* 979 4.51* 487 1.86*** 491 
 
2005 5.73* 989 4.81* 461 3.56* 527 
 
2006 9.84* 947 9.98* 430 2.28** 516 
 
2007 12.17* 929 8.03* 417 0.99 511 
 
2008 6.77* 754 2.80** 329 2.72** 424 
 
2009 8.60* 589 3.49* 279 1.57 309 
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Table 7: Parametric (ANOVA) of Intra- industry using book leverage. One-way analysis of variance by pooled, MNC and DC for the sample period 1991 – 
2009. */**/*** denotes 1%/5%/10% statistical significance. 
               Pooled : B_Leverage              DC : B_Leverage                   MNC : B_Leverage 
Year F-ratio d.f F-ratio d.f F-ratio d.f 
1991 3.46* 472  1.83 228 1.69 243 
 
1992 3.59* 527 3.82* 258 1.28 268 
 
1993 4.29* 628 4.82* 328 0.97 299 
 
1994 5.49* 686 4.31* 367 1.14 318 
 
1995 8.35* 751 5.51* 410 3.27* 340 
 
1996 10.17* 840 6.67* 453 4.01* 386 
 
1997 11.44* 859 8.76* 467 4.61* 391 
 
1998 5.85* 880 4.58* 477 4.17* 402 
 
1999 4.58* 881 3.46* 465 2.88* 415 
 
2000 6.67* 897 5.87* 463 3.66* 433 
 
2001 8.04* 882 8.78* 485 3.44* 396 
 
2002 7.29* 870 8.16* 479 2.18*** 390 
 
2003 8.19* 946 7.87* 517 1.02 428 
 
2004 5.48* 979 6.68* 487 0.99 491 
 
2005 6.29* 989 5.74* 461 2.03*** 527 
 
2006 7.17* 947 7.34* 430 1.03 516 
 
2007 9.43* 929 7.29* 417 1.43 511 
 
2008 7.54* 754 6.14** 329 1.48 424 
 
2009 11.04* 589 7.95* 279 2.19*** 309 
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Table 8: Parametric (ANOVA) Inter- industry
2
 using market leverage. One-way analysis of variance by MNC and DC for the sample period 1991 – 2009. 
*/**/*** denotes 1%/5%/10% statistical significance. 
 
 
Year 
Leverage = Debt / (Debt + Equity) 
F-ratio 
 
d.f 
 
Bartlett’s test statistics3 
1991 5.83* 472 35.39* 
1992 3.01* 527 12.66** 
1993 2.22** 628 9.77 
1994 3.47* 686 9.62 
1995 4.60* 751 39.55* 
1996 6.07* 840 56.58* 
1997 5.03* 859 50.85* 
1998 6.03* 880 44.23* 
1999 5.27* 881 21.83* 
2000 4.85* 897 14.43** 
2001 2.86* 882 21.90** 
2002 3.17* 870 36.78* 
2003 1.17 946 20.26* 
2004 1.57 979 40.80* 
2005 2.61** 989 47.47* 
2006 3.01* 947 55.62* 
2007 4.37* 929 73.40* 
2008 4.65* 754 44.41* 
2009 6.12* 589 56.74* 
 
ANOVA over sample period (1991-2009)                    55.22*     15,324         546.94* 
 
 
                                                          
2
 Inter-Industry analysis across MNC and DC is the subject of this chapter. 
3
 Bartlett’s test for equal variance. Bartlett, test the null hypothesis that the difference between variances are zero.  
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Table 9:  Reports the heteroskedastic-consistent linear regression, showing the significance of the interactive-term (Industry*MNC) between MNCs and DCs, 
along with determinants of capital structure. */**/*** denotes statistical significance at 1%/5%/10% respectively.  
 InvTangSizeROACFQFDCNDTSMNCIndustryLeverageM ititit .,,,,,,,,)*(_                  Eq. (3) 
Factors Co-efficient & (Robust HC Std. Err) t-statistic  [p-value] 
 
NDTS -.1271** 
(.0687) 
-1.85 
[0.064] 
 
FDC -.0000 
(.0000) 
-.72 
(.471) 
 
Q -.0909* 
(.0017) 
-52.60 
(0.0000) 
 
CF -.0276 
(.0195) 
-1.42 
(0.157) 
 
ROA -.1173* 
(.0136) 
-8.65 
(0.0000) 
 
Size .0063* 
(.0008) 
7.49 
(0.0000) 
 
Tang .2242* 
(.0093) 
24.05 
(0.0000) 
 
Inv -.4764* 
(.0341) 
-13.97 
(0.0000) 
 
IND_MNC -.0097* 
(.0008) 
-11.53 
(0.0000) 
 
Cons .2951* 
(.0069) 
                         R
2
        32% 
42.85 
(0.0000) 
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Table 10:  Target capital structure determinants: Estimation results of panel combined fixed and time effect regressions. The robust standard errors adjusted for 
clusters are in brackets. */**/*** denotes statistical significance at 1%/5%/10% respectively.  
 InvTangSizeROACFQFDCNDTSLeverageM iitit .,,,,,,,,*_                                                                Eq. (4) 
Factors Co-efficient & ( Robust Std. Err) t-statistic  [p-value] 
 
NDTS .2737**      (.1121) 2.44       [0.015] 
 
Q                   -.0645*       (.0028)          -22.90         [0.000] 
 
CF                -.0345***      (.0176)            -1.96         [0.050] 
 
ROA                    -.1666*      (.0218)           -7.66         [0.000] 
 
Size 
 
  .0418*     (.0051)             8.22        [0.000] 
 
Tang 
 
INV 
 
FDC                                                    
  .1517*     (.0302) 
 
                   -.3810*      (.0406) 
 
.0002**     (.0001) 
           5.03         [0.000] 
 
          -9.39         [0.000] 
 
            2.10        [0.036] 
 
Cons 
Year Dummies    (Yes) 
 .0825*     (.0309)             2.67        [0.008] 
 
R
2
 within                             0.2585  
R
2
 between 
R
2
 overall 
 
Wald test 
4
 
Wald test
5
 
Hausman test
6
 
Observations 
Groups 
0.1920 
0.1876 
 
105.32* 
29.54* 
255.91* 
                           15,325 
1,539 
 
                                                          
4
 Tests the null hypothesis that all coefficients in the model specification are jointly zero. 
5
 Test the null hypothesis that time effect is jointly zero. 
6
 Test the null hypothesis that coefficients from the fixed effect are equal to the coefficients from a random effect model.  
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Table 11: Reports LSDVC
AH
 dynamic estimation of industry capital structure (Market-Leverage) adjustment speed, across MNCs and DCs.  */**/*** denotes statistical 
significance of 1%/5%/10% respectively. Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses.
7
 
 
Eq. (7) 
  
                    Domestic – (DC) 
 
Multinationals – (MNC) 
 Mining Manu. Services T & C Wholesale Retail Mining Manu. Services T & C Wholesale Retail 
M_Leverageit-1 .4503* 
(.0969) 
.6791* 
(.0214) 
.5294* 
(.0379) 
.7065* 
(.0367) 
.5548* 
(.0416) 
.7276* 
(.0408) 
.6669* 
(.1953) 
.5844* 
(.0218) 
.6367* 
(.0650) 
.4713* 
(.0955) 
.5190* 
(.0979) 
.6420* 
(.0869) 
Size .0524 
(.0521) 
.0406* 
(.0123) 
.0375* 
(.0110) 
.0385 
(.0250) 
.0819* 
(.0301) 
.0213 
(.0190) 
.0075 
(.0857) 
.0205** 
(.0091) 
.0303 
(.0319) 
-.0606 
(.0532) 
.0234 
(.0346) 
-.0575 
(.0439) 
Tang .1301 
(.2314) 
.0671* 
(.0259) 
.1607* 
(.0425) 
.1146*** 
(.0629) 
.1460 
(.1199) 
.1084 
(.0853) 
.0509 
(.2806) 
.0215 
(.0461) 
.0485 
(.0948) 
-.0506 
(.1842) 
-.0118 
(.2555) 
-.0359 
(.2081) 
Q -.1283* 
(.0275) 
-.0315* 
(.0037) 
-.0474* 
(.0053) 
-.0626* 
(.0105) 
-.0683* 
(.0180) 
-.0397* 
(.0073) 
-.0562** 
(.0253) 
-.0461* 
(.0045) 
-.0343* 
(.0050) 
-.1552* 
(.0404) 
-.1086* 
(.0240) 
-.0457* 
(.0139) 
ROA .0231 
(.3449) 
-.1599* 
(.0338) 
-.0712 
(.0715) 
-.1458 
(.1172) 
-.2672 
(.2154) 
-.4642* 
(.0892) 
-.0834 
(.4848) 
-.3327* 
(.0608) 
.0113 
(.1974) 
.1325 
(.6045) 
-.2877 
(.4253) 
-.6653* 
(.2463) 
CF -.1923 
(.2027) 
-.0936* 
(.0253) 
-.1109** 
(.0519) 
-.1854* 
(.0617) 
-.1330** 
(.0417) 
-.1793* 
(.0423) 
-.1118 
(.2380) 
-.2063* 
(.0366) 
-.1790** 
(.0742) 
-.3267 
(.2071) 
-.0948 
(.1469) 
-.2202*** 
(.1131) 
NDTS .2986 
(.8811) 
-.0656 
(.1539) 
-.6663* 
(.2263) 
-1.1391* 
(.4215) 
.2465 
(1.0074) 
-1.0155** 
(.4680) 
-1.4282 
(-1.2087) 
-.2174 
(.2089) 
-.0202 
(.4743) 
.3718 
(1.3465) 
-1.7707 
(1.4925) 
-.6270 
(1.4334) 
INV .2238 
(.1933) 
.1909* 
(.0415) 
.0390 
(.1168) 
.1611 
(.1002) 
.3004 
(.2167) 
.2165* 
(.0392) 
.0753 
(.4396) 
.0580 
(.0751) 
.1868 
(.3746) 
-.1053 
(.1740) 
.0758 
(.5977) 
.1810 
(.4067) 
FDC -.0001 
(.0020) 
.0001 
(.0002) 
.0002 
(.0003) 
-.0003 
(.0011) 
-.0012 
(.0129) 
.0001 
(.0004) 
-.0063 
(.0292) 
-.0011 
(.0019) 
.0010 
(.0037) 
-.0388* 
(.0145) 
-.0124 
(.0266) 
-.0644** 
(.0279) 
             
Year Dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
#Obs             162    2,324      789       645       334       927        135      3,486      435      158       177       248 
             
Wald 83(8)* 1505(8)* 321(8)*  164(8)* 520(8)* 942(8)* 64(8)* 1958(8)* 116(8)*  (8)* 85(8)* 144(8)* 
             
             
Adj. Speed (γ) 55% 32% 47%     29% 45% 27% 33% 42% 36%     53% 48% 36% 
                                                          
7
 Bootstrapped standard errors generated with 10 replications. LSDVC is initialized by Anderson and Hsiao () bias correction 
estimator. 
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Table 12: Reports LSDVC
AH
 dynamic estimation of manufacturing industry capital structure (Market-Leverage) adjustment speed, across MNCs and DCs.  */**/*** denotes 
statistical significance of 1%/5%/10% respectively. Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. 
 
                                                                    
Eq. (7b) 
 
 Manufacturing Industry  
 Co-efficient & (Bootstrapped Std. Err. in brackets) z-statistic  [p-value] 
 
M_Leverageit-1 .6811*               (.0062) 109.74                     [0.000] 
Size .0320*               (.0055) 5.77                        [0.000] 
Tang .0363                 (.0325) 1.12                        [0.264] 
Q -.0374*              (.0028) -13.44                     [0.000] 
ROA -.1793*              (.0323) -5.56                       [0.000] 
CF -.1154*              (.0163) -7.09                       [0.000] 
NDTS -.2607**             (.1226) -2.13                       [0.033] 
INV .1705**              (.0781)                     2.18                          [0.029] 
FDC -.0000                 (.0002) -0.23                       [0.814] 
MNC .0221                  (.0993)                     0.22                          [0.824] 
MNC*M_Leverageit-1 -.0817*               (.0245) -3.33                       [0.001] 
 
Year Dummies 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
#Obs 
 
5,810 
 
   
Wald 1769* (8)  
   
   
Adj. Speed (γ) 32%  
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Table 13. Factors of adjustment speed. A two-stage estimation of adjustment speed is used. The target, M_Leverage*it, is generated in the first stage using 
LSDVC . Deviation is the difference between the target and the current market leverage. Δ is the actual change in leverage from t-1 to t. Z is the adjustment 
speed factors in columns. */**/*** denotes 1%/5%/10% respectively. Heteroskedastic consistent robust standard errors in brackets. 
 
         Eq. (10) 
 γRisk γDIST γQ γSize γPrice↑ γOver-Levered 
 
Mining – DC 
 
.0011*         (.0003) 
 
.4201*      (.0935) 
 
-.0161         (.0232) 
 
-.0108**        (.0050) 
 
-.1431*       (.0160) 
 
.2315*        (.0517) 
Mining – MNC 
 
 
.0027           (.0020) .2907*      (.0896) -.0319*       (.0113) -.0166*          (.0041) -.1002*       (.0140) .1288***    (.0614) 
Manuf. – DC .0001           (.0001) .6251*      (.0175) -.0149*       (.0014) -.0010            (.0013) -.1013*       (.0035) .0777*        (.0053) 
Manuf. – MNC 
 
 
.0022*         (.0005) .4628*      (.0010) -.0174*       (.0013) -.0048*          (.0008) -.0689*       (.0023) .0446*        (.0028) 
Services – DC .0002***     (.0001) .4980*      (.0323) -.0209*       (.0034) -.0075*          (.0020) -.1131*       (.0067) .0615*        (.0085) 
Services – MNC 
 
 
.0001           (.0021) .4039*      (.0300) -.0084*       (.0028) -.0019            (.0023) -.0574*       (.0061) .0285*        (.0061) 
T_C  – DC .0001           (.0003) .3105*      (.0396) -.0194*       (.0058) -.0046***      (.0026) -.1170*       (.0071) .0804*        (.0110) 
T_C  – MNC 
 
 
.0003           (.0056) .3417*      (.0923) -.0208***   (.0122) .0060             (.0042) -.1041*       (.0131) .0455**      (.0197) 
Wholesale – DC .0021*         (.0007) .3393*      (.0489) -.0270*       (.0070) -.0199*          (.0041) -.1244*       (.0095) .0686*        (.0114) 
Wholesale – MNC 
 
 
-.0003          (.0066) .3041*      (.0703) -.0450*       (.0114) -.0077            (.0064) -.1059*       (.0107) .0370**      (.0102) 
Retail – DC .0002           (.0002) .5454*      (.0347) -.0255*       (.0040) -.0002            (.0213) -.1095*       (.0056) .1111*        (.0117) 
Retail – MNC -.0175          (.0130) .4866*      (.0597) -.0214*       (.0062) .0124*           (.0047) -.0825*       (.0079) .0659*        (.0162) 
Note: Coefficient on Industry specific deviation, [α1(Deviationit)] in the model are not reported in the table, however the co-efficient range from .43 to .16 and 
are all positively significant at 1%. Industry median leverage (i.e. proxy for target leverage) is computed for each industry per year, across MNCs and DCs. The 
distance from industry median leverage, DISTit,  is derived by subtracting actual leverage from the industry median leverage.  
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Table 14. Herd Migration Hypothesis Regression Results. LSDVC regression of herding behaviour for industries across MNCs and DCs. The bootstrapped 
standard errors adjusted for clusters are in brackets. */**/*** denotes statistical significance at 1%/5%/10% respectively.  
 
ititititit gedianLeveraIndustryMeLeverageMLeverageMLeverageM    1210 ___                  Eq. (13) 
 
 
 Co-efficient & Std. Error of Lagged Industry Median 
Leverage 
 
 
Mining – DC 
 
 
-.2286                                                                           (.3704) 
Mining – MNC 
 
-.0937                                                                           (.1550) 
Manufacturing – DC .1810*                                                                          (.0627) 
Manufacturing – MNC 
 
.0571                                                                            (.0694) 
Services – DC .1640                                                                            (.1082) 
Services – MNC 
 
.0643                                                                            (.1420) 
Transportation & Communication – DC .0524                                                                            (.1242) 
Transportation & Communication – MNC 
 
.0250                                                                            (.1556) 
Wholesale – DC -.0619                                                                           (.1394) 
Wholesale – MNC 
 
-.0346                                                                           (.3223) 
Retail – DC -.0930                                                                           (.1134) 
Retail - MNC -.0208                                                                           (.1517) 
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APPENDIX  
Table I. Descriptive statistics: MNC vs. DC mean leverage (Market Leverage) by year and industry, and the corresponding graphs (a-f) 
Year Mining 
DC                      MNC 
Manufacturing 
DC                      MNC 
Transp. & Comm. 
DC                      MNC 
Wholesale Trade 
DC                      MNC 
Retail Trade 
DC                      MNC 
Services 
DC                      MNC 
1991 .46741928          .2548197 .3081049          .1833509 .2790881           .2898779 .352232           .3116583 .2093522            .1667659 .3019376           .2113654 
1992 .422021                   .1775537 .2453335            .1866853 .3075197            .2232189 .2717426            .3416715 .1938314            .1930107 . 253295           .1775984 
1993 .2988077                 .1302178 .2062887         .1713105 .2598243             .2372966 .2052811            .2787998 .1765194             .2010468 .2316012           .1600414 
1994 .2801925             .2129494 .2043929             .1722268 .30238           .3023535 .2334143            .2982374 .2147482          .2344098 .2314229            .1658647 
1995 .2778661             .1947256 .2000954               .1629328 .3289914             .2818814 .2076589           .2658796 .2045742           .235316 .2161292           .1213116 
1996 .249676               .1445204 .1612545             .1574414 .3411303              .2598522 .2201452             .2728913 .1907074          .2112204 .2055974             .0939228 
1997 .2295559              .1727985 .170186             .1514884 .3187967           .2666741 .2210406            .242831 .1735283          .1401834 .2142908            .0939228 
1998 .3740577             .2759784 .2203555            .2045008 .2839018             .311391 .2905721           .3444946 .2044269             .1446251 .2755429           .1199673 
1999 .3485531              .3047987 .2527118             .2293305 .3096385          .3127785 .3215103            .3725829 .2734124          .1768392 .3092381             .154702 
2000 .2223777              .2462414 .2640805          .2473698 .355503          .3255686 .3299117            .3160333 .3398528            .1616213 .3157426           .1716686 
2001 .3239164             .2486308 .2150871          .2374649 .3178051          .3592248 .2921348          .2585848 .2431755           .1480024 .2495871          .1693905 
2002 . 3318137             .2691397 .2266699         .2222596 .3301838          .2884644 .3619274           .2694045 .2694045           .2040967 .2759229             .1613235 
2003 .2734278             .2543339 .1676166          .1972697 .2814326          .2187478 .2734166           .2632858 .2056293          .1544584 .2391202            .1961567 
2004 .203977                  .182735 .1587087           .1796548 .2797394             .1930586 .1846491            .2531237 .2096612            .1498111 .1997903             .1434282 
2005 .1902213              .1217181 .1489102             .1757687 .2708882           .2306681 .1921214          .234985 .1794643            .1211576 .1978758            .1421686 
2006 .2124647              .1383574 .1441639             .1662367 .3198526          .192219 .1738765           .2229513 .2080842            .1176448 .2148873            .1507822 
2007 .221302                  .152173 .17283           .1699051 .350994            .2207294 .1842758             .1956529 .2438112            .1955203 .2450886          .1652877 
2008 .3469553              .2377717 .2612845             .2370392 .407682           .3531204 .3197264          .3268652 .3287978          .2231826 .306298           .2285053 
2009 
Industry Average 
.2731407              .2182355 
.2776797                .2016302 
.2370269             .18865 
.205009            .1917137 
.4089732           .2942834 
.3191967            .2674077 
.2868984          .1858477 
.2625976           .271673 
.2749302            .2314595 
.2282399             .1706826 
.2985817          .2007635 
.2488726            .1587475 
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Table II. Descriptive statistics: MNC vs. DC median leverage (Market Leverage) by year and industry  
Year Mining 
DC                      MNC 
Manufacturing 
DC                      MNC 
Transp. & Comm. 
DC                      MNC 
Wholesale Trade 
DC                      MNC 
Retail Trade 
DC                      MNC 
Services 
DC                      MNC 
1991 .4498721          .1764118 .2454418          .1390954 .232666           .2896817 .3249232              .268679 .1534437            .1735449 .2401675           .0938965 
1992 .3946148                  .0717494 .1665999            .1339191 .2587404            .262657 .2925487            .309226 .1308923            .1677724 . 2232418           .109261 
1993 .2824022                 .0462294 .1202564         .1257664 .1877187             .2887864 .1321167            .255655 .1332277             .1378354 .2132327           .121412 
1994 .2754221             .1749665 .1461831             .1234511 .2400357           .3251046 .2160258            .2469843 .1667855          .2088847 .1971008            .0966339 
1995 .2231343             .2035916 .116514               .1271889 .2958002             .2999399 .1816162           .2536508 .1389174           .2503444 .1964874           .086961 
1996 .1857743               .1127855 .1268292             .1199216 .2893918              .2259745 .1571178             .2832665 .1510139          .1530239 .1688543             .0655056 
1997 .156503              .1754271 .1075482             .110416 .2717765           .2488546 .1646094            .2228204 .1266484          .1051252 .1485873            .063517 
1998 .3400176             .2820913 .1550585            .167735 .240971             .2519799 .2473414           .3001092 .1580266             .1018357 .2174851           .0865203 
1999 .3477363              .2367778 .2252847             .1832103 .2800032          .25259 .3153422            .3871184 .2230294          .1146482 .2769717             .1107496 
2000 .1475461              .2347911 .2155614          .2002974 .3888948          .291138 .328287            .3903623 .2894513            .1296086 .2316292           .1070572 
2001 .3006582             .221035 .1436588          .1990755 .3093306          .2909703 .2767553          .1837565 .1610179           .1016829 .1631896          .0889316 
2002 . 3544306             .2321088 .1667994         .1911965 .2918977          .2927095 .3315669           .1828494 .2106476           .1676334 .1971416             .1096543 
2003 .2434947             .2352401 .101859          .169931 .2633637          .1880658 .2324626           .181144 .1567054          .091986 .1575816            .1565467 
2004 .2009424                  .1851149 .109214           .1466036 .2511431             .1631608 .157213            .2328555 .1523903            .1129394 .1411959             .1312911 
2005 .1675685              .1064772 .0937065             .150115 .2492718           .2092832 .1608521          .1724398 .1308051            .0935325 .1298565            .1097434 
2006 .215633              .1192576 .1028172             .1470484 .3221373              .2017538 .1569057           .2046684 .1840203            .0982616 .1369933            .1124437 
2007 .2148065                  .1391061 .1285583           .1424162 .3041134            .2163416 .1479874             .1854028 .197235            .1712678 .2018939          .1573006 
2008 .3151799              .208395 .1897608             .2103249 .4384005           .3643911 .3239707          .3318026 .2911301          .1843461 .2539196           .2202432 
2009 
Sample Industry Median 
.2669709              .1866134 
.2521661                .1739566 
.176134                 .1584885 
.1391982            .1555927 
.4096572           .3229028 
.2802702            .2527999 
.3043781          .1606722 
.2160258           .2434942 
.2660246            .1702729 
.1718234             .1228248 
.2650556          .156308 
.1891926            .1154042 
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        Chapter 4 
Macroeconomic Dynamics and Capital Structure Adjustment Speed: US MNCs and DCs 
Abstract 
This chapter uses an integrated dynamic partial-adjustment capital structure model to 
estimate the effect of macroeconomic factors (commercial paper spread, growth in 
aggregate capital expenditure of nonfinancial firms, and consumer price index (CPI)), 
and macroeconomic conditions defined by GDP, default spread, unemployment and 
price-output ratio on capital structure dynamics of US-based MNCs relative to DCs. The 
empirical results show that macroeconomic factors have significant influence on firms’ 
capital structure, however, the results shows statistically and significantly different effect 
of macroeconomic factors on MNCs relative to DCs. Similarly, the chapter finds strong 
evidence that MNCs adjust faster towards target leverage in good macroeconomic 
conditions than DCs. In addition, the chapter finds evidence supporting the market timing 
theory (Baker and Wurgler, 2002) that over-levered firms adjust faster in good 
macroeconomic conditions than under-levered firms. Moreover, the results for separately 
pooled regressions for MNCs and DCs,  unconditional on macroeconomic states, 
provides support for the pecking order theory that, under-levered firms  adjust towards 
target leverage faster than over-levered firms. 
 
Keywords: Macroeconomic factors, macroeconomic conditions, adjustment speed, MNCs, DCs. 
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1. Introduction 
Different stages of business cycle and macroeconomic conditions affect target capital 
structure and adjustment speed both directly and indirectly. Sources of external financing 
(i.e credit and equity market) are directly influenced by the conditions of the 
macroeconomy, while firm characteristics such as profitability
1
, probability of 
bankruptcy (Wilson, 1997)
2
, and capital investment are indirectly affected by stages of 
business cycle through cost of capital, cash flows, leverage and balance sheet factors 
(Hoshi et al. 1991; Whited, 1992; Hubbard, 1998; 1995; Gilchrist and Himmelberg 1995; 
Fazarri et al. 1988). In addition, agency problems are not a static phenomenon, and are 
thus susceptible to the general mood of the macroeconomy through changes in the firm-
specific characteristics. Therefore, the adaptability of firms in different macroeconomic 
conditions is a necessary condition in maintaining firm value, avoidance of bankruptcy, 
and managing agency problems.  
Generally, capital structure theories have significantly enhanced the overall 
understanding of how firms make their financing decisions (Modigliani and Miller, 1958; 
Modigliani and Miller, 1963; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Myers, 1977; Myers and 
Majluf, 1984; Stulz, 1990; Ross, 1977), however, not much is known about whether the 
                                                             
1
 This has important implications for both tax benefits of debt financing and 
equity price. A decrease in profitability may dilute current tax benefits 
associated with debt financing, and may also trigger a downward re-valuation 
of tax loss carry-forwards. Overall firm value may be affected as equity 
prices reflect changes in profit forecasts.   
2 Wilson, 1997; studied and developed a model that investigates the 
relationship between the probability of rating transition and macroeconomic 
variables, and it predicts the default risk based on the influence of the 
macroeconomic conditions. The study suggests higher probability of bankruptcy 
during different stages of the business cycle.  
3 
 
capital structure adjustment speed towards target leverage of US based MNCs
3
 and DCs 
are differently affected by macroeconomic conditions
4
. In addition to few available 
studies on the influence of macroeconomic variables on capital structure decisions, prior  
studies on capital structure adjustment speed  have  ignored or failed to recognize the 
differences between MNC’s and DC’s regarding  the impact of both  macroeconomic 
variables and  macroeconomic conditions (states)  on the relative adjustment speed of 
capital structure of MNCs and DCs. Intuitively, we may expect faster adjustment during 
good macroeconomic states than in bad macroeconomic states, however, it is equally 
imperative to seek whether MNCs and DCs differ in the adjustment process, contingent 
on the state of the macroeconomy. This is essential not only for efficient resource 
allocation, but also the implications for the holdings of investors (i.e. both debt and 
equity holders across MNC and DCs), the strength of cohesion in the global capital 
markets
5
 and the dynamics of conflict between investors and management, and between 
classes of various investors. Given the largely diversified macroeconomic exposure of 
MNCs, an investigation of differences in relative adjustment speed of MNCs and DCs 
                                                             
3 MNC is defined in this study as a firm that engages in foreign direct 
investment, either through acquisition and mergers, or through primary 
entrance into foreign market with established physical presence as a taxed 
entity. To differentiate foreign direct investment from pure international 
trade (i.e. import and export), a tax approach is used to defined MNCs. A 
subsidiary of an MNC pays taxes in the country in which it is located, thus 
firms with reported foreign tax are classified as MNCs. 
4
 Macroeconomic conditions and macroeconomic states are used interchangeably in 
this chapter. 
5 In a well integrated global capital markets, no or minimal arbitrage 
condition should exist, implying similar credit conditions in US. This is 
also a direct test of Modigliani and Miller (1958) arbitrage-free financing 
environment – one of the assumptions underlying their capital structure 
irrelevance hypothesis. International access to capital is one of the 
capabilities attributed to MNCs, thus during different economic cycles in US, 
MNCs may offset the effect by accessing the international capital markets. 
However, if global capital markets are efficient and well integrated, MNCs 
may have no advantage over the DCs. In fact, it may add additional cost to 
their financing activity. 
4 
 
due to macroeconomic conditions is an important test of the effect of US macroeconomy 
on US based multinational firms. Even in a normal macroeconomic condition, a little 
recapitalization cost can result in leverage ratio to deviate from target capital structure. 
This relationship between recapitalization cost and deviation from target leverage is even 
more important in bad or good macroeconomic conditions as the overall cost of capital 
changes in response to both equity and debt market depending on the state of the 
economy. 
Besides the direct impact of macroeconomic forces on capital structure, Rajan and 
Zingales (1995) has pointed out the highly probable distortions macroeconomic forces 
has on the original effect of firm specific characteristics on capital structure. Intuitively, 
Rajan and Zingales (1995) assertion is extendable to the dynamic capital structure 
adjustment process. The limited prior studies on the role of macroeconomic dynamics on 
capital structure adjustment speed have taken the aggregation approach, in which firms’ 
are not segregated into MNCs and DCs, even though quite a number of past studies on 
MNCs shows a relatively different leverage level for US based multinationals and their 
domestic counterparts
6
.  
Thus, this research is intended to fill the gap in the literature by directly testing the effect 
of macroeconomic forces on relative capital structure adjustment speed of MNCs and 
DCs.  
                                                             
6 Fatemi, Ali 1984, 1988; Burgman, T.1996; Lee & Kwok 1988; Michel & Shaked 
1986; Doukas & Pantzalis, 2003; Shapiro, 1978. 
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Specifically, at the first stage, this chapter directly investigates the relative effect of three 
macroeconomic factors (i.e commercial paper spread, growth of aggregate capital 
expenditure and general price level) on leverage level of MNCs and DCs. These three 
macroeconomic factors are selected based both on their tactical and economic influence 
on financing choice. For example, general rise in price level suggests an inflationary 
environment, which on one hand adversely affects existing debt holders and on the other 
hand may discourage debt issuance by firms’ due to increased cost of capital. A rise in 
aggregate capital expenditure in the economy may exert pressure on the overall demand 
for debt to finance incremental investments, which may cause disequilibrium in the debt 
market and thus increase the overall cost of capital. Similarly, a rise in commercial paper 
spread will likely exacerbate liquidity pressure on the firms’ balance sheet, which may 
result in an increase in long-term debt financing as firms’ strive to avoid bankruptcy costs 
resulting from short term borrowing. Importantly, the two balancing forces (tax benefit 
and bankruptcy costs) of the dynamic trade- off theory can be directly linked to the state 
of macroeconomic conditions – for example, tax benefit can be directly connected to the 
expansion or contraction of the overall economy through cash flows, and bankruptcy cost 
is connected to macroeconomic conditions through probability of default (Wilson, 1997), 
so changes in the macroeconomic conditions must lead to changes in target leverage and 
adjustment speed of capital structure.  
At the second stage, four macroeconomic factors (growth in real GDP, default spread, 
price-output ratio and unemployment) that defined macroeconomic conditions are put 
into quartiles in order to directly test the impact of macroeconomic conditions on the 
relative capital structure adjustment speed of MNCs and DCs. Prior studies using 
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aggregated data, which implies overall analysis of adjustment speed in a domestic 
context, found evidence of faster adjustment speed in a good macroeconomic condition 
relative to bad macroeconomic state. As compelling as these prior findings are, it failed to 
directly compare the adjustment speed of MNCs to DCs in different macroeconomic 
conditions.  In addressing the questions of whether macroeconomic factors and 
macroeconomic conditions differently impact the capital structure adjustment speed of 
MNCs relative to DCs; the rest of the chapter is organized as follows: 
Section 2 surveyed relevant literature, in particular the studies on the role of 
macroeconomic dynamics on capital structure adjustment speed. Section 3 poses the 
research question and the corresponding hypothesises. Section 4 discusses the integrated 
partial adjustment model and the specification of variables. Section 5 discusses the data 
and the construction of good and bad macroeconomic conditions based on quartiles. 
Section 6 highlights the descriptive statistic and their relevance for the overall study of 
the chapter. Section 7 discusses the empirical results and section 8 summarizes and 
concludes the chapter. 
 
 
 
2. Literature 
 
 
Over the past five decades, after Modigliani and Miller’s (1958) landmark paper on the 
irrelevance theory of capital structure, a variety of theories explaining the capital 
structure choices emerged out of an ongoing academic debate, culminating into a 
discovery of empirically testable influencing factors of the capital structure choice. 
However, most prior empirical studies of capital structure focus on the characteristics of 
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firms and industry. Relatively little research is done on the effect of macroeconomic 
conditions on capital structure dynamics, and very little is known about the impact of 
macroeconomic states on capital structure adjustment speed
7
 toward targets for MNCs 
relative to DCs.  Hackbarth et al. (2006), as one of the most influential papers on the role 
of macroeconomic conditions on capital structure, shows that macroeconomic conditions 
do affect the choice of target capital structure. Thus, the capital structure adjustment 
speed is subject to both macroeconomic factors and the overall condition of the economy. 
An earlier study on this subject (Choe et al., 1993; Korajczyk and Levy, 2003) found that 
macroeconomic states are non-trivial factors for firms’ financing decisions. Since 
macroeconomic conditions vary over time (i.e. the economy undergoes through the 
natural business cycle of expansion and contraction), capital structure decisions including 
the adjustment process varies over time and across firms’ as macroeconomic conditions 
change. This dynamic relationship between capital structure and the macroeconomy 
highlights managers’ active effort to manage firm value and other competing factors of 
their business environment
8
. In a domestic context, Hackbarth et al. (2006) studied the 
role of dynamic capital structure decisions by employing a contingent model, which 
                                                             
7
 One of the implicit underlying economic and financial implications for faster 
adjustment in a good macroeconomic state relative to bad macroeconomic state 
is that equity investors (i.e the true owners of the firm) are holding 2 in 1 
real options; they can either exercise their holdings in good macroeconomic 
state or hold for even better future returns as long as the firm moves closer 
to its target leverage which optimizes cost of capital. However, caution is 
needed here, because firms in a good macroeconomic state will likely move 
further away from the target due to a rise in market equity price, in which 
case, firms’ may need to rebalance their capital structure accordingly. 
Nevertheless, as long as firms adjust faster in good macroeconomic states 
relative to bad macroeconomic states, the 2 in 1 real option assumption is 
theoretically satisfied. 
 
8 Both firm value and the elements of the business environment may change in 
response to macroeconomic conditions. Naturally, such changes will affect 
different constituents of the firm differently. Therefore, to restore the 
perceived equilibrium between various constituents, managers’ must make 
adjustments.  
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allows for dynamic capital structure adjustment, and their model suggests faster 
adjustment in economic expansions than in contractions. Similarly, Drobetz et al. (2006) 
shows a positive relationship between capital structure adjustment speed and business 
cycle for a sample of Swiss companies. Recently, Cook and Tang (2010), documented a 
positive correlation between macroeconomic conditions and capital structure adjustment 
speed for sample of US firms over a 30 year sample period from 1976 – 2005. The 
empirical findings of Cook and Tang (2010) support the findings of Hackbarth et al. 
(2006) that firms’ adjust to their target leverage faster in good macroeconomic conditions 
relative to bad macroeconomic conditions. In their investigation of financing choice of 
unconstrained US firms, Korajczyk and Levy (2003) determined target capital structure 
as a function of the macroeconomic states and firm-specific characteristics, and shows a 
significant relationship between macroeconomic states and financing decisions for 
unconstrained firms. The state of the macroeconomy may also affect the dynamics of 
agency problems which in turn may affect capital structure dynamics. Thus, in their 
attempt to address the fluidity of agency problems in relation to changing macroeconomic 
conditions, Levy and Hennessy (2007) find evidence of a tactical managerial activism, 
where firms substitute equity for debt during economic expansions and substitute debt for 
equity during economic contractions. Such tactical rebalancing of debt and equity in  
different macroeconomic states serve a signalling function, in which managers during 
economic contraction deliberately increase their share of total equity holdings, sending a 
confidence signal to the market participants.  Another related study was by Gertler and 
Gilchrist (1994), who document the importance of macroeconomic conditions on firms’ 
capital structure.  Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) studied five periods of contractionary 
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monetary policy (i.e. 1968, 1974, 1978, 1979, and 1988)
9
 and then, group the sample 
firms’ by asset size to determine the effect of contractionary monetary policy on firms 
financing decisions. Their empirical results indicated that during periods of monetary 
policy tightening, short-term borrowing deteriorates for smaller firms and commercial 
paper
10
 financing rises for large firms
11
. Hence a period of contractionary monetary 
policy suggests existing good macroeconomic state, an increase in discount rate or a 
decrease in money supply directly affect long-term debt financing (Kashyap et al., 1993), 
which directly impact debt level and the adjustment process. Their study (Gertler and 
Gilchrist, 1994), assuming irreversible investment, has at least two implications for 
capital structure; first, the deterioration in short-term borrowing for smaller firms suggest 
a shift to longer term borrowing and further deviation from target leverage; second, 
increase in commercial paper financing by large firms suggests a shift from long-term 
                                                             
9 Gertler and Gilchrist’s (1994) study shared a similar contextual spirit with 
the study conducted by Kashyap et al., (1993) in which the latter authors 
discussed the potential impact of monetary policy actions on the supply of 
loans by financial institutions through the balance sheet of the borrowers. 
Since the collateral value of fixed assets tend to be economically pro-
cyclical, the leverage level through collaterability can be affected by the 
economic cycle. In other words, the return on fixed assets and the expected 
cash flows from those fixed assets in the case of bankruptcy determines the 
value of the collateral. Also to be noted is that the return on fixed assets 
and probability of bankruptcy may depend on the state of the economy.  
 
10
 In the U.S, commercial paper is currently the only source of publicly traded 
short-term debt. Because commercial paper market requires high credit rating, 
it provides large firms or MNCs with the financial flexibility to keep their 
overall debt level low. That is, it allows firms to finance investments only 
when financing needs are known, and therefore minimize the borrowing costs 
associated with long-term financing before undertaking the project or 
financing need are determined. From a strategic viewpoint, the provision of 
low debt feature of commercial paper allows future access to debt market.   
 
11
 This is consistent with the survey by Graham and Harvey (2001), that chief 
financial officers (CFOs) of US corporations cited financial flexibility as 
an important consideration for debt issues, and it also supports Opler et al. 
(1999) that firms may create financial flexibility by maintaining high cash 
holdings. It must be noted that high cash holdings involves substantial costs 
to the firm, nevertheless the benefits of high liquidity may offset the costs 
in a tight monetary policy environment. 
10 
 
borrowing to short-term borrowing and less deviation from target leverage (Saidenberg 
and Strahan, 1999). In the context of MNCs and DCs, the former (MNCs) are generally 
and relatively large conglomerates and are considered less risky due to their diversified 
expected cash flow portfolio.   At least, from the perspective of domestic finance, the 
debate of capital structure adjustment speed in different macroeconomic states is not as 
contentious as prior studies that have ignored the effect of macroeconomic conditions on 
capital structure adjustment speed. A consensus appears to be gaining a momentum from 
the literature that firms adjust faster in good macroeconomic states than in bad 
macroeconomic states, yet to this point, such a consensus is only emanating from studies 
which used aggregated data, and has largely ignored the effect of macroeconomic 
conditions on capital structure adjustment speed of MNCs relative to DCs.  
 
 
3. Research Question(s) and Hypothesises: 
Lack of specific prior empirical study of the effect of macroeconomic factors and 
macroeconomic conditions on capital structure adjustment speed of MNCs relative to 
DCs, motivates the following research questions serving as an extension of prior studies, 
and to shed new light on the impact of US macroeconomy on multinationals capital 
structure dynamic. Specifically, this chapter investigates the questions of whether 
macroeconomic factors have different effect on capital structure of MNCs relative to 
DCs?  And whether macroeconomic conditions have different impact on capital structure 
adjustment speed of MNCs and DCs? According to the mainstream capital structure 
theories, adjustment speed to target may depend on whether the firm is over - under 
11 
 
levered following market equity shock. Thus, using market oriented measure (price-
output ratio) of macroeconomic condition (i.e. good vs. Bad); this chapter investigates the 
effect of relative leverage on capital structure adjustment speed under good 
macroeconomic state relative to bad macroeconomic state.  These related questions leads 
to the following hypothesise: 
I. HO #1: Null = Macroeconomic factors has no differential effect on capital structure 
of MNCs relative to DCs 
II. HO #2: Null = No capital structure adjustment speed differential between MNCs and 
DCs under different macroeconomic conditions. 
III. HO #3: Null = Relative leverage under different macroeconomic conditions has no 
effect on capital structure adjustment speed of MNCs and DCs. 
 
4. The model and specifications 
First, this section uses heteroskesdatic consistent robust OLS, in order to empirically 
investigate the effects of firm characteristics and macroeconomic factors on capital 
structure of MNCs relative to DCs as follows: 
itttitit rsMacrofactoMNCMNCrsMacrofactoXML   _
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   (1)
 
Where X = [NDTS, Q, ROA, SIZE, TANG, RDD] and Macrofactors represents 
macroeconomic factors [SCP, GACE, and CPI],  MNC is a dummy variable which 
contrast DCs and MNCs and MNC_Macrofctors are the interactive terms comparing the 
12 
 
effect of macroeconomic factors on the capital structure of MNCs relative to DCs
12
. The 
empirical results of equation (1) using  market and book leverage measures are reported 
in table 4. 
The above model specification is based on the following leverage definition: 
            
  ititititititit TADBLEDDML /&/ 
(2)
 
Where [D=Long-term debt + long-term debt due in 1 year; E=share price at close of time 
t * number of shares outstanding; ML=market value-based leverage
13
; BL=book value-
based leverage]. 
Alternative definitions of leverage have been used in the literature. In prior studies, some 
form of debt ratio whether market or book values are used to study the composite nature 
of firms’ capital structure. Leverage measures also differ whether long term debt or total 
debt is used. Market-based leverage is forward looking, but far more likely to be volatile 
than book leverage, and it is also not directly controlled by management. Book value 
based leverage, in contrast is a historical accounting output, determined through the 
accounting systems, and management may have influence over the reported figures.
14
  
                                                             
12
 Variable definitions are reported in appendix A. 
13
 Market leverage is the primary leverage measure for this chapter, book 
leverage is used only for necessary comparisons. The literature is increasing 
moving towards the use of market oriented leverage measure in order to 
account for market dynamics. Market leverage measure (sum of long-term and 
short-term debt to sum of long-term, short-term debt due in one year and 
market value of equity) is consistent with the derivation of weighted average 
cost of capital (WACC) and unlike other measures, has also satisfied the 
converse test of leverage. Similarly, use of this measure of leverage, is 
consistent with firms’ long term investment objective.  
14
 On the issue of book value vs. Market value, Barclay et al. (2006) argued 
that the two measures are different. Some of the differences may be glean 
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Second, this section uses fixed-effect instrumental variables (FE-IV) method to estimate 
the integrated dynamic partial-adjustment model. Target leverage cannot be directly 
observed, thus, following Flannery and Rangan (2006)
15
, I estimate the effect of 
macroeconomic conditions on the capital structure adjustment speed of MNCs relative to 
DCs. Specifically, I model firms’ target capital structure as a linear function of firm 
characteristics and macroeconomic factors
16
as follows: 
ititit rsMacrofactoXML   
*
 (3)
                                    
In a perfect capital markets, firms would instantaneously or quickly adjust back to target 
leverage. Instantaneous reversion to target level suggests zero transaction costs 
(Hovakimian et al. 2001) and the type of perfect capital markets implied by Modigliani 
and Miller (1958). However, in an imperfect markets, in which recapitalization costs is 
non-trivial, firms may reasonably revert to target leverage in multiple periods. Thus, 
following prior literature
17
, I use standard partial adjustment model as follows:  
  10,1*1    ititititit MLMLMLML  
                                                                                                                                     (4)                  
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
from the conflicting predictions of well known capital structure determinants 
when book leverage and market leverage are used together. The predictions of 
trade off theory tend to favour book leverage, whereas pecking order and 
agency theories tend to be market-oriented. It is also critical to note that 
book leverage measure is highly susceptible to accounting manipulations. 
15
 Controlling for firm fixed effect, this integrated dynamic partial-
adjustment model allows target debt level to vary both across firms and over 
time, with an added implication that firms deviate from their target 
leverage, and due to market forces, the deviation is not completely 
eliminated in one period.  
16 The macroeconomic factors and firm characteristics used in the integrated 
dynamic partial-adjustment model; equation (3) are the same as in equation 
(1).  
17
 For example, Fama and French, (2002); Flannery and Rangan, (2006); Hovakimian 
et al., (2001); Cook and Tang, (2006). 
14 
 
In equation (4), the adjustment speed γ explains the actual changes in capital structure 
from period t-1 to t (MLit - . MLit-1), and it (γ) lies between 0 and 1, indicating 
multiple periods of adjustment. That is, the coefficient estimate for the lagged leverage
18
 
represents the proportion of deviation closed in one period, which is the focus of this 
chapter. Given equation (4), γ =1 suggests instantaneous adjustment or full adjustment 
within one year for any deviation away from target leverage. γ  may be zero or close to 
zero in an extreme case of inertia or managerial indifference to capital structure shocks. 
Generally, γ is expected to be more than zero but less than unity.  
Substituting eq. (3) into eq. (4) and rearranging yields the following empirically testable 
model: 
 
  ititititit rsMacrofactoMLML    11  
                                                                                                                                        (5)  
I use Eq. (5) to estimate capital structure adjustment speed for MNCs relative to DCs 
across good and bad macroeconomic conditions. The adjustment speed is ascertained by 
subtracting the co-efficient on the lagged dependent  1itML  from one  1..ei . Tables 
5 through 8, reports the empirical results of equation (5) using fixed-effect instrumental 
variables (FEIV) methodology. 
 
 
                                                             
18
 For any valid partial adjustment model, this coefficient is expected to be 
negative. 
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4a. Determinants of target leverage – Firm Characteristics 
Following the literature (DeAngelo and Masulis, 1980; Titman and Wessels, 1988; Harris 
and Raviv, 1991; Ranjan and Zingales, 1995; Hovakimian et al., 2001; Fama and French, 
2002; Flannery and Rangan, 2006; Frank and Goyal, 2005; Frank and Goyal, 2007; 
Kayhan and Titman, 2007), I use a standard set of firm characteristics as determinants of 
leverage:  
NDTS (non-debt tax shield) is the ratio of the sum of depreciation and amortization to 
total assets. Within the trade-off framework, higher depreciation and amortization 
expenses suggest less debt. That is, the tax shield advantage from debt is also available 
for non-debt tax shield items on the balance sheet (DeAngelo and Masulis, 1980). Thus, 
firms’ are less motivated to issue debt for tax shield purposes when NDTS increases. 
M/B (Q) is the ratio of market value of the firm to book value of total assets. The 
relationship between Q and leverage is mixed depending on which view of capital 
structure theory is taken. From a trade-off theory perspective, an increase in Q may be 
viewed as a sign of future growth opportunities, which shareholders may be less incline 
to share with debt holders. This view of trade-off theory implies a negative relationship 
between Q and leverage (Flannery and Rangan, 2006). From a strict pecking order theory 
perspective, retained earnings (i.e. if we assume retained earnings to equate actual 
realizable cash), may not be sufficient to finance growth opportunities, thus, leverage 
increases with growth opportunities as firms follow the pecking order of financing. 
However, the market timing theory and the dynamic version of pecking order theory are 
consistent with the view of the trade-off theory that Q is negatively related to leverage.  
16 
 
ROA or profitability is the ratio of earnings after taxes to total assets. Some researchers 
have used earnings before interest and taxes to total assets. I used the true residual 
earnings that are allocated between debt and equity holders. There is minimal 
disagreement in the literature concerning the negative relationship between ROA and 
leverage. From a pecking order perspective, high retained earnings minimized the need 
for debt. However, the trade-off theory implied positive relationship between profitability 
and leverage, because profitability maximizes the benefit of debt tax shield. Consistent 
with pecking order perspective, market timing implied a negative relationship between 
ROA and leverage, through the positive relationship between ROA and equity price.  
SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets. Due to their diversified expected cash flows, 
and higher collateral base, larger firms tend to have better access to capital markets, and 
thus tend to have higher leverage than smaller firms (DeAngelo and Masulis, 1980; 
Harris and Raviv, 1991; Rajan and Zingales, 1995). 
TANG is the ratio of net property, plant and equipment to total assets. Within the trade-
off framework, tangibility is expected to be positively related to leverage. That is, 
tangible assets can be collateralized and therefore lowers expected bankruptcy costs.  
RDD is a dummy variable, and takes the value of unity for firms that reported research 
and development costs, and zero otherwise. This dummy measures the effect of 
uniqueness on leverage. Firms with highly unique assets may indicate higher bankruptcy 
cost. Due to the uniqueness of these assets, a liquid secondary market may not exist 
which could increase expected bankruptcy costs and therefore lowers leverage.  
OL is a dummy variable, and takes the value of unity for firms that are over-levered (i.e. 
Debt/PPE >1), and zero otherwise. Debt capacity (Debt/PPE) has important implications 
17 
 
for both future financing and capital structure adjustment speed (Flannery and Rangan, 
2006).   
 
4b. Determinants of target leverage – Macroeconomic factors 
There is evidence that macroeconomic factors may affect capital structure dynamics 
(Kashyap et al., 1993; Choe et al., 1993; Gertler and Gilchrist, 1994; Kiyotaki and 
Moore, 1997; Friedman and Kenneth, 1998; Korajczyk and Levy, 2003; Hackbarth et al, 
2004; Cook and Tang, 2010). Thus, I employ three proxies (GACE, CPI, and SCP) for 
the debt market and the economic growth effect. 
GACE is the growth in aggregated capital expenditure (i.e. a component of GDP) of 
nonfinancial firms. The growth in aggregated capital expenditure implies an overall 
increase in demand for financing, which may put pressure on the debt market, 
subsequently increasing the overall cost of debt financing.  
CPI is the inflation proxy; which has conflicting financial implications for debt issuers 
and debt holders. Inflationary period is good for existing debt obligations and detrimental 
to existing debt holders. The opposite is true for new debt issuances during the 
inflationary period. Similarly, inflation has adverse effect on the overall wealth of equity 
holders through capital gains. 
SCP is the commercial paper spread; derive from the spread between the annualized rate 
of 3 months commercial paper and the annualized rate of 3 months Treasury bill. The 
spread has significant implications for short term borrowing, which provides financial 
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flexibility for firms, and generally allows for suspension of long-term borrowing until 
investment projects and financing needs are known.   
 
4c. Macroeconomic factors and macroeconomic Conditions 
Prior literature has used a set of macroeconomic factors including default spread, GDP, 
and price-output ratio to define macroeconomic conditions (Fama and French, 1989; 
Estrella & Hardouvelis 1991; Korajczyk, Levy 2003; Hackbarth et al. 2006; Rangvid, 
2006; Frank and Goyal, 2004; Cook and Tang, 2010).  In addition to unemployment rate 
as a measure of macroeconomic condition, I followed the literature and employ default 
spread, GDP and price-output ratio as a proxy for macroeconomic conditions.  
Following the literature, default spread is defined as the spread between Moody’s BAA 
rated long-term corporate bond yield and Moody’s AAA rated long-term corporate bond 
yield. In a good macroeconomic condition, the spread should be smaller and higher in 
bad macroeconomic condition (Fama and French, 1989).  
Generally, every economic system goes through the cycle of expansions and recessions. 
Thus, I use average annual real growth in GDP and divide it into four quartiles; the 
highest quartile is used to proxy good macroeconomic condition and the lowest quartile 
for bad macroeconomic condition. 
Defining the normal or natural rate of unemployment is a contentious issue in economics, 
thus given the size of US economy and the total labour force; I divided the annual 
unemployment rate into four quartiles. Incidentally, the three lowest quarters are within 
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the normal or natural rate of unemployment (i.e. <6%) Weidner and Williams (2011), 
which I classified as good macroeconomic condition and the highest quarter is used as a 
bad macroeconomic condition.  
Price-output ratio is used as an indicator of future aggregate equity market performance; 
derive as the S& P 500 index to GDP.  A stable price-output ratio suggests investor 
optimism which is more likely in a good macroeconomic environment. 
 
5. Data and Sample 
My data set consists of annual Compustat data from the years 1991 through 2009. 
Financial firms (SIC codes 6000-6999) and regulated utilities (SIC codes 4900-4999) are 
excluded from the sample as the capital structure of these firms are affected by 
regulation, thus not market driven. I eliminated firm-years with missing values for all 
leverage factors, X, and observations with negative book value of equity (Flannery and 
Hankins 2007). Given the econometric methodology (dynamic panel estimators), firms 
with less than 5 years of data are excluded. From the main sample, firms that reported 
foreign taxes are classified as MNC. Furthermore, in order to appropriately compute 
foreign tax ratios (FTR), negative and missing values of foreign and domestic taxes are 
excluded from MNC group (Chen et al, 1997). A firm may appear in both DC and MNC 
group if a firm did not report foreign taxes in a given year. To avoid this cross-listing or 
overlap between the two groups, I eliminate those firms in the DC group that are already 
in the MNC group. Agriculture, Fishing and non-classifiable industries are excluded as 
they constitute less than 1% of the total sample. To mitigate the probable impact of 
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outliers, firm specific variables are cut-off at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles. I obtain 
macroeconomic variables from Robert Shiller’s homepage and the website-database of 
various U.S government agencies. Specifically, the nonfinancial commercial paper rates, 
US Treasury bill rates, and corporate bond ratings are obtain from the US Federal 
Reserve Board website-database. S&P 500 index and CPI were obtained from Robert 
Shiller’s homepage, Unemployment data were obtained from US Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, and GDP figures were obtained from the US Department of Commerce. The 
data is divided in to quartiles based on macroeconomic factors (GDP, Default spread, 
Unemployment, and price-output ratio) used to define macroeconomic conditions. For 
GDP, the highest quartile represents good macroeconomic condition and the lowest 
quartile represent bad macroeconomic condition; for default spread and price-output 
ratio, the lowest quartile represent good macroeconomic condition, while the highest 
quartile represent bad macroeconomic condition; and for unemployment, the theoretical 
natural rate of unemployment is used as a threshold for good macroeconomic state, above 
which is considered a bad macroeconomic state. 
 
6. Descriptive Statistics  
Table 1a, 1b, and figure 1a,1b shows the yearly leverage level for DCs and MNCs using 
both book and market leverage measures. As expected, for both MNCs and DCs, the 
market leverage measure exhibits higher volatility than the book leverage. The relative 
instability of market leverage partially highlights the issue of control. That is, managers 
have some control over the book leverage, but not enough control over the market-based 
leverage. Overall, DCs shows higher leverage than MNCs. The highly visible boom and 
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bust in market leverage starting from 2007 (i.e. in figures 1a and 1b) underscores the 
impact of the latest financial crisis on leverage, underscoring an important potential effect 
of macroeconomic conditions on leverage. Table c through table e reports the correlation 
matrix of market leverage and the determinants of target leverage for the pooled data, 
DCs and MNCs. Figures 2a through 2c shows the time series graph of the 
macroeconomic factors. CPI shows steady upward trajectory, but almost stationary in the 
long run. This pattern of CPI is may be attributed to an effective execution of the Federal 
Reserve’s mandate, to keep inflation under control. The commercial spread (SpreadCP) 
graph shows unstable movement, and has clearly reflected the effect of the latest financial 
crisis from 2007 to 2009, although commercial paper spread was on a rapidly upward 
movement from 2004 to mid 2008. Interestingly, the movement in commercial paper 
spread resembles the movement in market leverage during the time of financial crisis. A 
significant fall in commercial paper spread in the time of the financial crisis may be 
explained by a coordinated US Federal Reserve’s two prong response to the financial 
crisis; a massive infusion of money into the economy or the quantitative easing, while at 
the same time keeping interest rates unprecedentedly low. More importantly, such a low 
commercial paper spread environment may have partly resulted in low market leverage as 
seen in the graph for 2008 and 2009, as firms choose cheap short-term over long-term 
financing. Although, slightly lower in 2008 and 2009, aggregate non financial 
expenditure per GDP appears to be stable across the sample period. Overall, Figure 3a 
shows a dismal growth for the US economy for the same sample period, which 
subsequently went into a decline in 2008 and 2009 (i.e. years of financial crisis). The 
effect of macroeconomic conditions from figure 3a can be seen on figure 3b and 3c. 
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Figures 3b and 3c show the trajectory of debt and market value of equity for DCs and 
MNCs respectively. The near stationarity of debt and equity and the relationship between 
the two over the sample period is not surprising as the US economy was not performing 
during the same sample period, which underscores the impact of macroeconomic 
conditions on the capital structure dynamics. Figure 3d, shows the average market-book 
equity in order to measure equity market conditions for DCs and MNCs. The equity 
market condition is fairly persistent for MNCs but not so persistent for DCs especially 
between 2004 and 2009. To further investigate the effect of macroeconomic conditions 
on capital structure dynamics, figures 4a and 4b, graphically presents the market-book 
equity in good and bad macroeconomic conditions according to GDP, default spread, and 
unemployment. Not surprisingly, market-book leverage is distinctively higher in good 
macroeconomic conditions than in bad macroeconomic conditions. However, the effect is 
more visible for MNCs than DCs, and this may be explained by the contagion effect of 
US economy on the subsidiaries of US-based MNCs located outside of US.  
Table 2 panel A, shows the differences in means of market based leverage across 
macroeconomic states and across MNCs and DCs over the sample period 1991 to 2009, 
and table 2 Panel B, shows the debt-equity ratio for MNCs and DCs across 
macroeconomic states over the same sample period. The mean leverage for MNCs and 
DCs are also compared for similar macroeconomic states (i.e Good vs. Good & Bad vs. 
Bad).The p-values are reported and are all significant. Table 3 summarizes the mean of 
key market-based leverage related factors under different macroeconomic conditions. 
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7. Empirical Results 
The empirical results in table 4, shows the empirical relationship between leverage and 
determinants of capital structure. All the variables exhibit the expected theoretical 
predictions. Importantly, the results for both book and market leverage shows that MNCs 
on average have higher agency costs than DCs, which is consistent with prior studies 
(Fatemi, 1984; Fatemi, 1988; Burgman, 1996; Lee and Kwok, 1988; Michel and Shaked, 
1986; Doukas and Pantzalis, 2003; Shapiro, 1978). The effect of macroeconomic factors 
is significantly different for MNCs relative to DCs.
19
 An increase in aggregate capital 
expenditure results in higher debt for MNCs relative to DCs. This may imply a pressure 
on the overall US debt market as the need for financing growth increases, which in turn 
increases costs of capital. However, for MNCs which are generally large and operating in 
multiple international jurisdictions, a competitive debt market in US may be offset with 
access to international markets through their subsidiaries. Commercial paper spread is 
positively related to leverage. As the spread increases cost of short term borrowing 
increases and this put liquidity pressure on the balance sheet and thus increases 
bankruptcy costs, thus, firms will likely switch to longer-term financing. However, the 
capital structure of DCs are less affected by an increase in commercial paper spread than 
MNCs. This is consistent with the features of commercial paper, because only large, and 
high credit rated firms can issued such an unsecured debt. CPI is negatively related to 
leverage for both MNCs and DCs. That is, cost of borrowing will likely increase in an 
inflationary environment, as new debt issues reflect the expected inflation. Not 
surprisingly, DCs are more impacted by this macroeconomic factor than MNCs. 
                                                             
19 For market-based leverage measure, which is the main focus of this chapter.  
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The empirical results of table 5, 6 and 7 using equation (5) shows that MNCs adjust faster 
to target leverage in good macroeconomic conditions than their domestic counterparts. In 
table 5 and 6, where macroeconomic conditions are defined by growth in GDP and 
default spread, Both tables shows faster adjustment for MNCs in good macroeconomic 
conditions relative to DCs, although the adjustment is more pronounced for the table 
which exclude 2008 and 2009 (i.e. table label as pre- 2008-2009)
20
. Similarly, when 
macroeconomic condition is defined by unemployment (i.e. table 7), MNCs adjust faster 
in good macroeconomic conditions than DCs. Finally, using the stock market 
performance variable to defined macroeconomic condition, table 8 reports, for MNCs and 
DCs the effect of macroeconomic conditions on capital structure adjustment speed when 
firms are over or under levered. For DCs, The negative coefficient from the interaction of 
good macroeconomic condition dummy (GDUMMY) and over-levered dummy (OL) 
suggests that over-levered firms adjust faster than under-levered firms in good 
macroeconomic states. This evidence supports the market timing hypothesis, because 
over-levered firms have higher incentive than under-levered firms to adjust toward target 
when stock conditions are favourable. However, this study finds no evidence for 
adjustment difference between over-levered and under-levered firms for MNCs across 
macroeconomic conditions. Although the positive coefficient on over-leverage dummy 
(OL) for the independent regressions on both MNCs and DCs without taken 
macroeconomic conditions into account (i.e. GDUMMY=dummy for macroeconomic 
condition) indicates that under-levered firms adjust faster than over-levered firms. This 
evidence supports pecking order theory since over-levered firms have no clear incentive 
to adjust towards the target leverage.  
                                                             
20 The interaction term between MNC, GDUMMY, and lagged leverage. 
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8. Summary and Conclusion 
In this chapter, I investigate the effect of macroeconomic factors on capital structure of 
MNCs and DCs, and also investigate the impact of macroeconomic conditions on capital 
structure adjustment speed of MNCs relative to DCs. The empirical results show that 
both macroeconomic factors and macroeconomic conditions have significant effect on the 
capital structure dynamics of firms’. Specifically, the results show that there are 
significant differences between MNCs and DCs regarding macroeconomic factors; 
furthermore, MNCs adjust faster in good macroeconomic conditions than DCs. The 
results also suggest that over-levered firms adjust faster in good macroeconomic 
conditions than under-levered firms. The study finds support for both market timing and 
pecking order theory regarding the adjustment pattern of over-levered and under-levered 
firms. Faster capital structure adjustment speed for MNCs relative to DCs across 
macroeconomic conditions implies imperfection in the global capital markets, since 
MNCs appears to have offset the US macroeconomic factors more than their domestic 
counterparts. For example, the effect of aggregate capital expenditure, commercial paper 
spread and CPI are statistically different for MNCs and DCs. The implications of faster 
capital structure adjustment speed, for the broader capital market participants are non-
trivial. For equity investors (i.e. both existing and potential equity investors), faster 
adjustment to target leverage signals lower recapitalization costs for the firm; stable and  
optimized overall cost of capital, and financial flexibility. For debt investors, the value of 
the existing and new debt depends not only on the firm characteristics such as liquidity, 
but also on the state of the macroeconomy such as monetary policy and inflation. For the 
firm, issuance of debt or equity and adjustment to target capital structure depends not 
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only on health of the firms’ balance sheet but also on the state of the overall economy. 
Since all firms and other market participants have a functional relationship one form or 
another with the overall macroeconomic forces, this chapter has attempted to shed new 
light on the effect of macroeconomic forces on capital structure dynamics of  MNCs 
relative to DCs, and its implicit implications for market participatnts.  
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Appendix A – Variables Definition 
 
Debt Long-term debt  +  debt in current liabilities 
Equity Common shares outstanding  *  share price @ end of period t 
ML Debt / (Debt + Equity) 
BL Debt / Total Assets 
Tobin’s Q /Q (Equity + Debt) / Total Assets 
Non-debt tax shield (NDTS) (Depreciation + Amortization) /Total Assets 
Tangibility/Tang PPE / Total Assets  
Size Log (Total Assets) 
ROA (EBIT – Total taxes) / Total Assets 
Debt Capacity Debt / PPE 
PPE Net Property, Plant and Equipment (Fixed Assets) 
Under-Leverage (UL) Debt Capacity < 1 
Over-Leverage (UL) Debt Capacity > 1 
Debt-Equity Ratio 
ACE 
GACE 
CP Spread/SCP/SpreadCP 
CPI 
RDD 
Net LTD 
Shares_Out 
Δ Shares_Out 
MVE 
Δ Value 
Δ FA 
Liquidity 
RGGDP/GDP 
Default Spread/DS 
Price-Output/PO 
Unemployment/UNE 
Book Debt/Book Equity 
Aggregate Capital Expenditure 
(ACE @ t – ACE @ t-1) / ACE @ t-1 
Annualized 3-month commercial paper less the 3-month Treasury bill 
Consumer Price Index 
Research and development dummy 
Long term debt/Total assets 
Shares outstanding 
(Shares_Out @ t – Shares_Out @ t-1)/Shares_Out @ t-1 
Market value of equity 
(MVE @ t – MVE @ t-1)/MVE @ t-1 
((PPE @ t + Depreciation+Amortization @ t) – PPE @ t-1)/ PPE @ t-1 
Working Capital = Current assets – Current liabilities 
Annual average real growth rate of GDP  
MOODY’s average spread between corporate AAA and BAA bonds 
S & P 500 stock price index @ Beginning  month of t / GDP @ t-1 
Annual unemployment rate 
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Appendix B – Macroeconomic Data Sources  
 
I. Nonfinancial commercial paper rate: 
Annual flow of funds database of the Federal Reserve Board: 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases 
Annual flow of funds database of the Federal Reserve Board: 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases 
 
 
 
II. US Treasury bill rate: 
Annual flow of funds database of the Federal Reserve Board: 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases 
 
 
 
III. Moody’s Corporate AAA and BAA bonds: 
Annual flow of funds database of the Federal Reserve Board: 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases 
Annual flow of funds database of the Federal Reserve Board: 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases 
 
 
IV. S&P 500 index & CPI: 
Robert Shiller’s homepage at http://www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/data.htm 
 
 
 
V. GDP: 
U.S. Department of Commerce at http://www.bea.gov/bea. 
 
VI. Aggregate non financial capital expenditure: 
Annual flow of funds database of the Federal Reserve Board: 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases 
 
VII. Unemployment rate: 
US Bureau of Labour Statistics: http://www.bls.gov 
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Table 1a & Figure1a – Summary statistics of leverage characteristics 
This table and figure presents the mean, median and standard deviation (SD) of the two alternative measures of 
leverage for domestic firms (DCs) over the sample period, from 1991 to 2009. Book-leverage (BL) is defined as 
a ratio of the sum of long-term book debt and short-term book debt to total book assets, and market-leverage 
(ML)  is defined as a ratio of the sum of long-term book debt and short-term book debt to long-term book debt 
,short-term book debt and market-value of outstanding  stocks (stock price* number of shares outstanding).  
 Book-Value Leverage (DC) Market-Value Leverage (DC) 
Year Mean Median SD Obs Mean Median SD Obs 
1991 .2573054 .2364253 .1592416 229 .2946358 .2401675 .2312476 229 
1992 .2440919 .2194274 .1602759 259 .2506223 .2064966 .2112091 259 
1993 .2291089 .1960163 .1601661 329 .2127721 .1567708 .1874188 329 
1994 .2195665 .190689 .1569629 368 .2231144 .1771334 .1895165 368 
1995 .2225025 .1974877 .159857 411 .2190692 .1712698 .195669 411 
1996 .2216219 .1986515 .1620449 454 .2118043 .1523036 .1959352 454 
1997 .216512 .1837546 .1664115 468 .1933454 .1395856 .1844781 468 
1998 .2402962 .2066211 .1708467 478 .2423272 .1848774 .206688 478 
1999 .248685 .231535 .1709423 466 .2792467 .2404223 .224483 466 
2000 .2474799 .2387439 .162923 464 .2989434 .2490434 .235458 464 
2001 .2286032 .2009919 .1696206 486 .2456786 .1839086 .2175673 486 
2002 .2304429 .1991348 .1720578 480 .2663098 .2032247 .2223384 480 
2003 .2284554 .1987694 .1746998 518 .2109417 .1593374 .1898772 518 
2004 .2133564 .1811624 .1631927 488 .192724 .1427357 .1786921 488 
2005 .2116081 .1740103 .1629921 462 .1819633 .1313494 .1713262 462 
2006 .2252894 .1999858 .164061 431 .1957127 .140097 .1756616 431 
2007 .2354221 .2075415 .1723045 418 .2260966 .1708385 .1992161 418 
2008 .2360815 .2128747 .1654686 330 .3082022 .2569487 .2369474 330 
2009 .2444383 .2184028 .1745361 280 .2851391 .2488093 .2243824 280 
Overall .2303469 .2027193 .1664895 7819 .2354346 .1779913 .2069445 7819 
Table1a 
 
 
 
 
 
       
 
Figure1a – Corresponds to table 1a 
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Table 1b & Figure1b – Summary statistics of leverage characteristics 
This table and figure presents the mean, median and standard deviation (SD) of the two alternative measures of 
leverage for multinational firms (MNCs) over the sample period, from 1991 to 2009. Book-leverage (BL) is 
defined as a ratio of the sum of long-term book debt and short-term book debt to total book assets, and market-
leverage (ML)  is defined as a ratio of the sum of long-term book debt and short-term book debt to long-term 
book debt ,short-term book debt and market-value of outstanding  stocks (stock price* number of shares 
outstanding).  
 Book-Value Leverage (MNC) Market-Value Leverage (MNC) 
Year Mean Median SD Obs Mean Median SD Obs 
1991 .1801509 .1767899 .1151481 244 .1951925 .1485567 .1678544 244 
1992 .1879949 .1783992 .1305723 269 .1929037 .1467609 .1722497 269 
1993 .1885243 .1629602 .1310056 300 .1767961 .1331702 .1584501 300 
1994 .1859027 .1623995 .1283568 319 .1839281 .1329835 .1633079 319 
1995 .1895007 .1819432 .1225318 341 .1716255 .1433948 .143921 341 
1996 .1862333 .1774262 .1249645 387 .1615422 .1204419 .1416611 387 
1997 .1992827 .1877351 .133194 392 .1541838 .1121582 .1844781 392 
1998 .225137 .2185662 .1346678 403 .2037298 .1647872 .1608031 403 
1999 .2358222 .2302343 .1414173 416 .2302739 .1832103 .1858203 416 
2000 .2312512 .2150244 .1440167 434 .2396877 .1818671 .2010497 434 
2001 .2447704 .2438277 .1436987 397 .2289791 .187192 .1828114 397 
2002 .2218505 .2081276 .1310195 391 .2201541 .1873891 .169636 391 
2003 .2218629 .2155207 .1339215 429 .1995333 .167845 .1596179 429 
2004 .2091192 .1952391 .1253911 492 .1766555 .145853 .1388043 492 
2005 .2059209 .1936324 .1320845 528 .1706476 .1380162 .1408733 528 
2006 .2057114 .1941833 .1268861 517 .1644819 .1378856 .1284489 517 
2007 .2095236 .2032354 .1287728 512 .1733997 .1527521 .1343587 512 
2008 .2232648 .2167988 .1311686 425 .2447204 .2192961 .1721649 425 
2009 .2149187 .2096207 .1290824 310 .1975696 .163505 .1475105 310 
Overall .2105308 .1996581 .1325339 7506 .193619 .1561969 .1604744 7506 
Table1b 
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Figure 1b - Corresponds to table 1b 
Table1 c – e: Correlation matrix among market leverage and traditional capital structure determinants and 
macroeconomic factors. LM is the market leverage measure; NDTS is the non-debt tax shield; Q is the tobins’ 
q; ROA is the profitability measure; Size is the log assets, TANG is the collaterability/tangibility; CP Spread is 
the commercial spread, GACE is the growth in aggregate capital expenditure of non-financial US based firms, 
CPI is the consumer price index and RDD is the research and development dummy. 
Table 1 c: Correlation (Pooled): Correlation among market leverage, macro-factors and firm specific variables. 
 LM NDTS Q ROA SIZE TANG CP 
SPREAD 
GACE CPI RDD 
LM 1.000          
NDTS 0.048 1.000         
Q -0.512 0.002 1.000        
ROA 0.000 -0.117 -0.119 1.000       
SIZE 0.042 -0.151 -0.035 0.332 1.000      
TANG 0.224 0.495 -0.113 0.080 0.041 1.000     
CP Spread 0.053 0.001 -0.031 0.053 0.001 0.014 1.000    
GACE -0.085 -0.022 0.084 0.031 -0.060 0.002 0.209 1.000   
CPI 0.005 -0.104 -0.036 -0.024 0.185 -0.109 -0.057 -0.322 1.000  
RDD -0.221 -0.052 0.186 -0.134 0.052 -0.272 0.013 0.009 -0.014 1.000 
 
Table 1 d: Correlation (DC): Correlation among market leverage, macro-factors and firm specific variables 
 LM NDTS Q ROA SIZE TANG CP 
SPREAD 
GACE CPI RDD 
LM 1.000          
NDTS 0.056 1.000         
Q -0.495 -0.004 1.000        
ROA 0.120 -0.097 -0.271 1.000       
SIZE 0.172 -0.103 -0.118 0.285 1.000      
TANG 0.239 0.444 -0.127 0.181 0.226 1.000     
CP Spread 0.068 0.000 -0.038 0.042 -0.018 0.018 1.000    
GACE -0.096 -0.045 0.090 0.037 -0.071 -0.014 0.236 1.000   
CPI 0.004 -0.029 -0.047 -0.053 0.203 -0.048 -0.097 -0.332 1.000  
RDD -0.251 -0.031 0.278 -0.389 -0.322 -0.302 -0.007 0.011 -0.035 1.000 
 
Table 1 e: Correlation (MNC): Correlation among market leverage, macro-factors and firm specific variables 
 LM NDTS Q ROA SIZE TANG CP 
SPREAD 
GACE CPI RDD 
LM 1.000          
NDTS -0.010 1.000         
Q -0.554 0.016 1.000        
ROA -0.363 -0.038 0.559 1.000       
SIZE 0.057 -0.081 0.080 0.093 1.000      
TANG 0.150 0.569 -0.090 -0.025 0.093 1.000     
CP Spread 0.040 0.009 -0.023 0.106 -0.007 0.018 1.000    
GACE -0.075 0.009 0.080 0.045 -0.067 0.024 0.182 1.000   
CPI 0.020 -0.211 -0.024 -0.017 0.178 -0.179 -0.021 -0.312 1.000  
RDD -0.131 0.025 0.099 0.038 -0.013 -0.133 0.019 0.010 -0.030 1.000 
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Figure 2 a – c: Shows the time series behaviour of consumer price index, commercial paper spread and 
aggregate capital expenditure scaled by real GDP
1
. 
Figure 1a 
 
Figure 1b 
 
Figure 1c 
                                                          
1
  The effect of 2008-2009 financial crises is highly visible for commercial paper spread and 
aggregate capital expenditure. Inflation appears to be largely unaffected during the same period - 
likely due to the price stabilization intervention policy by the Federal Reserve. 
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Figure 3a-3d: figure (a) shows the growth in US GDP; figure (b) shows the relationship between log book debt 
and log market value of equity for DCs; figure (c) shows the relationship between log book debt and log market 
value of equity for MNCs; and figure (d) shows the market to book equity for MNCs and DCs over the sample 
period 1991-2009. 
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Figure 4 a-b. These figures summarized the market-to book equity for MNCs and DCS, conditional on 
macroeconomic conditions defined by real growth in US GDP, default spread (DS) , and Unemployment rate 
(UNE) for the sample period 1991-2009. Sorting by GDP, the highest quartile represents good macroeconomic 
state and the lowest quartile represents bad macroeconomic state. For default spread (DS), the lowest quartile 
represents good macroeconomic state and the highest quartile represents bad macroeconomic state. For 
unemployment (UNE), the normal or natural unemployment rate (i.e < 6%) is used as a cut-off for good 
macroeconomic state, and an unemployment rate at 6% and above represents bad macroeconomic state 
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Table 2. This table shows the differences in means of market based leverage across macroeconomic states and 
across MNCs and DCs over the sample period 1991 to 2009 in Panel A. Panel B shows the debt-equity ratio for 
MNCs and DCs across macroeconomic states over the same sample period. Macroeconomic states are 
determined by using four macroeconomic indicators as follows: (A) RGGDP is the annual average real growth 
rate of GDP; (B) Default Spread is the MOODY’s rated average yield difference between corporate AAA and 
BAA bonds; (C) Price-output ratio is the market portfolio index (S & P 500 stock price index at the beginning 
of the year scaled by GDP from previous year); (D) Unemployment is annual unemployment rate. In order to 
maintain consistency with timing of availability of macroeconomic data, the sample data is divided into 
quartiles based on each macroeconomic indicator.  Sorting by RGGDP, the highest quartile represents good 
macroeconomic state and the lowest quartile represents bad macroeconomic state. For default spread and price-
output ratio, the lowest quartile represent good macroeconomic state and the highest quartile represents bad 
macroeconomic state. For unemployment, the natural unemployment rate (i.e < 6%) is used as a cut-off for 
good macroeconomic state, and an unemployment rate at 6% and above represents bad macroeconomic state. 
The reported p-values compare the macroeconomic states within and across MNCs and DCs.  
Panel A. Summary statistics of quartile market leverage across macroeconomic states by MNCs and DCs. 
 RGGDP Default Spread Price-Output Unemployment 
MNC Mean Mean Mean Mean 
Good .201 .175 .181 .200 
Bad .210 .214 .226 .189 
     
Good vs. Bad -.009 -.039 -.045 .011 
P - Value .040** .000* .000* .025* 
DC     
Good .238 .218 .236 .250 
Bad .254 .265 .266 .249 
     
Good vs. Bad -.016 -.047 -.030 .001 
P - Value .005* .000* .000* .444* 
Good vs. Good .025* .000* .000* .000* 
Bad vs. Bad .000* .000* .000* .000* 
 
Panel B. Summary statistics of quartile debt-equity across macroeconomic states by MNCs and DCs. 
 RGGDP Default Spread Price-Output Unemployment 
MNC Mean Mean Mean Mean 
Good .735 .679 .655 .749 
Bad .706 .701 .779 .677 
     
Good vs. Bad .029 -.022 -.124 .072 
P - Value .246 .324 .001* .110 
DC     
Good 1.20 .841 .830 .983 
Bad .954 1.00 .925 .837 
     
Good vs. Bad .248 -.161 -.095 .146 
P - Value .251 .139 .098*** .088 
Good vs. Good .095*** .004* .000* .013** 
Bad vs. Bad .009* .019** .021** .005* 
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Table 3. Summary statistics of quartile Net LTD , change in share of common stocks outstanding, change in 
aggregate market value of equity, net capital investment, and excess liquidity, across macroeconomic states by 
MNCs & DCs. RGGDP (GDP) is the annual average real growth rate of GDP; Default Spread (DS) is the 
MOODY’s rated average yield difference between corporate AAA and BAA bonds; Price-output ratio (PO) is 
the market portfolio index (S & P 500 stock price index at the beginning of the year scaled by GDP from 
previous year); and Unemployment (UNE) is annual unemployment rate. The reported p-values compare the 
variables across macroeconomic states within MNCs and DCs. 
 
  GDP DS PO UNE 
MNC Quartile Mean Mean Mean Mean 
Net LTD 1 .199 .184 .176 .197 
 4 .201 .198 .216 .176 
              p-value 
Δ Shrs_Out 
 
1 
.322 
.077 
.000* 
.166 
.000* 
.138 
.000* 
.110 
 4 .109 .056 .111 .112 
              p-value 
Δ Value 
 
1 
.002* 
.118 
.000* 
.192 
.023** 
.234 
.466 
.143 
 4 .162 .062 .088 .218 
              p-value 
Δ FA 
 
1 
.004* 
.042 
.000* 
.052 
.000* 
.046 
.000* 
.047 
 4 .047 .038 .051 .042 
              p-value 
Liquidity 
 
1 
.029** 
61 
.000* 
43 
.002* 
49 
.022** 
57 
 4 57 68 45 52 
              p-value 
 
DC 
 .139 .000* .065*** .050** 
Net LTD 1 .203 .195 .201 .201 
 4 .203 .207 .209 .206 
              p-value 
Δ Shrs_Out 
 
1 
.460 
.070 
.007* 
.113 
.044** 
.108 
.125 
.093 
 4 .100 .066 .086 .111 
              p-value 
Δ Value 
 
1 
.000* 
.254 
.000* 
.200 
.021** 
.269 
.039** 
.221 
 4 .250 .213 .182 .263 
              p-value 
Δ FA 
 
1 
.444 
.073 
.329 
.104 
.000* 
.090 
.059*** 
.088 
 4 .086 .066 .090 .081 
              p-value 
Liquidity 
 
1 
.003* 
12 
.000* 
9 
.472 
10 
.175 
12 
 
              p-value 
 
4 12 
.484 
13 
.000* 
11 
.015** 
10 
.007* 
Note: GDP = real growth in GDP, DS = default spread, PO = price-output ratio, UNE = unemployment, Net 
LTD = net long-term debt issuance scaled by total assets, Δ Shrs_Out = change in common shares outstanding, 
Δ Value = change in existing equity investors portfolio, Δ FA = incremental investment in fixed assets scaled by 
total assets (log total assets), Liquidity = excess liquidity after current obligations scaled by total assets. 
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Table 4.  Using heteroskedastic consistent robust OLS regression, Panel A and B shows the relationship between leverage 
and capital structure determinants. Book leverage (BL) is defined as a ratio of  total book debt to total book assets, and 
market leverage (ML) is defined as a ratio of total book debt to sum of total book debt and market-value of outstanding 
stocks (stock price* number of shares outstanding). SCP is the commercial paper spread, computed from the annualized 
rate of 3-month commercial paper less the 3-month Treasury bill. CPI is the annualized consumer price index. GACE is 
the growth in aggregate capital expenditure of non-financial firms of the US economy. NDTS is the sum of depreciation 
and amortization to total assets. Q equals the ratio of market to book value. TANG equals the ratio of net property, plant 
and equipment to total assets. ROA is the earnings before interest to total assets. SIZE is the natural log of assets. RDD is 
a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if firms report R&D expenses and takes the value of 0, if otherwise, and MNC 
is the dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the firms belong to multinational category and takes the value of 0, if 
otherwise.  Panel A is market value-based leverage regression and Panel B is book value-based leverage. */**/*** denotes 
statistical significance level at1%/5%/10% respectively. Robust heteroskedastic standard errors are in brackets. 
(A)             itttitit rsMacrofactoMNCMNCrsMacrofactoXML   _
 (1)
 
 Pooled DC MNC DC vs. MNC DC vs. MNC 
NDTS -.3563 (.0656)* -.1773 (.0803)** -.6135 (.1017)* -.3120 (.0653)* -.3041 (.0652)* 
Q -.0906 (.0016)* -.0848 (.0022)* -.0935 (.0025)* -.0914 (.0016)* -.0913 (.0016)* 
ROA -.1853 (.0121)* -.1396 (.0135)* -.4053 (.0465)* -.1600 (.0124)* -.1614 (.0124)* 
SIZE .0051 (.0007)* .0099 (.0012)* .0089 (.0010)* .0095 (.0008)* .0096 (.0008)* 
TANG .1514 (.0081)* .1423 (.0108)* .1219 (.0119)* .1362 (.0082)* .1366 (.0082)* 
SCP .0523 (.0069)* .0720 (.0112)* .0394 (.0081)* .0527 (.0068)* .0708 (.0112)* 
GACE -.1164 (.0145)* -.1689 (.0234)* -.0697 (.0168)* -.1151 (.0144)* -.1640 (.0234)* 
CPI -.0002(.0001)* -.0005 (.0001)* -.0001 (.0001) -.0003 (.0001)* -.0005 (.0001)* 
RDD -.0404 (.0026)* -.0396 (.0047)* -.0202 (.0033)* -.0299 (.0027)* -.0298 (.0027)* 
MNC    -.0352 (.0034)* -.1150 (.0223)* 
MNC_GACE     .0953 (.0287)* 
MNC_SCP     -.0366 (.0137)* 
MNC_CPI     .0005 (.0001)* 
CONS .3435 (.0124)* .3586 (.0192)* .3122 (.0166)* .3384 (.0124)* .3780 (.0185)* 
    (B)   itttitit rsMacrofactoMNCMNCrsMacrofactoXBL   _          
 Pooled DC MNC DC vs. MNC DC vs. MNC 
NDTS -.3124 (.0589)* -.1506 (.0714)** -.4977 (.0972)* -.2814 (.0589)* -.2667 (.0588)* 
Q -.0249 (.0012)* -.0205 (.0015)* -.0327 (.0022)* -.0254 (.0012)* -.0256 (.0012)* 
ROA -.0971 (.0118)* -.0702 (.0130)* -.1137 (.0458)** -.0793 (.0119)* -.0818 (.0119)* 
SIZE .0090 (.0006)* .0141 (.0011)* .0104 (.0009)* .0121 (.0007)* .0123 (.0007)* 
TANG .1709 (.0074)* .1798 (.0099)* .1215 (.0113)* .1603 (.0076)* .1608 (.0076)* 
SCP .0133 (.0061)** .0218 (.0096)** .0045 (.0077) .0136 (.0061)** .0210 (.0096)** 
GACE -.0250 (.0131)*** -.0380 (.0204)*** -.0135 (.0163) -.0241 (.0130)*** -.0361 (.0204)*** 
CPI .0000(.0001) -.0003 (.0001)* .0002 (.0001)* -5.26e-06 (.0001) -.0003 (.0001)* 
RDD -.0299 (.0024)* -.0208 (.0042)* -.0214 (.0031)* -.0226 (.0025)* -.0225 (.0025)* 
MNC    -.0246 (.0031)* -.1313 (.0198)* 
MNC_GACE     .0230 (.0260) 
MNC_SCP     -.0170 (.0123) 
MNC_CPI     .0006 (.0001)* 
CONS .1747 (.0110)* .1949 (.0166)* .1531 (.0153)* .1711 (.0110)* .2245 (.0160)* 
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Table 5. Adjustment Speed – Macroeconomic condition defined by real GDP growth (RGGDP). This table reports the 
estimation results of equation (5) using fixed effect instrumental variable econometric technique (FEIV):  SCP is the 
commercial paper spread, computed from the annualized rate of 3-month commercial paper less the 3-month Treasury 
bill. CPI is the annualized consumer price index. GACE is the growth in aggregate capital expenditure of non-financial 
firms of the US economy. NDTS is the sum of depreciation and amortization to total assets. Q equals the ratio of market 
to book value. TANG equals the ratio of net property, plant and equipment to total assets. ROA is the earnings before 
interest to total assets. SIZE is the natural log of assets. RDD is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if firms report 
R&D expenses and 0, if otherwise. MNC is the dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the firms belong to MNC 
group and 0, if otherwise. OL takes the value of 1 if the firm is over-levered, defined as (Debt/PPE) being greater than 
one, and zero if otherwise. GDUMMY takes the value of 1 if the firm year observation belongs to a good macroeconomic 
state, and 0 if otherwise. The interaction terms investigate adjustment speed differential of macroeconomic states between 
MNCs and DCs.  * */**/*** denotes statistical significance level at1%/5%/10% respectively. 
  ititititit rsMacrofactoMLML    11        (5) 
 Market leverage Market Leverage – Pre-Financial Crisis: 08 – 09. 
 
 
DC MNC MNC vs. 
DC (1) 
MNC vs. 
DC (2) 
DC MNC MNC vs. 
DC (1) 
MNC vs. 
DC (2) 
MLit-1 
 
.4509 
(.0318)* 
.3581 
(.0359)* 
.4199 
(.0235)* 
.4191 
(.0379)* 
.3330 
(.0385)* 
.2162 
(.0435)* 
.2960 
(.0287)* 
.2160 
(.0479)* 
Size 
 
.0439 
(.0062)* 
.0358 
(.0056)* 
.0426 
(.0042)* 
.0426 
(.0042)* 
.0590 
(.0070)* 
.0649 
(.0071)* 
.0637 
(.0050)* 
.0628 
(.0051)* 
Tang 
 
.3015 
(.0320)* 
.1609 
(.0398)* 
.2611 
(.0242)* 
.2611 
(.0242)* 
.2890 
(.0356)* 
.1824 
(.0478)* 
.2565 
(.0275)* 
.2543 
(.0275)* 
Q 
 
-.0482 
(.0033)* 
-.0557 
(.0038)* 
-.0514 
(.0025)* 
-.0516 
(.0024)* 
-.0500 
(.0035)* 
-.0526 
(.0042)* 
-.0514 
(.0027)* 
-.0509 
(.0026)* 
ROA 
 
-.1852 
(.0292)* 
-.3640 
(.0678)* 
-.1815 
(.0244)* 
-.1830 
(.0244)* 
-.2212 
(.0316)* 
-.4575 
(.0803)* 
-.2220 
(.0265)* 
-.2287 
(.0265)* 
RDD 
 
.0365** 
(.0168) 
.0077 
(.0110) 
.0226 
(.0100)** 
.0224 
(.0100)** 
.0522* 
(.0200) 
.0082 
(.0137) 
.0311 
(.0122)** 
.0328 
(.0123)* 
NDTS 
 
-.2346 
(.1609) 
.2828 
(.2190) 
-.1625 
(.1250) 
-.1690 
(.1245) 
-.0258 
(.1709) 
.3244 
(.2501) 
-.0219 
(.1358) 
-.0428 
(.1354) 
CP Spread 
 
.1256 
(.0086)* 
.0819 
(.0071)* 
.1069 
(.0056)* 
.1072 
(0056)* 
.0401 
(.0196)** 
.0309 
(.0162)*** 
.0394 
(.0131)* 
.0389 
(.0131)* 
GACE 
 
-.0632 
(.0304)** 
-.0437 
(.0234)** 
-.0649 
(.0194)* 
-.0647 
(.0195)* 
-.1917 
(.0428)* 
-.2833 
(.0344)* 
-.2380 
(.0281)* 
-.2444 
(.0285)* 
CPI 
 
-.0011 
(.0001)* 
-.0006 
(.0001)* 
-.0009 
(.0001)* 
-.0009 
(.0001)* 
-.0030 
(.0003)* 
-.0017 
(.0002)* 
-.0024 
(.0002)* 
-.0025 
(.0002)* 
OL 
 
.1034 
(.0074)* 
.0793 
(.0055)* 
.0935 
(.0046)* 
.0940 
(.0045)* 
.1023 
(.0081)* 
.0839 
(.0062)* 
.0973 
(.0052)* 
.0969 
(.0052)* 
GDUMMY 
 
.0056 
(.0042) 
.0025 
(.0042) 
.0078 
(.0043)*** 
.0024 
(.0074) 
.0352 
(.0080)* 
.0344 
(.0067)* 
.0395 
(.0060)* 
.0097 
(.0095) 
MNC 
 
  .0275 
.(0068)* 
.0271 
(.0124)** 
  .0319 
(.0074)* 
-.0155 
(.0155) 
MNC*GDUMMY 
 
  -.0049 
(.0047) 
.0108 
(.0090) 
  -.0088 
(.0049)*** 
.0335 
(.0103)* 
MNC*MLit-1 
 
   .0097 
(.0354) 
   .1587 
(.0445)* 
GDUMMY*MLit-1 
 
   .0221 
(.0246) 
   .1173 
(.0280)* 
MNC*GDUMMY*MLit-1 
 
 
 
 
  -.0740 
(.0316)** 
   -.1671 
(.0350)* 
Obs. 
Fixed-effect 
 
3,144 
YES 
 
2,700 
YES 
 
5,844 
YES 
 
5,844 
YES 
 
2,669 
YES 
 
2,129 
YES 
 
4,798 
YES 
 
4,798 
YES 
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Table 6. Adjustment Speed – Macroeconomic condition defined by Default Spread.  This table reports the estimation 
results of equation (5) using fixed effect instrumental variable econometric technique (FEIV):  SCP is the commercial 
paper spread, computed from the annualized rate of 3-month commercial paper less the 3-month Treasury bill. CPI is the 
annualized consumer price index. GACE is the growth in aggregate capital expenditure of non-financial firms of the US 
economy. NDTS is the sum of depreciation and amortization to total assets. Q equals the ratio of market to book value. 
TANG equals the ratio of net property, plant and equipment to total assets. ROA is the earnings before interest to total 
assets. SIZE is the natural log of assets. RDD is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if firms report R&D expenses 
and 0, if otherwise, and MNC is the dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm is a multinational and 0, if 
otherwise. OL takes the value of 1 if the firm is over-levered, and zero if otherwise. GDUMMY takes the value of 1 if the 
firm year observation belongs to a good macroeconomic state, and 0 if otherwise.  * */**/*** denotes statistical 
significance level at1%/5%/10% respectively.  
.
 
  ititititit rsMacrofactoMLML    11     (5) 
 Market leverage Market Leverage – Pre-Financial Crisis: 08 – 09. 
 
 
DC MNC MNC vs. 
DC (1) 
MNC vs. 
DC (2) 
DC MNC MNC vs. 
DC (1) 
MNC vs. 
DC (2) 
MLit-1 
 
.4815 
(.0321)* 
.4284 
(.0340)* 
.4593 
(.0234)* 
.4515 
(.0610)* 
.4191 
(.0377)* 
.3513 
(.0400)* 
.3891 
(.0277)* 
.1792 
(.0900)** 
Size 
 
.0383 
(.0065)* 
.0197 
(.0050)* 
.0326 
(.0042)* 
.0473 
(.0055)* 
.0624 
(.0080)* 
.0508 
(.0071)* 
.0603 
(.0055)* 
.0690 
(.0074)* 
Tang 
 
.3126 
(.0335)* 
.1518 
(.0363)* 
.2667 
(.0243)* 
.2763 
(.0292)* 
.3259 
(.0382)* 
.1244 
(.0427)* 
.2654 
(.0281)* 
.2793 
(.0340)* 
Q 
 
-.0461 
(.0038)* 
-.0443 
(.0037)* 
-.0460 
(.0027)* 
-.0457 
(.0032)* 
-.0445 
(.0041)* 
-.0367 
(.0041)* 
-.0420 
(.0029)* 
-.0452 
(.0034)* 
ROA 
 
-.1660 
(.0345)* 
-.3002 
(.0684)* 
-.1676 
(.0279)* 
-.1902 
(.0345)* 
-.2088 
(.0381)* 
-.3075 
(.0794)* 
-.2164 
(.0309)* 
-.1999 
(.0376)* 
RDD 
 
.0055 
(.0169) 
.0096 
(.0107) 
.0108 
(.0101) 
.0321 
(.0134)** 
-.0076 
(.0197) 
.0052 
(.0137) 
.0002 
(.0125) 
.0110 
(.0177) 
NDTS 
 
-.4186 
(.1870)** 
.1576 
(.2156) 
-.2899 
(.1385)** 
-.3473 
(.1638)** 
-.1871 
(.2117) 
.2629 
(.2518) 
-.0912 
(.1593) 
-.1710 
(.1890) 
CP Spread 
 
.1945 
(.0198)* 
.1475 
(.0139)* 
.1719 
(.0124)* 
.1870 
(0281)* 
.1847 
(.0540)* 
.2369 
(.0369)* 
.2034 
(.0340)* 
.1711 
(.0389)* 
GACE 
 
-.1879 
(.0448)* 
-.1173 
(.0327)* 
-.1608 
(.0286)* 
-.0772 
(.0325)** 
-.1405 
(.0504)* 
-.1181 
(.0353)* 
-.1385 
(.0321)* 
-.0590 
(.0542) 
CPI 
 
-.0026 
(.0004)* 
-.0016 
(.0002)* 
-.0022 
(.0002)* 
-.0013 
(.0003)* 
-.0041 
(.0006)* 
-.0023 
(.0004)* 
-.0032 
(.0003)* 
-.0021 
(.0005)* 
OL 
 
.1204 
(.0080)* 
.0773 
(.0054)* 
.1002 
(.0049)* 
.1014 
(.0058)* 
.1199 
(.0085)* 
.0759 
(.0061)* 
.1018 
(.0054)* 
.1058 
(.0065)* 
GDUMMY 
 
-.0772 
(.0139)* 
-.0697 
(.0098)* 
-.0675 
(.0093)* 
-.0254 
(.0205) 
-.0997 
(.0317)* 
-.1097 
(.0223)* 
-.0883 
(.0204)* 
-.0684 
(.0336)** 
MNC 
 
  .0191 
.(0082)** 
.0623 
(.0214)* 
  .0334 
(.0096)* 
.0234 
(.0282) 
MNC*GDUMMY 
 
  -.0083 
(.0062) 
-.0278 
(.0177) 
  -.0187 
(.0069)* 
.0113 
(.0235) 
MNC*MLit-1 
 
   -.0998 
(.0634) 
   .1237 
(.0947) 
GDUMMY*MLit-1 
 
   -.0464 
(.0535) 
   .1341 
(.0770)*** 
MNC*GDUMMY*MLit-1  
 
 
  .0369 
(.0631) 
   -.1675 
(.0880)*** 
Obs. 
Fixed-effect 
2,612 
YES 
 
2,285 
YES 
 
4,897 
YES 
 
3,293 
YES 
 
2,137 
YES 
 
1,714 
YES 
 
3,851 
YES 
 
2,842 
YES 
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Table 7. Adjustment Speed – Macroeconomic condition defined by Unemployment rate.  This table reports the estimation 
results of equation (5) using fixed effect instrumental variable econometric technique (FEIV):  SCP is the commercial 
paper spread, computed from the annualized rate of 3-month commercial paper less the 3-month Treasury bill. CPI is the 
annualized consumer price index. GACE is the growth in aggregate capital expenditure of non-financial firms of the US 
economy. NDTS is the sum of depreciation and amortization to total assets. Q equals the ratio of market to book value. 
TANG equals the ratio of net property, plant and equipment to total assets. ROA is the earnings before interest to total 
assets. SIZE is the natural log of assets. RDD is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if firms report R&D expenses 
and 0, if otherwise, and MNC is the dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm is a multinational and 0, if 
otherwise. OL takes the value of 1 if the firm is over-levered, and zero if otherwise. GDUMMY takes the value of 1 if the 
firm year observation belongs to a good macroeconomic state, and 0 if otherwise.  * */**/*** denotes statistical 
significance level at1%/5%/10% respectively.  
  ititititit rsMacrofactoMLML    11      (5) 
 Market leverage 
 
 
DC MNC MNC vs. DC (1) MNC vs. DC (2) 
MLit-1 
 
.4350 
(.0211)* 
.3757 
(.0229)* 
.4114 
(.0153)* 
.2529 
(.0638)* 
Size 
 
.0415 
(.0041)* 
.0341 
(.0034)* 
.0405 
(.0027)* 
.0410 
(.0027)* 
Tang 
 
.2879 
(.0218)* 
.1543 
(.0252)* 
.2488 
(.0161)* 
.2535 
(.0163)* 
Q 
 
-.0498 
(.0023)* 
-.0508 
(.0024)* 
-.0503 
(.0016)* 
-.0499 
(.0016)* 
ROA 
 
-.2022 
(.0208)* 
-.2981 
(.0449)* 
-.1963 
(.0170)* 
-.2012 
(.0171)* 
RDD 
 
.0049 
(.0112) 
.0115 
(.0072) 
.0105 
(.0066) 
.0102 
(.0067) 
NDTS 
 
-.2244** 
(.1133) 
.2193 
(.1376) 
-.1257 
(.0850) 
-.1357 
(.0849) 
CP Spread 
 
.1123 
(.0075)* 
.0748 
(.0057)* 
.0964 
(.0047)* 
.0968 
(.0047)* 
GACE 
 
-.0651 
(.0177)* 
-.0980 
(.0125)* 
-.0849 
(.0110)* 
-.0877 
(.0112)* 
CPI 
 
-.0010 
(.0001)* 
-.0008 
(.0001)* 
-.0009 
(.0001)* 
-.0009 
(.0001)* 
OL 
 
.1131 
(.0052)* 
.0785 
(.0036)* 
.0967 
(.0031)* 
.0957 
(.0031)* 
GDUMMY 
 
-.0031 
(.0044)* 
.0165 
(.0032)* 
-.0023 
(.0040) 
-.0520 
(.0155)* 
MNC 
 
  .0102 
.(0064) 
-.0355 
(.0186)*** 
MNC*GDUMMY 
 
  .0142 
(.0051)* 
.0616 
(.0167)* 
MNC*MLit-1 
 
   .1614 
(.0637)** 
GDUMMY*MLit-1 
 
   .1838 
(.0552)* 
MNC*GDUMMY*MLit-1 
 
 
   -.1705 
(.0595)* 
Obs. 
Fixed-effect 
 
5,181 
YES 
 
4,639 
YES 
 
9,820 
YES 
 
9,820 
YES 
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Table 8. Adjustment Speed – Macroeconomic condition defined by price-output ratio.  This table reports the estimation 
results of equation (5) using fixed effect instrumental variable econometric technique (FEIV):  SCP is the commercial 
paper spread, computed from the annualized rate of 3-month commercial paper less the 3-month Treasury bill. CPI is the 
annualized consumer price index. GACE is the growth in aggregate capital expenditure of non-financial firms of the US 
economy. NDTS is the sum of depreciation and amortization to total assets. Q equals the ratio of market to book value. 
TANG equals the ratio of net property, plant and equipment to total assets. ROA is the earnings before interest to total 
assets. SIZE is the natural log of assets. RDD is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if firms report R&D expenses 
and 0, if otherwise, and MNC is the dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the firms belong to multinational category 
and 0, if otherwise. OL takes the value of 1 if the firm is over-levered, defined as (Debt/PPE) being greater than one, and 
zero if otherwise. GDUMMY takes the value of 1 if the firm year observation belongs to a good macroeconomic state, 
and 0 if otherwise. The interaction term investigates the pecking order theory of over-leverage on adjustment speed across 
macroeconomic states within MNCs and DCs.  * */**/*** denotes statistical significance level at1%/5%/10% 
respectively.   ititititit rsMacrofactoMLML    11       (5) 
 Market leverage 
 
 
DC -  Pooled 
(1) 
DC -  Good 
(2) 
DC - Good/OL 
(3) 
MNC -  Pooled 
(1) 
MNC -  Good 
(2) 
MNC - Good/OL 
(3) 
MLit-1 
 
.4137 
(.0320)* 
.4064 
(.0571)* 
.4039 
(.0330)* 
.4599 
(.0348)* 
.3367 
(0500)* 
.4312 
(.0344)* 
Size 
 
.0555 
(.0067)* 
.0466 
(.0099)* 
.0536 
(.0068)* 
.0541 
(.0058)* 
.0277 
(.0066)* 
.0468 
(.0057)* 
Tang 
 
.2881 
(.0333)* 
.3138 
(.0521)* 
.2895 
(.0333)* 
.1700 
(.0405)* 
.1126 
(.0489)** 
.1721 
(.0396)* 
Q 
 
-.0548 
(.0038)* 
-.0567 
(.0064)* 
-.0551 
(.0038)* 
-.0428 
(.0034)* 
-.0370 
(.0055)* 
-.0464 
(.0034)* 
ROA 
 
-.2806 
(.0363)* 
-.1977 
(.0585)* 
-.2761 
(.0364)* 
-.2272 
(.0693)* 
-.2943 
(.0907)* 
-.2096 
(.0678)* 
RDD 
 
-.0160 
(.0175) 
.0039 
(.0248) 
-.0145 
(.0175) 
.0173 
(.0119) 
.0795 
(.0134)* 
.0213 
(.0117)*** 
NDTS 
 
-.0436 
(.1884) 
-.3418 
(.2829) 
-.0534 
(.1888) 
-.0978 
(.2085) 
-.3273 
(.2626) 
-.3416 
(.2054)*** 
CP Spread 
 
.0346 
(.0249) 
.0570 
(.0344)*** 
.0099 
(.0304) 
.1034 
(.0185)* 
-.0235 
(.0223) 
.0004 
(.0220) 
GACE 
 
.2602 
(.0518)* 
.1623 
(.0996) 
.2742 
(.0529)* 
-.0023 
(.0397) 
.1282 
(.0619)** 
.0641 
(.0396) 
CPI 
 
.0004 
(.0003) 
.0001 
(.0005) 
.0003 
(.0003) 
-.0006 
(.0002)* 
.0001 
(.0003) 
-.0006 
(.0002)* 
OL 
 
.1191 
(.0079) 
.1090 
(.0121)* 
.1285 
(.0092)* 
.0825 
(.0058)* 
.0687 
(.0076)* 
.0847 
(.0064)* 
GDUMMY 
 
  -.0035 
(.0065) 
  -.0337 
(.0049) 
GDUMMY*OL 
 
 
  -.0206 
(.0104)** 
  -.0064 
(.0069) 
Obs. 
Fixed-effect 
 
2,550 
YES 
 
1,212 
YES 
 
2,550 
YES 
 
2,219 
YES 
 
1,106 
YES 
 
2,219 
YES 
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